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Abstract 
The anatomy of disadvantage in Chile and in Santiago is a product of a long history and is broad 
and deep, with great income inequality and widely dispersed populations. These conditions are also 
not unusual in other middle-income countries and fast growing economies, many of which are also 
investing heavily in urban transport systems at this time.     
In the mid-2000s, in an effort to confront some of these problems, there was a large expansion of 
Santiago’s (Chile) subway network (Chapter 2). This thesis investigates the socioeconomic impacts 
of the much-improved urban transport accessibility. 
This expansion occurred within a short period of time (2004 through 2006). Because of a 
conjunction of efforts by the Chilean government to evaluate the effectiveness of the country's 
social policies, there is much data available characterising the socioeconomic conditions both before 
and after the expansion. For example, in this thesis I use a panel survey with circa 5000 interviewees 
with labour market outcomes, administrative panel data with standardised test scores of 100,000 
students in eighth grade, and police crime records with all reported crimes to the police in Santiago.  
To control for workers (Chapter 4), students (Chapter 5) and small crime areas (Chapter 6) 
individual and unobserved characteristics that do not change in time, I use a fixed-effects method. 
Depending on the outcome, the unit of observation was an individual or a spatial unit. In addition, 
to allow for differential pre-existing trends in the outcome variable, in the first-differenced form I 
control for relevant baseline characteristics. 
There are three socioeconomic conditions examined in detail in this thesis. These are impacts on 
the labour market (in Chapter 4), student achievement (in Chapter 5), and property crime (in Chapter 
6). 
In Chapter 4, my general findings are that greater proximity to the subway network increases labour 
market participation, employment hours, and labour earnings. However, the main policy implication 
of this part of the study is that accessibility of transportation is a crucial factor affecting the female 
employment rate. This is extremely important in cities with a low female employment rate and a low 
or non-existent coverage of rapid transit systems such as subways.  
In Chapter 5, I find that increased proximity to the subway network is associated with substantially 
lower test scores. Policy implications to consider are that schools that will soon be more accessible 
to rapid transit systems should consider the possibility of undesired increases in class sizes due to 
more demand because of the increased availability of nearby rapid transit stations. 
In Chapter 6, I find that greater proximity to subway stations increased both robbery and larceny in 
the public space within one year after the opening of the subway stations. One policy implication is 
that the police should redistribute its personnel whenever the flows of pedestrians and commuters 
may be affected because of changes in the transport network. 
In light of the well-established fact that citizens appreciate improvements in the subway network 
that increase their accessibility to employment and to services in general, this thesis provides 
evidence that a relevant advantage of better urban transport is an improvement in labour market 
conditions.  
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Glossary of Terms 
Accessibility: ‘[E]xtent to which individuals and households can access day to day services, such as 
employment, education, healthcare, food stores and town centres’ (Department for Transport 2011). 
Domestic burglary: Unauthorised entry into the dwelling of the victim with the intention of 
stealing something. In this thesis, I use ‘burglary’ as shorthand for ‘domestic burglary’. 
Domestic violence in the dwelling (‘domestic violence’): Wounding, assaults, or psychological 
violence that involves household members. 
Human capital: ‘Loosely speaking, human capital corresponds to any stock of knowledge or 
characteristics the worker has (either innate or acquired) that contributes to his or her 
“productivity”’ (Acemoglu and Autor 2009, 3). 
Larceny in the public space (‘larceny’): Stealing something of value without the use of force or 
intimidation. This category includes snatch theft, where the use of force is just enough to snatch the 
property away and stealth theft, where the victim is unaware of the larceny. 
Property crime: In this thesis, property crimes include burglary, robbery, and larcenies. 
Rapid transit: High-capacity public transport that operates on an exclusive right-of-way, typically 
rail tracks. 
Robbery in the public space (‘robbery’): taking or attempting to take something of value by force 
or intimidation. 
Santiago: Unless explicitly noted, in this thesis, ‘Santiago’ refers to the Santiago Metropolitan 
Region (one of the fifteen administrative regions in Chile, as well as the country’s capital).  
Socioeconomic: ‘[R]elating or concerned with the interaction of social and economic factors’ 
(Oxford University Press 2014). More specifically, in this thesis, these social and economic factors 
include labour market, academic achievement, and property crime. 
Subsidised housing: Housing that receives a subsidy from the Government to provide affordable 
housing to low-income households through tenure. 
Subway: Underground rapid transit system. 
Value added in education: ‘Value added is a measure of the progress students make between 
different stages of education.’ (Department for Education 2014) 
Violence in the public space: Wounding and assaults in the public space. 
Violent crime: In this thesis, violent crimes include domestic violence and violence in the public 
space.  
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Chapter 1 
1. Does Public Transport Play a Role  
in a City’s Socioeconomic Outcomes? 
Does transport play a significant role in the socioeconomic success of cities? In the words of 
Edward Glaeser, ‘cities are the absence of physical space between people and companies. They 
are proximity, density, closeness… Their success depends on the demand for physical 
connection’ (2011, 6). The goal of this thesis is to explore the impact of increased physical 
connections and accessibility through better urban transport on socioeconomic outcomes in 
Santiago de Chile’s Metropolitan Region (‘Santiago’).  
The key event in this impact analysis is the dramatic extension of Santiago’s transportation 
system in the mid-2000s. This extension happened in the context of great disadvantage and 
inequality in Santiago, and a remarkable lack of transportation adequately serving the poor. 
Because of this expansion, more than 50 per cent of households in Santiago increased their 
proximity to the subway network. A very high percentage of these households were in the vast 
sections of the city inhabited by the poor. 
Both in the mid-2000s and currently, Chile and its capital Santiago had extremely high rates of 
inequality in income, labour market, academic achievement and crime across socioeconomic 
groups. Citizens in the poorest income deciles groups had a low share of income, a high 
perception of increased crime, and lower employment rates and educational performance 
relative to citizens in the poorest income deciles groups in other Latin American and OECD 
countries. This socioeconomic inequality has its urban counterpart in a high spatial segregation 
in Chile’s capital. Compared to citizens in wealthier neighbourhoods, citizens in poorer 
neighbourhoods in Santiago had worse accessibility to employment, lower employment rates, 
worked fewer hours, earned less, and attended schools of lower grades.  
The socioeconomic outcomes I will look at are labour market, student achievement, and 
property crime outcomes. Labour market outcomes—especially labour earnings—are crucial 
for a households’ economic status. Academic achievement is a crucial determinant of 
individuals’ future labour earnings (Neal and Johnson 1996). Hence, I consider student 
achievement as another dimension of an individual’s socioeconomic outcomes. In addition, 
because property crime—although illegal and unproductive at the aggregate level—is a form of 
employment (Becker 1968), I also consider the level of property crime as a socioeconomic 
outcome. I examine the effect of urban transport accessibility on all these socioeconomic 
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outcomes because these are crucial dimensions in citizens’ well-being, and there is previous 
evidence—detailed in the next paragraphs—that the effect of better urban transport accessibility 
on these outcomes may be significant. 
This topic is timely and important because middle-income countries and fast growing 
economies like China, Brazil, and Russia are investing heavily in their urban transport systems—
especially in rapid transit systems (Gaubatz 1999, Ferreira and Alves 2012, Moscow City 
Government 2014). Despite this large investment, the literature with well identified parameters 
about the impacts of better urban transport accessibility on socioeconomic outcomes in 
developing countries is relatively thin. For example, Chen and Whalley (2012) concluded that 
the inauguration of the Taipei subway in 1993 implied a sharp decrease in carbon monoxide, 
but almost no change in level ozone pollution. Although environmental characteristics are not 
necessarily socioeconomic outcomes, both dimensions are related through individuals’ well-
being. An assessment of these impacts in a middle-income country could help inform policy 
makers in several middle-income countries and fast growing economies around the world about 
socioeconomic impacts when they are making investment decisions about urban transport 
infrastructure. 
Why might improved transport access at workers’ place of residence change labour market 
outcomes? Gibbons and Machin (2006) argue that transport may affect labour market outcomes 
through three channels: labour supply, labour demand, and the equilibrium between labour 
supply and labour demand. Regarding labour supply, better accessibility, by definition, lowers 
the cost of commuting to most employment destinations in a city. Hence, an improvement in 
the transport network may increase the number of people willing to work by decreasing their 
reservation wage. In a standard labour market model, a reduction in the reservation wage (the 
lowest wage at which a worker is willing to be employed) would shift the labour supply curve 
rightwards, increasing the employment rate and lowering wages. As I argue in Chapter 2, given 
the spatial mismatch between the residence of low-income workers in the metropolitan edge 
and jobs in the centre-business district, in Santiago’s case the labour supply channel may be a 
relevant one. Regarding labour demand, better transport accessibility may affect firms’ 
behaviour with respect to their location, their demand for labour, and wages (the latter, in cases 
of firms with some monopsonistic power) (Gibbons and Machin 2006). Regarding the 
equilibrium between labour supply and demand, better transport accessibility may improve the 
matching process between workers and firms. This can be the result of increased effort and 
distance to feasible commuting locations due to reduced commuting costs (Phillips 2012). 
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Hence, an expansion of a city’s transport infrastructure may decrease frictions in the labour 
market (Coulson, Laing, and Wang 2001). This may enhance the benefits of agglomeration 
economies on workers’ labour market outcomes (D’Costa et al. 2013). 
Student achievement may be affected by better urban transport accessibility because of changes 
in the value added provided by the students’ school or by direct effects on students not mediated 
by the school. Several potential mechanisms operate through schools. Increased urban transport 
accessibility may lead to an upturn in school enrolment. Because of the importance of class size 
to outcomes, if this leads to greater class sizes, better urban transport accessibility may actually 
decrease student performance. Krueger and Whitmore (2001) find that a decrease in class sizes 
from 22–25 students to 13–17 students in the Tennessee STAR project improved test scores 
taken twelve years after the beginning of the intervention by 13 per cent of a standard deviation. 
In a related research using teacher/student ratios as a key variable,  Banerjee et al. (2007) find 
in data from India, that having an additional teacher in a class improved test scores by 10 per 
cent of a standard deviation one year after the program was over.  
In addition to the mechanism of class size, better transport accessibility could affect the value 
added provided by schools through school competition. In an educational market with free 
school choice, schools that are more accessible face more competition from other schools. Card, 
Dooley, and Payne (2010) find a positive effect of competition on test scores (6–8 per cent of 
a standard deviation). On the other hand,  Gibbons et al. (2008) find modest effects for faith-
based voucher schools. In another study, Gibbons and Telhaj (2011) found that increased pupil 
mobility modestly reduces student test scores due to school disruption.  
There are a number of other potential mechanisms that are not mediated by schools. Better 
urban transport accessibility may affect student performance through changes in 
neighbourhood characteristics. However, Gibbons et al. (2013) find no effect of changes in 
socioeconomic characteristics of neighbourhoods on students’ test scores. On the other hand, 
increased transport accessibility increases the students’ access to attractive destinations of 
truancy. Although the research on the destinations of truancy is extremely thin, anecdotal 
evidence (The Branding Brothers 2008) shows that most destinations of truancy in Santiago 
such as parks and movie theatres are in places served by the subway network. Hence, greater 
proximity to the subway network may increase truancy and this may reduce student 
achievement. Alternatively, greater proximity between the student’s school and the subway 
network may imply a reduction in travel time to school for affected students. If this reduction 
in commuting time results in an increase in study time or in the effort at school because the 
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students are not tired from travelling, better school accessibility could improve student 
achievement.  
Property crime is the third socioeconomic factor I will consider that might be affected by greater 
access to public transportation. Better urban transport accessibility may affect property crime 
rates through three mechanisms. First, better urban transport accessibility implies better access 
to jobs for the potential perpetrators (see Chapter 4). This, in turn, could decrease the number 
of property crimes committed by the affected individuals. Following the seminal contribution 
to the field of the economics of crime by Gary Becker (1968), rational choice theories state that 
every individual evaluates the benefits and costs of legal and illegal work and chooses the option 
that maximises the expected utility. In an example of evidence in favour of using a rational 
choice perspective to model property crime, Machin and Meghir (2004) conclude that there is a 
strong negative association among low-paid workers between wages and property crime.  
An implication of a rational choice perspective to model the occurrence of property crime is 
that the latter decreases when access to legal jobs increases. This is because the opportunity cost 
of crime also increases. Using USA data, Wang and Minor (2002) found that there is less crime 
in areas with good job accessibility. However, they use data aggregated at the census tract level 
and do not control for unobservable variables that could be correlated with both job accessibility 
and crime rates (for example, individuals with less skills for the legal job market may choose to 
live in locations with worse accessibility to the legal labour market). Ihlanfeldt (2002) 
investigated the differences in the association between job accessibility and crime rates in black 
and white neighbourhoods in the USA. He concluded that if black neighbourhoods were to 
have the access to jobs (defined as a product between the employment rates and the distance 
from jobs) enjoyed by white neighbourhoods, the difference between property crime rates in 
black and white neighbourhoods would be 21 per cent lower. Ihlanfeldt does not exploit 
exogenous changes in job accessibility. Hence, the changes in job accessibility he exploits could 
be associated with other (unobserved) characteristics of census tracts that could be driving the 
crime rates such as local economic shocks. 
A second mechanism through which urban transport accessibility may affect property crime 
rates is by decreasing the journey-to-crime for potential perpetrators, thus increasing the crime 
rate near the improved transport infrastructure (Brantingham and Brantingham 1981). Using 
data from Indianapolis, White (1931) finds that crime was concentrated in the central business 
district, with some individuals commuting to commit crime. An essential aspect of 
understanding criminal mobility is understanding the urban system as a ‘crime opportunity 
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structure’ (Capone and Nichols 1976, 200). From a rational choice perspective, all else being 
equal, a criminal would prefer to commit an offense which required shorter rather than longer 
trips (Brantingham and Brantingham 1984). As a third mechanism, better urban transport access 
due to new subway stations might increase the number of commuters who are attractive targets 
around these new stations. Because theory predicts an ambiguous effect of better urban 
transport accessibility on property crime rates, the effect of an expansion of the subway network 
on property crime rates is an empirical question.  
In this thesis, I derive causal estimates of the impact of better urban transport accessibility on 
socioeconomic outcomes. To derive causal estimates, I adopt the ‘experimentalist’ approach. 
The experimentalist approach ‘emphasises the distinction between variables that have causal 
effects, control variables, and outcome variables’ (Angrist and Krueger 1999, 1278). Hence, in 
this thesis, by carefully selecting my treatment and control groups in each of the empirical 
chapters (Chapters 4, 5, and 6), I put ‘issues of identification and causality at centre stage’ 
(Gibbons and Overman 2012, 188). To obtain this thesis’ causal estimates, I use changes in 
proximity to the nearest subway station induced by a large expansion of the subway network in 
Santiago in the mid-2000s. I argue that, conditional on some baseline characteristics, this 
expansion is an exogenous shock to the proximity to the subway network. My identification 
strategy uses panel data before and after the subway expansion to derive a fixed-effects estimator 
that accounts for endogeneity in the relation between the distance to the subway network and 
the socioeconomic outcomes of the affected individuals and areas. 
The first contribution of this thesis is its use of a careful fixed-effects identification strategy and 
exploit an expansion of a subway network to assess the impact of closer proximity to the subway 
network on socioeconomic outcomes. By controlling for baseline characteristics of individuals 
in the chapter on labour market outcomes (Chapter 4), of students in the chapter on student 
achievement outcomes (Chapter 5), and baseline characteristics of neighbourhoods in the 
chapter on crime outcomes (Chapter 6), my estimates are robust to differential trends in the 
dependent variable for individuals, students and neighbourhoods with differing baseline 
characteristics. In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, by carrying out falsification checks to test my identifying 
assumptions, I show that there is no evidence that my identifying assumption in each chapter 
do not hold.  
The second contribution of this thesis is an assessment of the impact of better urban transport 
accessibility on socioeconomic outcomes in the context of a middle-income country. To my 
knowledge, the few studies that have explored such impact have been conducted in the USA 
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and the UK. Given the differences in labour market institutions, institutional contexts, 
performance in education, and levels of and trends in crime, the results obtained in the UK and 
the USA are not necessarily applicable to a middle-income country like Chile.  
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 0 sets the scene by presenting trends in economic 
outcomes, income and spatial inequality, employment, schooling, and crime outcomes in Chile 
and Santiago. Santiago’s pattern of disadvantage is closely related to Chile’s urbanisation process 
over the last 150 years. The rapid population growth experienced by the city in the mid-20th 
century is associated to the fact that the city was not able to absorb adequately the demands of 
the most vulnerable population in terms of access to employment, transport, housing and 
schooling. Santiago’s high income, labour market, academic achievement and crime perception 
inequality is also reflected in spatial inequality across all these dimensions. In the early 2000s, 
citizens in subsidised housing on Santiago’s metropolitan periphery had to commute long hours 
to get to the central business district were most employments was located, had a lower 
employment rate and, controlling for parental socioeconomic characteristics, exhibited a lower 
academic performance relative to citizens in wealthier neighbourhoods in Santiago. 
In Chapter 3, I explain the methods I use in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 to estimate impacts of better 
transport accessibility on socioeconomic outcomes. Chapter 3 also discusses my definition of 
transport accessibility. 
Chapter 4 uses household panel data to estimate the impact of better transport accessibility on 
labour market outcomes. There is clear evidence that, controlling for worker’s unobserved 
characteristics such as ability, greater proximity to the subway network increases earnings, 
employment, and hours of work. A substantial increase in the female employment rate 
accounts for the rise in employment rate. A placebo experiment in the period when there was 
no subway expansion (1996–2001) provides evidence that there are no pre-existing trends in 
the employment rate biasing my results. This chapter provides evidence suggesting that urban 
public transport is a key factor of labour market outcomes in cities. 
Chapter 5 uses panel data from an administrative source to estimate the impact of better 
school accessibility on student performance. I find that closer proximity to the subway 
network is associated with lower test scores. I also find suggestive evidence that this 
association is at least in part due to an increase in the number of students in schools that 
experienced a large decrease in distance from the subway network. My results are not due to 
selection caused by higher dropout of the worst students in the group, who experienced a 
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large increase in proximity to the subway network. I also show that the statistical significance 
of my results is robust to spatial correlation between the regression errors.  
Chapter 6 uses administrative data about all the crimes reported to the police before and after 
the subway expansion in Santiago in the mid-2000s to estimate the impact of better transport 
accessibility on property crime. Closer proximity to the subway network implies a substantial 
increase in reported robbery and larceny. There is no evidence that this association is due to 
an unobserved citywide shock (such as the increase in mobile phones between 2005 and 2007) 
that could have driven the effect. In addition, there is no evidence that this association is due 
to an increase in the rate of reported crimes to total crimes in the areas that experienced an 
increase in proximity to the subway network. Hence, Chapter 6 does not provide evidence 
that one of the drivers of the positive valuation of closer proximity to the subway network 
could be a reduction in property crime. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by summarising its contributions, discussing policy 
implications, suggesting venues of potential future research and pointing out the type of data 
that would improve the robustness of this thesis’ conclusions. The analysis in this thesis could 
be improved by the use of instruments that could satisfy the exclusion restriction by only 
affecting socioeconomic outcomes through the transport improvement. I further explain 
some of these potential instruments in Chapter 7. While each chapter has a section that 
summarises and presents some implications of the findings, Chapter 7 develops those 
conclusions further and integrates the conclusions across chapters. Better urban transport 
accessibility improves labour market outcomes (employment rate, labour earnings, and hours 
worked). However, better urban transport accessibility implies lower student achievement and 
an increase in robbery and burglary. The main policy implication is that urban public transport 
accessibility is a crucial factor affecting the female employment rate. This is extremely 
important in cities with a low female employment rate and low or inexistent coverage of rapid 
transit systems such as subways. Other policy implications that I consider are that schools that 
will experience a future increase in proximity to rapid transit systems should plan accordingly 
to avoid undesired increases in class sizes due to more demand after nearby rapid transit 
stations are inaugurated.  
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     Chapter 2 
2. An Anatomy of Disadvantage in Chile and Santiago 
There is a long history of urbanisation in Chile and its capital Santiago, a process that has been 
developing over the last 150 years, and has resulted in the increasing primacy of the Santiago 
metropolitan region in its share of the country’s population. By the early 2000s (the baseline 
period in Chapters 4, 5, and 6) and currently, Chile and Santiago had extremely high rates of 
inequality in income, employment, schooling and crime across socioeconomic groups. Citizens 
in the poorest income deciles groups had a low share of income, a high perception of crime 
increase, and lower employment rates and educational performance relative to citizens in the 
poorest income deciles groups in other Latin American and OECD countries. This 
socioeconomic inequality has its urban counterpart in a high spatial segregation in Chile’s capital. 
Compared to citizens in wealthier neighbourhoods, citizens in poorer neighbourhoods in 
Santiago had worse accessibility to employment, lower employment rates, worked fewer hours, 
earned less, and (conditional on their families’ socioeconomic status) attended schools whose 
students, on average, attained lower high school grades. 
The topic of this chapter is to what extent the association between urban transport accessibility 
and socioeconomic outcomes in Chile is generalisable to other contexts. To inform this 
discussion, I will provide a snapshot of how socioeconomic inequality in Chile has evolved. The 
chapter focuses on particular aspects of inequality (employment, schooling, and crime 
outcomes) which were chosen because of their crucial importance to individuals’ well-being. 
These aspects of inequality are discussed in the context of Santiago’s history, geography, 
government policies, and transport patterns.  
In addition, the resulting picture of the anatomy of disadvantage in Chile and Santiago will help 
us understand the socioeconomic impacts of the major expansion of Santiago’s public transport 
infrastructure that occurred in the early 2000s. These impacts are the subject of empirical 
analyses in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.1 outlines the history and 
geography of disadvantage in Santiago. This section serves as background. Section 2.2 details 
the transport system in Santiago and its major expansion beginning in 2001; Section 2.3 
discusses long-term trends in socioeconomic outcomes in Chile and Santiago; and Section 2.4 
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outlines indicators of disadvantage as of the 2001 transport expansion. Section 2.5 summarises 
my findings and presents concluding remarks. 
2.1 The geography of disadvantage in Santiago 
2.1.1 Urbanisation and economic segregation 
Santiago’s population grew steadily at an annual average rate of 2.7 per cent during the 16th 
century and the beginning of the 17th century. During the rest of the 17th, 18th, and 19th 
centuries, the population grew at an average annual rate of two per cent.  
However, during the 20th century, Santiago experienced a demographic explosion. This was 
due to a mining crisis in Chile’s north during the 1930s and the migration of rural sectors in the 
1940s and 1960s. This, plus high fertility rates, implied that the average annual growth rate of 
the city’s population between 1952 and 1960 was 4.9 per cent. (At the beginning of the 21st 
century, the average annual growth rate of Santiago’s population decreased to 1.4 per cent 
(COPESA 2010).)  In the 1990s, Latin America was the most urbanised developing region in 
the world and Chile, one of the  most urbanised countries in Latin America (Browder, Bohland, 
and Scarpaci 1995).  
Since the 19th century, following the trend of most Latin American nations, Chile’s population 
has become more urbanised and concentrated in its capital. Fig 2.1 shows that, while Chile’s 
urban population increased from 22 per cent in 1865 to 87 per cent in 2002, the proportion of 
Chile’s population residing in Santiago increased from 6 per cent in 1865 to 36 per cent in 2002. 
Yet, the increasing trend in the concentration of Chile’s population in Santiago stabilised during 
the 1990s. More specifically, the proportion of Chile’s population residing in Santiago remained 
constant in the decade between 1992 and 2002 (35.5 and 35.7 per cent respectively). In fact, 
‘there were more departures than arrivals to metropolitan Santiago in the … 1997–2002 
[period]” (Portes and Roberts 2005, 54).   
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Fig. 2.1 Chile’s urban population and proportion residing in Santiago. Note: Author’s estimates are 
from Madaleno and Gurovich’s (2004) data. 
2.1.2 Santiago’s history, geography, urban expansion and housing policy  
Santiago has occupied the Mapocho riverside since at least the time of the Spanish conquest, 
and maybe even as far back as the time of the Incas. From the 16th century until the 19th 
century, Santiago’s population was concentrated in what today is the west of Santiago’s central 
business district (see Fig. 2.2). At the end of 19th century, looking for more space away from 
the city centre, families of higher socioeconomic status started to migrate towards the east of 
the city, founding the municipality of Providencia in 1891. The eastern periphery of the city 
near the Mapocho river is more humid relative to the other very dry areas of the city’s periphery 
(De Ramón 1992; Recabarren 2008; Palmer 2014).  
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Fig. 2.2 Satellite view of Santiago’s geography in 2014. Notes: Santiago’s population lives in the grey 
areas. The mountains are in brown colours. Cultivable land is green. Major roads are in orange. 
Source: Google Maps (2014). 
The area covered by the city also increased. In 1915 Santiago covered 3,007 hectares; this 
increased to 6,500 hectares in 1930, to 20,900 hectares in 1960, and to 40,619 hectares in the 
early 1990s (De Ramón 1992). Hence, the annual growth rate of the city’s area between 1960 
and 1990 was 2.2 per cent. 
Fig 2.2 shows that Santiago is in a valley surrounded by mountains. The city’s expansion is 
limited by the Andes range to the east and north and by a series of lower mountains to its west. 
Since the 1940s, the growth of Santiago has incorporated satellite towns into its metropolitan 
area in the north, southwest, and south of the city. During the 20th century, the city’s most 
affluent families continued expanding towards the east. However, given the geographical limits 
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imposed by the surrounding mountains, the natural direction for the city’s sprawl is to the south 
(Browder, Bohland, and Scarpaci 1995).  
At the same time, during the 20th century, several slums—created through illegal acquisition of 
land by low-income households—appeared in Santiago. Pinochet’s coup d'état in 1973 in Chile 
ended with illegal acquisition of land in Santiago. During his military dictatorship and the 
subsequent democratic governments since 1989, the Chilean government carried out an 
aggressive policy of eradicating slums from Santiago’s city centre and the affluent areas in the 
city’s northeast (municipalities of Las Condes and Vitacura) (Hidalgo-Dattwyler 2004).  
Unlike in many countries where the government provides public housing through rentals, the 
Chilean government’s strategy was to provide housing through ownership. This was first done 
in Chile in 1977 when the Chilean government decided to provide low-income families below a 
poverty cut-off but with a certain amount of savings with a voucher for purchasing housing 
(Gilbert 2004). This public housing policy had such a significant effect on Chile’s housing 
market that, between 1976 and 2007, 67 per cent of dwellings built were publicly subsidised. In 
2002, the proportion of households in Chile who owned their own dwellings was 76 per cent. 
This was eight percentage points higher than the average proportion of households owning their 
own dwelling in OECD countries (Simian 2010). Santiago was no exception within Chile in 
terms of the percentage of subsidised housing out of total housing units.  
Given the lower cost of land in the city’s periphery, the relocation of the eradicated families in 
conjunction with the provision of housing through tenure, gave way to publicly subsidised 
housing projects on the periphery of the metropolitan area. In 2005, according to Brain, Sabatini 
and Iacobelli (2005), 71 per cent of subsidised housing was at a distance greater than 10 km 
from the centre of the city. Fig. 2.2 depicts the high concentration of subsidised housing in 
Santiago’s periphery. 
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Fig. 2.3 Publicly subsidised housing in Santiago and density of constructions in Santiago (number of 
dwellings per square kilometre) 1980–2001. Notes: Subsidised housing is in red (darker if 
printed in greys) and density of constructions is in blue (darker meaning more dwellings per 
square kilometre). Source: Observatorio de Ciudades Universidad Católica de Chile (2011). 
When compared to most Latin American capitals, Santiago is a highly spatially segregated city 
in terms of economic groups. Arriagada and Simioni (2001) find that economic segregation—
measured by the Duncan Index of dissimilarity in the ratio of household poverty between 
municipalities—increased in Santiago between 1992 and 1998.1  Santiago’s economic spatial 
segregation according to the Duncan Index in the 2001 study was high even when compared to 
                                                 
1 Although the Duncan index was proposed by Duncan and Duncan (1955) to measure racial segregation, nowadays 
this index is widely used to measure the economic segregation in terms of the distribution of poor and non-poor 
households across spatial units in a city. For an example, see Massey and Eggers (1990). 
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other Latin American cities with high economic segregation such as Lima or Mexico City 
(Rodríguez and Arriagada 2004). 
In 2002, most jobs in Santiago were located near the city’s central business district and its 
northeast. Fig. 2.4 shows the distribution of commuters’ destination municipalities in Santiago. 
This figure shows that the destination of more than 50% of all commuters in Greater Santiago 
was in the municipalities of Santiago, Providencia Ñuñoa and Las Condes. According to Brain 
et al. (2005), in 2004, on average, subsidised housing dweller workers commuted 1 hour and 42 
minutes round trip per day. Moreover, in La Pintana, a borough in the south of Santiago with 
the largest proportion of poor households in Santiago and with no subway coverage, in 2010, 
48 per cent of workers commuted more than two hours per day to get to their jobs and back. 
In contrast, in all the wealthiest boroughs in Santiago (Las Condes, Ñuñoa, Providencia, and 
Vitacura) less than 10 per cent of workers commuted more than two hours per day (El Mercurio 
2012).  
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Fig. 2.4 Daily commuters due to work or study according to destination municipality in 2002. Source: 
Gobierno Regional Metropolitano (2009). 
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In Alonso’s (1964) monocentric city model, there is a trade-off between housing and commuting 
costs. In equilibrium, this trade-off interacts with the households’ wealth, their preferences for 
dwelling plot size and accessibility to the city centre. Hence, in this equilibrium, the employed 
reside near the city centre and the unemployed, at the city edge (Zenou 2000). The difference 
between Alonso’s traditional monocentric model and the case of Santiago is that, because the 
only possibility for affordable housing for low-income households is subsidised housing located 
on the metropolitan periphery, these households’ locations are exogenously determined by the 
city planner. As Glaeser et al. (2008) point out, in US cities, the poor tend to live in the city 
centre. They argue that the main factor for why the poor live in the city centre is because they 
rely on public transport to access employment opportunities. However, the poor in Santiago are 
assigned by the Government to live on the outskirts of the city and because the poor cannot 
afford to travel by car to employment opportunities in the city centre, adequate service by public 
transportation became a major issue. Public transportation and its major expansion beginning 
in 2001 will be discussed in detail in Section 2.2.  
2.1.3 Population and density 
In 2001 (before the subway expansion shown in Section 2.2), Santiago’s population was 
distributed unevenly across the city. Fig 2.4 shows the density and population of municipalities 
in urban Santiago. The municipalities with the highest population densities were in the city’s 
south (La Granja and San Ramón), southwest (Pedro Aguirre Cerda and Lo Espejo) and west 
(Lo Prado and Cerro Navia). The municipalities of La Granja, San Ramón and Cerro Navia are 
precisely the ones highlighted in Fig. 2.4 with a high concentration of subsidised housing. Fig. 
2.4 also shows that, in 2001, the Santiago subway system did not serve these three municipalities. 
Hence, Fig. 2.3 and Fig. 2.4 suggest that the Chilean government has been an active actor in the 
location of vulnerable households and thus in shaping the anatomy of disadvantage in Santiago. 
It took advantage of  cheaper land costs in the west and south metropolitan peripheries where 
it provided subsidised housing  and thus increased the density in that area despite the fact that 
the area had poor access to a rapid transit system. 
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Fig. 2.5 Population, population density of municipalities, and subway network in Santiago in 2001 
(before the expansion of the subway network in the mid-2000s). Note: Author’s estimates are 
from the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas de Chile (2014) data. 
Having shown Chile’s urbanisation process, the concentration of the country’s population in 
metropolitan Santiago, the geographic and historical reasons for a concentration of economic 
disadvantage in the south and east of the city, and the unusually high proportion of home 
owners who have benefitted from publicly subsidised dwellings, the next section will discuss the 
city’s overall transport network and the expansion of the subway network in the mid 2000’s. 
2.1.4 The transport system in Santiago and its major expansion in the mid-2000s 
In the early 2000’s, the period before the expansion of Santiago’s subway network, the transport 
network was crucial for most Santiago citizens’ daily activities. In 2001, there were 13.1 million 
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trips taken in Santiago, 71 per cent of which were motorised (the rest of the trips were made on 
foot) (SECTRA 2002). Of the motorised trips, 46 per cent of the trips were made by bus, 41 
per cent by car, 12 per cent by subway, and 11 per cent in taxi or shared taxi (author’s estimates 
based on SECTRA 2002 data).  
Therefore, the two main modes in Santiago’s public transport system in the early 2000s were 
bus and subway. The subway network covered the densest part of the city in terms of 
population, and was a fast and reliable transport system. A master plan dating from 1968 had 
established the construction of five subway lines in Santiago (Pávez Reyes 2007). The first three 
lines (Lines 1, 2, and 5) were inaugurated between 1975 and 1997 and encompassed a 40.2-km 
railway network (Agostini and Palmucci 2008). Fig. 2.5 shows a map of Santiago’s subway 
network in 2001 (panel A) with lines 1, 2, and 5. Panel B shows Santiago’s subway network in 
the city centre. Lines 1, 2, and 5 are in red, yellow and green. Fig 2.5 shows that Santiago’s 
subway network in the early 2000s did not serve the population in the metropolitan periphery. 
This was especially true for Santiago’s population in the city’s southeast, an area that would be 
served in the mid-2000s by the blue line (Line 4) in panel B. The population in the city’s 
southwest would be served in the early 2010s by the extension of the green line (Line 5).  
As with any rapid transit system, Santiago’s subway system was fast because it was not subject 
to congestion. In addition, Santiago’s subway had predictable wait times (with timetables being 
adhered to), and was a safe means of transport.  
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Panel A: Subway network in 2001. Source: 
Metro de Santiago (2014)
 
 
Panel B: Subway network in 2012. Source: 
Google Maps. 
 
Fig. 2.6 Santiago’s subway network     
By 2001, the bus network covered the whole city of Santiago including its metropolitan 
periphery, and had a high share of the city’s trips on public transport. Pinochet’s military 
dictatorship (1973–1989) implemented a bus system that had no barriers of entry to new 
operators. During the 1990s, the newly elected democratic governments of Chile’s centre-left 
Concertación, put out to tender the routes that crossed the city centre. By the late 1990s, there 
were almost 4,000 bus operators, most of which owned just one bus (Gschwender 2005).  
However, the bus network was subject to several problems. It was slow during peak-times, had 
unpredictable waiting times, and was a dangerous and relatively unpleasant means of transport 
(Gschwender 2005). First, at peak times, buses were subject to high levels of congestion. This 
is a characteristic shared by any transport system without exclusive lanes. Second, waiting times 
were unpredictable. Although the individual operators associated to form bus lines, because of 
the atomised structure of ownership, buses competed even within the same lines. This 
competition implied that, ‘it was normal to see two or even three buses from the same line 
travelling together, ‘fighting’ to catch passengers in the next stop’ (Gschwender 2005, 5). Hence, 
this competition increased bus bunching, making waiting times unpredictable. Third, there was 
a high probability of accidents involving buses. This was because of the incentives for drivers 
to go above the speed limits because of the competition between buses, and the fact that drivers 
often worked long hours because labour laws were not enforced. (see the explanation of ‘the 
war for the fare’ by Johnson, Reiley and Muñoz 2005). Fourth, buses in Santiago deteriorated 
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rapidly because of a lack of preventive maintenance. The atomised structure of ownership along 
the same routes implied a lack of professional management or preventive maintenance schemes 
for buses (Gschwender 2005). On the other hand, one positive aspect of Santiago’s bus system 
was that the routes were extremely long, so most commuters did not need to make transfers 
(Gschwender 2005). Hence, in the early 2000s, though it was limited in geographic coverage, 
the subway network had superior attributes relative to the bus network in terms of speed, safety, 
and quality of service. 
At the beginning of 2001, there were two competing projects to extend Santiago’s subway 
network. One alternative was to extend the subway network to Maipú (in Santiago’s southwest); 
the other alternative, was to extend it to Puente Alto (in Santiago’s southeast) (Radio 
Cooperativa 2001). Each of these two municipalities in the city’s metropolitan periphery had a 
large population (around 500,000) not served by the subway network. (See further below Fig. 
2.13 for a map with the location of Maipú and Santiago.) 
In May 2001, the Chilean government announced the construction of subway Line 4, a 24-km 
subway line running from Providencia, located 5 km east of Santiago’s central business district, 
to Puente Alto (see Fig. 2.6). In December 2001, the exact locations of the stations were 
announced. The new subway line was inaugurated in two phases; the first in November 2005 
and the second in March 2006. Before this date, many citizens living in Santiago's most 
unserviced areas in the southeast of the city (Puente Alto) had more than four-hour round trip 
commutes each day to get to jobs and schools in the central business district and the wealthier 
part of the city (Providencia and Las Condes) located in the north eastern part of the city. In 
addition to this large expansion of the system, between September 2004 and November 2005 
Line 2, which runs in the north-south direction, also experienced a (small) extension of the line 
and the addition of six new subway stations.  
The opening of the subway Line 4 to Puente Alto and the extension of Line 2 took place 
between September 2004 and March 2006. This was the greatest expansion of Santiago’s subway 
network since the 1970s and implied an increase in urban transport accessibility whose 
socioeconomic impacts I will evaluate in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
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Fig. 2.7 Santiago post-subway expansion (July 2006) subway map. Note: Stations inaugurated between 
September 2004 and March 2006 highlighted with black circles. Source: Metro de Santiago. 
In November 2005, Chile’s President Lagos announced the 14-km extension of subway Line 5 
to Maipú (Atina Chile! 2005) (See this extension in Fig. 2.5 Panel B.). This extension was 
inaugurated in February 2011. In Chapters 5 and 6, I use the extension of Line 5 to Maipú as a 
‘placebo experiment’ for Santiago’s subway expansion in the mid-2000s. One characteristic of 
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this extension that makes it suitable as a placebo experiment is that this was a proposed subway 
line in the early 2000s that was inaugurated after my post-expansion data (2006 in Chapters 4 
and 5 and 2007 in Chapter 6). Another characteristic is that the destination of both proposed 
subway extensions, the municipalities of Puente Alto and Maipú, share similar characteristics in 
terms of their location in Santiago’s metropolitan periphery and their large population with 
limited access to Santiago’s subway network during the early 2000s. These two facts provided 
the mayors of Maipú and Puente Alto great bargaining power for lobbying the central 
government’s authorities for the subway to pass through their municipalities. 
Having explained the geography of disadvantage in Santiago, in the next section I explain 
historic trends in socioeconomic conditions in Chile and Santiago. 
2.2 Historic trends in socioeconomic conditions in Chile and Santiago 
In this section, I document broad socioeconomic trends in Chile and Santiago. Second, this 
section describes the trends in income, labour market, student achievement, and crime 
indicators over the last two to three decades (depending on the availability of data) in Chile and 
Santiago.  
2.2.1 Income and labour market  
Chile is a middle-income country that has experienced high economic growth during the last 
two decades. In 2012, Chile’s GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) was US$17,580. 
Chile’s GDP per capita in 2012 was 43 per cent lower than the average GDP per capita at PPP 
of OECD countries (OECD 2014b). With a share of 12 per cent in the country’s GDP in 2013, 
and 57 per cent of the country’s exports in 2012, Chile’s main industry is mining, mainly copper 
(88 per cent of mining’s GDP in 2013) (Banco Central de Chile 2014b). According to the 
International Monetary Fund (2014), Chile ranked 54 out of 187 countries according to its GDP 
(PPP) per capita.  
To have a better perspective of Chile’s economic indicators relative to other countries, I 
compare Chile’s indicators with those of two developed countries (the USA and the UK) and 
with another middle-income, Latin American country of similar GDP per capita, Mexico. Panel 
A in Fig. 2.8 shows that Chile’s income per capita is below that of the USA, the UK and the 
average in OECD countries. Since the 1990s, Chile has experienced sustained high economic 
growth of six per cent of average growth per year.  
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Santiago has 40 per cent of Chile’s population. While Chile’s population in 2012 was 17.4 
million, Santiago’s population in the same year was 7.0 million (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadisticas 2005). Santiago’s income per capita is higher than the average income per capita in 
Chile. According to the Banco Central de Chile (2014a), in 2012, Santiago’s PPP GDP per capita 
was  US$24,783, 10.4 per cent higher than Chile’s PPP GDP per capita (see panel B in Fig. 2.8). 
In 2013, Santiago’s GDP was 49 per cent of the country’s GDP. The main sector in Santiago’s 
economy is financial and business services (36 per cent), followed by retail, restaurants and 
hotels (16 per cent), personal services (13 per cent), and manufacturing (11 per cent of Santiago’s 
GDP).  
Panel A: Chile’s national income per head. Notes: 
author's estimates are from OECD (2014a) and the 
Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (2014a) data.  
 
 
Panel B: Santiago and Chile’s national income per head 
in 2012. Notes: author’s estimates use GDP and GDP 
deflators from Banco Central de Chile (2014a), 
population from Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas de 
Chile (2014b) and Chile’s 2012 PPP conversion factor 
for GDP from OECD (2014b). 
 
 
Fig. 2.8 Net national and regional income per head.  
Panel A in Fig. 2.9 shows that with an absolute cut-off of US$4/day, Chile’s poverty rate using 
after-taxes and transfers household disposable income fell from 59.9 per cent in 1987 to 9.9 per 
cent in 2011. In 2011, Chile’s $4/day poverty rate was lower than that in Mexico, Brazil, and 
Peru at 18, 15.9 and 14.6 percentage points, respectively. Most Latin American countries use an 
absolute cut-off to define their official poverty lines. In Chile, the government’s cut-off in 2011 
was higher than US$4/day. Instead of 9.9 per cent, its official poverty rate in 2011 was 14.4 per 
cent. Using Chile’s official poverty rate, Santiago’s poverty rate in 2011 was 2.9 percentage 
points lower than the national poverty rate (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social de Chile 2012a). 
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Panel A: Chile’s absolute poverty rate relative to other 
countries. Notes: The poverty line is set at US$4/day. 
Author’s estimates are from Socio-Economic Database 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (2014a) data. 
 
 
Panel B: Chile’s relative poverty rate relative to other 
countries. Notes: The poverty line is set at 50 per cent of 
contemporary median income. Author’s estimates are 
from OECD (2014b) and Socio-Economic Database 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (2014a) data. 
 
Fig. 2.9   Poverty rate after taxes and transfers. Notes: Equivalised household disposable income. 
Similarly, with an after-taxes and transfers relative cut-off of 50 per cent contemporary median 
household disposable income, Chile’s poverty rate has also been decreasing over the past 25 
years. Fig. 2.9’s panel B shows that while the country’s poverty rate of households with incomes 
below 50 per cent of median income in 1987 was 22.3 per cent, the poverty rate in 2011 was 
17.8 per cent. In 2011, Chile’s poverty rate was 3.1 percentage points lower than in Mexico, 
almost the same compared to the poverty rate in the USA and 8.3 percentage points higher than 
in the UK. Using a relative cut-off, Santiago’s poverty rate is similar to the national poverty rate. 
If the poverty line is set at 50 per cent of the contemporary median income, the poverty rate in 
Santiago and Chile is 17.4 and 17.6 per cent respectively (author’s estimate based on Chile’s 
Casen 2011 data). 
Because this chapter deals with disadvantage in Chile, a relevant issue is whether, apart from 
experiencing reductions in the poverty rate, the country has also experienced reductions in the 
country’s income inequality. Panel A in Fig. 2.9 shows that Chile’s income inequality measured 
by the Gini coefficient decreased from 55.5 per cent in 1987 to 50.3 per cent in 2011. Despite 
this decrease, in 2009, Chile was within the 12 per cent most unequal countries in the world 
according to the Gini coefficient (author’s calculation based on data from the World Bank 2014). 
In 2011, Chile’s Gini coefficient was 2.9 percentage points higher than Mexico’s and much 
higher than the Gini coefficient of the USA and the UK (11.4 and 15.9 percentage points 
respectively, see Fig. 2.10’s panel A).  
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Panel A: Chile’s income inequality relative to other 
countries. Note: Author’s estimates are from OECD 
(2014b) and (2014a) data (see Appendix 1). 
 
Panel B: Santiago and Chile’s income inequality in 
2011. Note: Author’s estimates are from Casen 2012 
data (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social de Chile 2012b). 
Fig. 2.10 Gini coefficient of income inequality. Notes: Gini coefficient at equivalised household 
disposable income, post taxes and transfers.  
In 2011, Santiago’s income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient was two percentage 
points higher than Chile’s Gini coefficient (see Fig. 2.9’s panel B). To have a perspective on 
what two percentage points in the Gini coefficient means, if Chile’s Gini coefficient in 2009 
would have been two percentage points higher, Chile would have climbed five places in the 
ranking of most unequal countries in the World—from place 20 to place 15 out of 158 countries. 
(Author’s calculations based on data from the World Bank 2014.) 
Some authors have argued that one of the main structural factors affecting Chile’s high income 
inequality during the 2000s is the high ratio of the employment rate of the richer income groups 
to the employment rate of the lower income groups relative to the same ratio in other Latin 
American countries with similar  per capita income (Velasco and Huneeus 2012). I now explore 
the validity of this claim. In 2001, the baseline year in Chapter 4, Chile’s employment rate was 
extremely low. Within 27 OECD countries with available data in 2001, Chile had the seventh 
lowest employment rate for persons aged 15 and over. Chile’s employment rate of 48.6 per cent 
was far below the OECD average of 55.2 per cent. Panel A in Fig. 2.11 shows that between 
2009 and 2013 the employment rate of Chile’s population aged 15 and over increased 5.6 
percentage points from 50.5 to 56 per cent. This narrowed the employment rate gap with other 
OECD countries substantially. In 2013, Chile’s employment rate was 0.8 percentage points 
higher than the average in OECD countries and slightly lower than the employment rate in 
Mexico (another Latin American country with similar income per capita), the UK, and the USA 
(1.3, 2.1 and 2.6 percentage points respectively) (OECD 2014b). 
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Panel A: Chile’s employment rate relative to other 
countries. Note: Author’s estimates are from OECD 
(2014a) data. 
 
Panel B: Santiago and Chile’s employment rate. Note: 
Author’s estimates are from Encuesta Nacional de 
Empleo 1986–2009 and Nueva Encuesta Nacional de 
Empleo 2010–2013 data (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadísticas de Chile 2014a). 
 
 
Fig. 2.11 Annual employment rate, aged 15 and over.  
Chile’s employment rate during the mid-2000s was also low relative to other Latin American 
countries. In 2003 (this is, before the subway expansion in the mid-2000s), after Honduras and 
Dominican Republic, Chile had the third lowest employment rate out of 19 countries in Latin 
America for adults aged 25–64. Chile’s employment rate in this age range was 65.4 per cent, 
several percentage points below the Latin American average (69.9 per cent). Specifically, Chile’s 
female employment rate of 47.2 per cent was the fourth lowest rate within Latin American 
countries (Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean 2014b). 
As can be seen in Fig. 2.11’s panel B, in 2001, Santiago’s employment rate was four percentage 
points lower than Chile’s employment rate. In terms of country rankings according to their 
employment rate, a four-percentage point difference is relevant. In 2001, Chile ranked 21 out 
of 27 OECD countries with available data in terms of its employment rate. Because in 2001 
Santiago had an employment rate four percentage points lower relative to Chile’s employment 
rate, Santiago would have ranked 26th out of 27 countries in the OECD.  
Chile’s low overall employment rate in 2001 was due to an extremely low female employment 
rate. Out of 27 OECD countries with data for 2001, Chile ranked last in the OECD, with a 
female employment rate of 31.4 per cent—15.7 percentage points lower than the OECD 
countries’ average female employment rate (see Fig. 2.12). By contrast, the male employment 
rate in Chile in 2001 was 66.3 per cent. This is 2.3 percentage points higher than the OECD 
countries’ average male employment  
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Fig. 2.12 Annual employment rate of OECD countries by sex in 2001, aged 15 and over. Note: Author’s 
estimates are from OECD (2014b) data. 
Compared to other middle-income Latin American countries like Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and 
Uruguay, Chile’s employment rate in the three poorest tenths in 2011 was low (Velasco and 
Huneeus 2012). Fig. 2.12 shows that in 2011 the employment rate of Chile’s poorest tenth was 
26 per cent. By contrast, this same rate in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Uruguay was 12, 15, 
25, and 31 percentage points higher relative to Chile’s employment rate in the poorest tenth. 
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Fig. 2.13 Employment rate of the poorest tenth 
in Chile and other middle-income 
Latin American countries. Notes: 
employment rate is for adults aged 18 
to 65 years. Author’s estimates are 
from Velasco and Huneeus’ (2012) 
data. 
 
Fig. 2.14 Ratio of the employment rate of the 
richest tenth to the employment rate 
of the poorest tenth. Notes: 
employment rate is for adults aged 18 
to 65 years. Author’s estimates are 
from Velasco and Huneeus’ (2012) 
data. 
 
Following Velasco and Huneeus (2012), one way of measuring inequality in access to 
employment is by using the ratio of the employment rate of the richest tenth to the employment 
rate of the poorest tenth. According to this measure, Chile’s employment inequality is twice as 
large as in Mexico and Uruguay, and around 50 per cent higher than in Brazil and Argentina 
(see Fig. 2.13). 
Are there any reasons for this high inequality in access to employment? In Section 2.2.2 on the 
institutional context of schools, I show evidence that Chile’s high inequality in access to 
employment may be due to inequality in human capital acquisition. In addition, Montenegro 
and Pagés (2004) conclude that ‘both minimum wages and job security regulations [during the 
early 2000s in Chile] reduce[d] the employment opportunities of the young and the unskilled—
and particularly unskilled youth—while promoting the employment rates of skilled and older 
workers’ (p. 431). In Section 2.1.2 (on Santiago’s urban expansion), I show that affordable 
housing in Chile is located in the metropolitan periphery without access to rapid transit systems. 
In that section, I argue that the provision of subsidised housing through tenure to low-income 
households in the metropolitan periphery is a factor that influences a low employment rate 
among disadvantaged citizens in Santiago. 
Fig. 2.12 and 2.13 provide suggestive evidence that the high inequality in access to employment 
between richest and poorest tenths may be one of the causes of income inequality in Chile. Why 
is there a stronger association between household income and employment status in Chile 
relative to other middle-income countries in Latin America? Given the close association 
between academic achievement and future wages (Neal and Johnson 1996), in Section 2.2.3 I 
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show data on whether the effect of household income on human capital acquisition in secondary 
school is higher in Chile relative to other countries. I am interested in student achievement 
trends in Chile because of the impact of human capital acquisition on economic outcomes 
(including economic inequality) and in order to provide more context about how economic and 
educational disadvantage are related to spatial disadvantage in Santiago and Chile. Before 
showing results in academic achievement, the next section explains the institutional context of 
schools in Chile. 
2.2.2 Institutional context of schools 
To have a better understanding of the trends in student performance in Chile, I first explain the 
schools’ institutional setting, which has some unusual characteristics. The Chilean education 
system is structured as an educational market where schools compete for greater student 
enrolment. In my sample in the Santiago urban area (the area within 20 km of Santiago’s 2006 
subway network), there were 1,435 schools in 2004. At that time, 52 per cent (742 schools) were 
administered by a private institution and received a per-student subsidy from the government 
(‘voucher schools’), 35 per cent (502) of the schools were administered by the local government 
(‘municipal schools’), and 13 per cent (191 schools) were administered by a private institution 
receiving no subsidy from the government (‘private schools’).2 
Since 1981, the Chilean school system has been structured on five key characteristics. First, the 
government subsidy for municipal and voucher schools is a per capita sum proportional to 
student attendance. Second, voucher schools are allowed to select students from the applying 
pool of students and may charge families an additional top-up fee to families. Third, school 
entry is a relatively unregulated process with practically no administrative barriers for new 
schools (Gallego and Hernando 2008). Fourth, families are free to choose any school within 
their budget constraint (i.e. there were no catchment areas). Despite the non-existence of 
catchment areas, the median distance between the residences of students in fourth (primary) 
grade in 2002 and their school was 1.9 km (Gallego and Hernando 2009). Fifth, as a cap on 
oversubscription, Chilean law mandates that the maximum class size is 45 students. 
Oversubscribed municipal schools select students using academic criteria, and voucher and 
private schools use academic and other criteria. For instance, faith-based schools may take into 
                                                 
2 An additional 1% of schools (28) were run by Associations of companies or private entities that administered 
vocational schools. 
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account the family’s religious participation, and international (e.g. British) schools may take into 
account a family’s cultural background. 
The next section shows the results that Chile’s market-oriented and relatively unregulated school 
system has delivered, and the association between these results and households’ socioeconomic 
status. 
2.2.3 Academic achievement in secondary school  
Is the association between income disadvantage and academic disadvantage stronger in Chile 
than in other countries? Given the positive impact of academic achievement on future labour 
earnings, a strong relation between household income and student achievement would provide 
suggestive evidence of a pervasive reinforcing cycle of disadvantage.  
Although the performance of secondary school students in Chile was low in 2000, during the 
last 10 years it has improved substantially. In 2000, Chile’s 15-year olds who took the 
‘Programme for International Student Assessment’ (PISA) test in reading ranked 38 out of the 
42 countries that took the PISA test3. In 2012, Chile climbed five places, ranking 33 out of 42 
countries. Because no other country which had ranked in the last 15 places in the PISA 2000 
climbed more than two positions by the 2012 ranking in reading , Chile’s improvement is 
remarkable. Panel A in Fig. 2.14 shows that in 2000, Chile scored below Mexico, the OECD, 
the USA, and the UK in reading—by 12, 90, 95, and 114 points respectively. By contrast, in 
2012, Chile scored higher relative to Mexico—18 points higher—and narrowed the gap with 
the OECD, the USA, and the UK—to a difference of 54, 56, and 58 points respectively. On 
the other hand, Panel B in Fig. 2.14 shows that in 2000 the average ‘Sistema de Medición de la 
Calidad de la Educación’ (SIMCE, System for the assessment of the education quality) test score 
of students was the same in Santiago and Chile. 
  
                                                 
3 I exclude Macedonia because students in this country did not take the PISA test in 2012. 
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Panel A: Chile’s PISA test score in reading relative to 
other countries. Notes: the PISA test is taken by 15-
year olds. Author’s estimates are from PISA (2014) 
data.   
 
Panel B: Santiago and Chile’s SIMCE test score for 
14-year olds (primary grade’s 8th grade) in 2013. Note: 
Author’s estimates are from SIMCE 2013 data 
(Agencia de la Calidad, Ministerio de Educación de 
Chile 2014). 
Fig. 2.15 Average test score in reading. 
Despite such improvements in reading, the economic, social, and cultural status of Chilean 
students’ families strongly predict the students’ test scores in reading and mathematics. 
According to PISA’s economic, social, and cultural status indicator in 2012, Chile ranked fourth 
and third—out of 63 countries—in terms of the amount of variance in the reading and 
mathematics PISA test scores respectively.4 Panel A in Fig. 2.15 shows the explanatory power 
of the economic, social and cultural status indicator on student’s PISA test score for Chile 
relative to other selected countries. One of the worrying issues is that not only is  Chile’s 
performance highly determined by families’ socioeconomic and cultural status but also the 
proportion of the variance of test score explained by the socioeconomic and cultural status 
increased in the 2009–2012 period. Panel B in Fig. 2.15 shows that, according to the 2004 
SIMCE test, the explanatory power of the family’s socioeconomic status for Santiago’s students 
is even larger than for Chile’s students.  
  
                                                 
4 According to PISA (2013), ‘The PISA index of economic, social and cultural status was derived from the following 
three indices: highest occupational status of parents […], highest educational level of parents in years of education 
according to [the International Standard Classification of Education] ISCED […], and home possessions.’ (p. 200). 
For details on the derivation of the index of home possession and other technicalities, see Appendix 3. 
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Panel A: Explanatory power of the economic, social 
and cultural status indicator on students’ PISA test 
score in reading for Chile and other selected countries. 
Source: author’s estimates are from OECD (2013) and 
OECD (2010) data. Note: The explanatory power is 
derived using a single-level bivariate regression of 
performance on the economic, social and cultural status, 
the slope is the regression coefficient for the economic, 
social and cultural status. 
 
Panel B: Santiago and Chile’s explanatory power of the 
school’s income category on students’ SIMCE test score 
in reading in 8th grade in 2004. Notes: author’s 
estimates are from SIMCE 2004 dataset. The 
explanatory power is derived using the R-squared in a 
regression of performance on the student’s school income 
level. The school’s income level corresponds to the category 
of the school’s median household. There are 30 categories 
of school income level.  
 
 
Fig. 2.16 The association between school performance and socioeconomic and cultural status.   
Hence, Fig. 2.15 provides evidence that the academic achievement of students in Santiago and 
Chile is highly determined by their parents’ socioeconomic (occupational status, educational 
level and wealth) and cultural status (cultural possessions, home educational resources, and 
books). In turn, this is suggestive evidence that, at least from the perspective of human capital 
acquisition, Chile’s income inequality might continue to be extremely high in the future. 
However, employment and schooling outcomes are not the only determinants of citizens’ well-
being. Well-being is also determined by neighbourhood characteristics, including crime rates 
(Ludwig et al. 2012). Hence, in the next section I describe the trends in property crime in Chile 
and Santiago, and detail how the perception of increases in property crime distributes across 
socioeconomic groups during the last decade. This also helps to provide a wider picture of 
disadvantage. 
2.2.4 Crime  
Between 2005 and 2012, the rate of property crime per 100,000 inhabitants recorded by Chile’s 
police remained stable (see Panel A in Fig. 2.16): in 2005, this rate was 2,258 reported crimes 
per 100,000 population; in 2012, it was 2,241 reported crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. This 
provides background information for Chapter 6 on the impact of better transport accessibility 
on property crime reported to the police. On the other hand, the rate of property crime recorded 
by the police in the UK and the USA decreased substantially during the same period. In the case 
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of the UK, this figure decreased from 4,574 to 3,133 property crimes recorded by the police per 
100,000 inhabitants in 2005 and 2012 respectively. 
Panel A: Chile’s police-recorded property crime rate 
relative to other countries. Note: Author’s estimates are 
from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(2014) data.  
 
 
Panel B: Santiago and Chile’s crime rate. Proportion of 
households with at least one member victim of a crime 
during the last 12 months. Note: Author’s estimates are 
from the Encuesta Nacional Urbana de Seguridad 
Ciudadana data (Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad 
Pública 2014; Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad 
Pública 2014b).  
 
 
Fig. 2.17   Crime rates.  
By contrast, according to Chile’s ‘National Urban Survey of Public Safety’ (‘ENUSC’ in 
Spanish), the proportion of households in which at least one member was a victim of crime 
during the prior year experienced a sharp decrease of 13.5 percentage points, changing from 
38.3 per cent in 2005 to 24.8 per cent in 2013 (see panel B in Fig. 2.15). The discrepancy between 
this information in the ENUSC survey and the police-recorded crime could be because panel A 
shows the rate of property crime and panel B, the rate of all crimes. In addition, during this 
period the willingness of Chilean citizens to report crimes could have increased. This possibility 
motivates the fact that in Chapter 6 on the impact of better urban transport accessibility on 
property crime rates, I analyse the robustness of my results to changes in victims’ willingness to 
report crime to the police. On the other hand, Panel B in Fig. 2.16 shows that between 2005 
and 2013, the proportion of households in which at least one member has been the victim of a 
crime in Santiago follows a similar trend to the one experienced by the country as a whole.  
During the 2000s, there was a dissonance between perceived and reported crime rates by 
socioeconomic groups in Chile. Panel A in Fig. 2.18 shows that individuals of lower 
socioeconomic status are more likely to perceive that crime has increased in their 
neighbourhood during the prior year relative to individuals from higher socioeconomic status. 
By contrast, Panel B in Fig. 2.18 shows that individuals from all socioeconomic levels have 
experienced a decrease in the proportion of households with at least one victim of crime during 
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the prior 12 months. Moreover, this proportion is lower for individuals of lower socioeconomic 
status relative to the same proportion for individuals of higher socioeconomic status. 
Panel A: Proportion of individuals who report perception 
that crime has increased in their neighbourhood during 
the last 12 months by socioeconomic status. 
  
Panel B: Proportion of households with at least one 
member who reported being victim of a crime during the 
last 12 months by socioeconomic status. 
 
Fig. 2.18   Crime by socioeconomic status in Chile. Note: Author’s estimates are from Godoy and 
Gillmore (2009) based on Chile’s Encuesta Nacional Urbana de Seguridad Ciudadana 2003–
2008 data. 
This section shows that Chile is a middle-income country that has experienced high economic 
growth and a drastic reduction in poverty, but whose income inequality—particularly in 
Santiago—has remained high over the last two decades. In addition, this section shows that 
Chile’s employment rate in the early 2000s—especially the female employment rate and that of 
the lower income decile groups—was extremely low relative to other Latin American countries. 
All these characteristics also apply to Santiago. I then show that Chile’s student achievement 
was extremely low relative to the achievement results for countries that took the PISA test in 
2000. I also show recent evidence that the explanatory power of a student’s socioeconomic and 
cultural statuses on student performance is high in Chile relative to countries in the OECD, and 
to comparable countries like Mexico. Moreover, the explanatory power of students’ economic 
status on student achievement is even higher in Santiago relative to the same explanatory power 
in Chile as a whole. Finally, this section shows that individuals of lower socioeconomic status 
in Chile systematically report a higher perception that crime is increasing relative to individuals 
of higher socioeconomic status. 
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2.3 Specific indicators of disadvantage, as of the mid-2000s subway expansion 
This section provides a picture of the labour market, academic achievement, and property crime 
outcomes across the municipalities in Santiago in the early 2000s, the period before Santiago’s 
subway expansion and the baseline period for Chapters 4, 5, and 6.  
2.3.1 Labour market  
Fig. 2.19 shows that, in 2001, average labour earnings for the population aged 15 and older5 
were higher for individuals living in municipalities in Santiago’s northeast (Las Condes and La 
Reina) relative to individuals living in the city’s southwest (especially in Lo Espejo and Cerrillos). 
This figure shows the average monthly labour earnings of the population aged 15 and over in 
every municipality surveyed in the Panel Casen survey in 2001. For an explanation for the criteria 
that determined the inclusion of municipalities in the sample and the list of included 
municipalities, see Appendix 2.  Fig. 2.19 also shows the subway network in 2001 (before the 
expansion in the mid-2000s). 
                                                 
5 This is, assuming zero earnings from labour for non-working individuals. 
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Fig. 2.19 Average monthly individual labour earnings of municipalities in Santiago and the city’s subway 
network in 2001 (before the expansion of the subway network in the mid-2000s). Notes: 
Author’s estimates are from Chile’s Panel Casen data. The sample is restricted to population 
15 years and older in 2001 who were not full-time students in that year. The Panel Casen survey 
did not sample municipalities in white (it excluded some municipalities with small population 
through a lottery). See Appendix 2 for more details. 
In Alonso’s (1964) monocentric city model, high earners with a preference for good accessibility 
(as opposed to having large plots of land) choose to live near the central business district, and 
low earners with a weak attachment to the labour market choose to live on the metropolitan 
periphery with poor access to the central business district. By contrast, Glaeser et al.’s (2008) 
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observation that the poor tend to live nearer to the central business district because they rely on 
public transport would imply a  negative association between transport accessibility to the centre 
business district and employment rates. In the case of Chile and in line with Glaeser et al.’s 
(2008) argument, Sanhueza and Celhay (2011) highlight the fact that, despite the high supply of 
housing subsidised by the Chilean government, in 2008 Santiago still had slums located relatively 
near the central business district. According to these authors, living in slums in Santiago is a 
strategic decision by slum dwellers to improve their access to jobs. 
Interestingly, Fig. 2.19 provides visual evidence of a labour earnings and good accessibility to 
the central business district using the subway network. Hence, this figure provides some 
suggestive visual evidence in favour of Alonso’s monocentric city model. 
Fig. 2.20 shows the employment rate of municipalities in Santiago in 2001. In line with the 
predictions from Alonso’s monocentric model and with Fig. 2.19, I expect employment rates to 
be greater in districts with greater accessibility. Panel A shows the employment rate in 2001 of 
men and women aged 15 to 59 who were not in full-time study. I constrain the age to 59 because 
the retirement age of females in Chile is 60 years old. Panel A provides suggestive evidence that 
other factors apart from accessibility to the central business district affect employment rates. In 
this panel, there is no clear association between employment rates and accessibility to the central 
business district. Hence, this panel does not provide visual evidence in favour of the predictions 
of Alonso’s monocentric model.  
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Panel A: Employment rates of men and women aged 
15 to 59.
Panel B: Employment rates of men and women aged 
15 and older. 
 
 
Panel C: Proportion of the population aged 65 and older. 
 
Panel D: Employment rates of women aged 15 and 
older. 
 
 
Fig. 2.20 Employment rates for different age ranges and proportion of the population aged 65 and older 
in municipalities in Santiago and the city’s subway network in 2001 (before the expansion of 
the subway network in the mid-2000s). Notes: Author’s estimates are from the 2001 wave of 
Chile’s Panel Casen data. The sample is restricted to population 15 years and older in 2001 
who were not full-time students in that same year. The Panel Casen survey did not sample 
municipalities in white (it excluded some municipalities with small population through a 
lottery). See Appendix 2 for more details. 
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In Chapter 4, I analyse the impact of better urban transport accessibility on labour market 
outcomes. Because part of the impact can be on the labour market outcomes of the population 
around retirement age, in that chapter, I do not constrain the sample to a maximum age. To 
provide a clearer picture of the baseline employment rate in Chapter 4, Fig. 2.20 panel B shows 
the employment rate of females and males aged 15 and older. This panel suggests that the 
association between transport accessibility to the city’s centre and the employment rate is 
negative. Panel B shows that the municipalities of Santiago and Providencia—where the central 
business district is located—had relatively low employment rates (46 and 48 per cent 
respectively). By contrast, the municipalities of Renca and La Florida—that are farther from the 
central business district, had higher employment rates (77 and 69 per cent respectively). Because 
the panel B sample includes individuals of retirement age, a potential explanation for the 
unexpected negative visual association between employment rates and accessibility could be 
because municipalities with good accessibility to the central business district may have a high 
proportion of individuals past the retirement age. Panel C shows the proportion of individuals 
in each municipality older than 65 years old. I choose this threshold because it coincides with 
the retirement age of men in Chile. Panel C shows a strong visual association between the 
proportion of individuals aged 65 and older and accessibility to the central business district. 
In Section 2.2.1, I show that the female employment rate in Chile in 2001 was extremely low 
relative to the male employment rate and relative to the female employment rate in other OECD 
and Latin American countries. Given this unusually low female employment rate, it would be 
interesting to explore whether the spatial inequality in access to employment in Santiago is 
different for females relative to the spatial inequality for the whole population. Panel D in Fig. 
2.20 shows the municipal average employment rate of females aged 15 and older. By visual 
inspection, the female employment rate in this age range shows a slightly stronger association 
with transport accessibility to the central business district relative to the general population’s 
employment rate in the same age range (panel B). For example, panel D shows that the female 
employment rate in municipalities with good transport accessibility like Providencia and 
Santiago is higher than the employment rate of the other municipalities in Santiago. Hence, the 
spatial inequality in employment access for women in Santiago is visually different from the 
spatial inequality in access to employment for the whole population. This suggests that in 
Chapter 4 I should analyse whether the impact of better urban transport accessibility is different 
for women relative to the same impact on men.  
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Therefore, in 2001 in terms of labour market outcomes, individuals in Santiago’s northeast had 
the highest labour earnings and worked more both in the extensive and in the intensive margin 
relative to individuals in the rest of the city. By contrast, individuals in the city’s southwest had 
lower average earnings from labour and were less likely to be employed relative to individuals 
in the rest of the city.  
Is there any evidence that could help us forecast how spatial inequalities and disadvantage will 
evolve? Given the predictive power of human capital on future labour market outcomes, in the 
next section I explore the distribution of spatial educational performance and opportunities in 
Santiago.  
2.3.2 Academic achievement in secondary school 
Fig. 2.21 shows the spatial distribution of student performance in Santiago according to the 
2004 SIMCE test score in mathematics. This figure shows that schools in the city’s northeast 
have higher average test scores (on average, higher than 75 per cent of one standard deviation 
above the national mean). In contrast, schools in the city’s west and south exhibit the worst test 
scores in Santiago (on average, lower than 22 per cent of one standard deviation below the 
national mean). The map in this figure is consistent with the general picture portrayed by Fig. 
2.19, where labour earnings were also higher in Santiago’s northeast and lower in the city’s west 
and south. 
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Fig. 2.21 ‘Average student performance in each school’ and ‘average student performance in the area’ 
of eighth-graders (13 year olds) in the 2004 SIMCE test in mathematics and Santiago’s subway 
network in 2004 (before the expansion of the subway network in the mid-2000s). Notes: The 
unit of observation for the average student performance is each school. The average student 
performance in the area is an interpolation of the average student performance in each school. 
This is a kernel interpolation with barriers with an Epanechnikov kernel of bandwidth 2.7 km. 
Test scores are measured as z-scores standardised at the national level with a mean of zero and 
a standard deviation of one. 
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Given the close relation between human capital and future wages, educational performance is 
relevant insofar that it enables us to have an idea of the future map of economic disadvantage 
in a city. However, evidence about the spatial inequalities of educational opportunities in 
Santiago would also be relevant. Hence, a Santiago map showing the average value-added to 
students in each school would be ideal to show this distribution. A crucial input to a school 
value-added calculation is data for the same student in the same school over two periods. 
Unfortunately, to my knowledge, there are no panel datasets with test scores in Chile’s capital 
during the early 2000s that would enable me to derive value-added calculations.  
An indicator that could provide an imperfect but still valuable proxy for school value-added is 
what I call ‘contextual student performance’. I define average contextual student performance 
as the average test score in a certain cohort of a school controlling for characteristics of students 
that affect achievement that are beyond the school’s control. These characteristics could include, 
for example, the student’s gender as well as socioeconomic characteristics such as household 
income and parental level of education. The strength of the contextual student performance 
indicator is that, because it controls for socioeconomic characteristics as well as the student’s 
gender, the indicator does not reflect the socioeconomic characteristics of the students’ families, 
or the student’s gender. The weakness of contextual student performance as a proxy for school 
value-added is that the individual (unobserved) talent of the student could still dominate my 
proxy for school value-added. As I explain in Section 2.2.2, one of the characteristics of Chile’s 
educational system during the 2000s is that voucher, private schools, and oversubscribed 
municipal schools were able to select students for such things as their abilities. This magnifies 
the possibility that my measure of contextual student performance is influenced not only by the 
schools’ value-added to student achievement, but also by the students’ innate ability. To my 
knowledge, no other researcher has calculated proxies of school (or teacher) value-added using 
only cross-section data.  
Fig. 2.22 shows the average contextual student performance for the different areas in Santiago. 
I calculate the contextual student performance by running a regression of eighth graders’ 
individual test scores in the 2004 SIMCE test score in mathematics on household income, 
maternal and paternal levels of education (primary, secondary, vocational, graduate, or 
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postgraduate education) interacted by the number of maternal or paternal completed years of 
education, the child’s gender, and a dummy variable for each school in Santiago.6  
 
Fig. 2.22  ‘Contextual average student performance’ and ‘contextual average student performance in the 
area’ of eighth-graders (13 year olds) in the 2004 SIMCE test in mathematics and Santiago’s 
subway network in 2004 (before the expansion of the subway network in the mid-2000s). 
Notes: The unit of observation for the contextual average student performance is each school. 
The contextual average student performance in the area is an interpolation of each school’s 
contextual average student performance. This is a kernel interpolation with barriers with an 
Epanechnikov kernel of bandwidth 2.7 km. Test scores are measured as z-scores standardised 
at the national level with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. 
                                                 
6 See Appendix 4 for a detailed description of the method of imputation of missing values for each of these 
socioeconomic variables. 
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I interpret the coefficient on each school’s dummy variable (this is, the school fixed-effects) as 
the average contextual student performance for each school. When running this regression on 
these test scores, both the student’s gender as well as the maternal and paternal levels of 
education interacted by the number of parental completed years in the highest education level 
are highly significant. In addition, the correlation between student performance and contextual 
student performance is 58 per cent. Hence, the contextual student performance measure is not 
identical with the student performance measure itself. Despite this non-perfect correlation, Fig. 
2.22 shows that the map of contextual student performance is remarkably similar to the one of 
student performance. 
This section provides suggestive evidence that, although student performance and contextual 
student performance do not correlate entirely, the degree of spatial inequality in average student 
performance and of educational opportunities in different areas in Santiago go hand in hand. 
On the other hand, as mentioned in Chapter 1, there is a large body of literature that 
hypothesises and concludes that an improvement in legal employment opportunities decreases 
the incentives for illegal employment (or crime). Having reviewed the spatial inequality in 
employment and schooling opportunities in Santiago, in the next section I explore the spatial 
inequality in property crime outcomes in Santiago. A second aim of this section is to provide a 
picture of the baseline distribution of property crime in Santiago before the subway expansion 
in the mid-2000s. This provides the background for Chapter 6 analysis of the impact of better 
urban transport accessibility on property crime. 
2.3.3 Property crime  
How is property crime distributed in Santiago? Does property crime correlate with urban 
transport accessibility to the central business district? The aim of this section is to provide a 
preliminary analysis of these two questions. In Chapter 6, I provide a more nuanced answer to 
the second question by using panel data and a quantitative analysis.  
To respond to the first question, it is useful to think of how different theories can help us predict 
what the property crime distribution in a city will be like. First, a large body of literature on 
criminology tests whether criminals are more prone to commit crimes near their places of 
residence compared to places away from their places of residence. The hypothesis that criminals 
prefer to commit crimes nearer to rather than farther from their homes is known as the ‘distance 
decay theory’. Using aggregate data, Capone and Nichols in Miami (1976) and Rattner and 
Portnov (2007) in Israel find that crime is more frequent nearer the offender’s home. However, 
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Koppen and Keijser (1997) point out that even if individuals would increase their crime rate 
with distance, the spational distribution of aggregate data would still show a distance-decay 
shape. If the distance decay hypothesis were correct, we would expect to see more property 
crimes in the areas where people more prone to commit crime live. Second, as I discuss in the 
introductory chapter, following the seminal contribution by Gary Becker (1968), the rational 
choice hypotheses state that there is a trade-off between legal and illegal work. According to 
this framework, individuals with better employment opportunities, which in turn are correlated 
with the location of the individual and with the individual’s human capital, have fewer incentives 
to engage in property crime. Third, because an affluent property crime target (an individual or 
a dwelling) is theoretically more attractive than a less affluent one, household or individual 
affluence of the target could positively affect property crime rates. However, an affluent 
household may potentially invest more on security than a less affluent one. Hence, whether the 
affluence of the target has a positive or negative effect on property crime rates is an empirical 
question. In fact, while Tseloni et al. (2004) find that household affluence is associated with 
higher burglary rates in the UK, the same authors find that household affluence is associated 
with lower burglary rates in the USA.   
The joint implication of the distance decay and rational choice perspectives is that we should 
expect to see more property crime in areas where employment opportunities are scarce. This is 
because the opportunity cost of crime is lower in these areas and individuals tend to commit 
crimes near their residence. The affluence of the area (affluence that is also correlated with 
employment opportunities but is not identical to it) could also affect property crime rates, but 
in a context-dependent way. 
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, the areas where individuals have fewer employment opportunities 
are in Santiago’s south- and east-ends. Hence, all else being equal, I expect higher crime rates in 
Santiago’s southern and eastern metropolitan peripheries. In the specific case of burglary, I also 
expect that the density of dwellings should also affect the density of burglary. Therefore, all else 
being equal, burglary should be higher in municipalities with a denser residential population. As 
shown in Fig. 2.3, the densest municipalities in terms of population are in the eastern and 
southern peripheries of the 2001 subway network.  
My second question was whether there is a correlation between urban transport accessibility 
and property crime rates. The prediction of theoretical models about the effect of transport 
accessibility on crime rates is ambiguous on this point. Proximity to the subway network implies 
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easier access of potential offenders to the area with better transport accessibility. In addition, in 
the case of robbery and larceny, better transport accessibility also implies a higher density of 
targets of property crime around the subway stations. Both predictions imply a positive 
association between better urban transport accessibility and property crime rates. On the other 
hand, better transport accessibility may also imply more ‘eyes on the street’ that could deter 
crime due to a higher probability of the on-going crime being reported to the police (Jacobs 
1961). This last factor would imply a negative association between transport accessibility and 
property crime rates. Given the theoretically negative and positive impacts of better urban 
transport accessibility on property crime rates, the sign of such impact is also an empirical 
question. 
Fig. 2.23 shows the distribution of the density of reported burglary to the police in Santiago.7 
This figure shows that there are more reports of burglary in the city’s central business district 
relative to reports of burglary in the city’s periphery. This is not in line with the joint prediction 
of the distance decay and rational choice theories or with the prediction that there would be 
more burglary in those municipalities with a higher population density. The pattern in Fig. 2.23 
is consistent with the prediction of higher property crime rates in places where the targets 
(dwellings) are more affluent and, hence, more attractive. On the other hand, the pattern in this 
figure does not show a visual correlation between proximity to the subway network and 
burglary. 
                                                 
7 For the definition of burglary, see the glossary of terms. 
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Fig. 2.23 Density of burglary recorded by the police and Santiago’s subway network in 2005 (before the 
expansion of the subway network in the mid-2000s). Note: Author’s estimates are from Chile’s 
Subsecretaria de Prevención del Delito data. The density of burglary is an interpolation of the 
number of burglary per unit of area. This is a kernel interpolation with barriers with an 
Epanechnikov kernel of bandwidth 2.7 km. 
One important difference between burglary and the joint category of robbery and larceny is 
that, while in the former category, the targets (dwellings) are immobile, in the latter category 
the targets (people) are mobile. Does this imply that the spatial distribution of reported crime 
in Santiago for immobile and mobile targets might be different?  
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Fig 2.23 shows the density of robbery and larceny in Santiago.8 Both panels in this figure show 
a high visual association between proximity to the subway network and robbery or larceny. 
Hence, this figure provides cross-section evidence that urban public transport accessibility may 
have a stronger effect on the spatial distribution of robbery and larceny than on the spatial 
distribution of burglary. Fig. 2.23 also provides visual evidence that, insofar as workers who are 
commuting to their jobs using the subway network are attractive targets of crime, the 
attractiveness of the areas close to the subway network for likely offenders is positively related 
to the property crime rate. By contrast, this figure does not visual provide evidence in favour of 
the joint prediction of the distance decay and rational choice theories; these theories imply that 
there should be more property crime in the southern and eastern metropolitan peripheries. 
Panel A. Density of robbery in Santiago. 
 
Panel B. Density of larceny in Santiago. 
 
Fig. 2.24 Density of robbery and larceny recorded by the police and Santiago’s subway network in 2005 
(before the expansion of the subway network in the mid-2000s). Note: Author’s estimates are 
from Chile’s Subsecretaria de Prevención del Delito data. The density of burglary is an 
interpolation of the number of burglaries per unit of area. This is a kernel interpolation with 
barriers with an Epanechnikov kernel of bandwidth 2.7 km. 
My findings in this section are consistent with the hypothesis that the attractiveness of the 
targets of property crime is a crucial factor in property crime rates. In the case of burglary, the 
most attractive destinations with a relatively high density of dwellings are in high-income, 
                                                 
8 For the definition of robbery and larceny, see the glossary of terms. 
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centrally located municipalities like Santiago and Ñuñoa (see Fig. 2.23). However, in the case of 
robbery and larceny, the most attractive targets move and there is a high spatial concentration 
of them in the central business district and around the subway network (see Fig. 2.23). 
2.4 Summary and conclusions 
What does this chapter tells us about how generalisable the conclusions from Chapters 4, 5 and 
6 are? As argued in the context of Amsterdam by Van Praag and Baarsma (2005), there are 
several facts that suggest that Santiago’s housing market is not in equilibrium. As pointed out in 
Section 2.3.2, two thirds of dwellings built in Chile between 1976 and 2007 were publicly 
subsidised. This, plus the fact that beneficiaries of publicly subsidised dwellings in Chile were 
not allowed to sell their dwellings within the first five years generated frictions in Chile’s housing 
market.  
Other factors affecting ‘dwelling immobility’ also contributed to a lack of equilibrium in the 
market. For example, in 2002, 76 per cent of all dwellings in Chile were owned by their residents. 
These frictions or ‘dwelling immobility’ in Chile are documented by Simian (2010) and in the 
international literature (see, for example, Helderman et al. 2004).  
Hence, most likely, unlike in other cities, many citizens in Santiago with low income but high 
chance of being employed live in the metropolitan edge because the government gave them 
housing in that specific location (not because they chose that place). If this conjecture were true, 
could this mean that the impacts of better transport accessibility estimated in Chapters 4, 5, and 
6 are likely to be different in other contexts? Most likely, the external validity of my findings 
depends on the socioeconomic dimension. The impact of better urban transport accessibility 
on the probability of being employed could be higher in Santiago than in cities with a housing 
market in equilibrium. Due to rigidities in the housing market, we could hypothesise that citizens 
in Santiago's metropolitan edge have a higher elasticity between commuting costs and the 
probability of employment (or, more generally, other labour market outcomes) relative to 
citizens living in cities whose housing market is in equilibrium. The reason is that, in cities with 
housing markets in equilibrium, Alonso's monocentric model would predict that individuals 
with a high elasticity between commuting costs and probability of employment are probably 
more prone to live nearer the central business district relative to individuals living in cities with 
a high dwelling immobility.  
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Similarly, the magnitude of the impact of better urban transport accessibility on high school 
academic achievement could also be higher in contexts of high dwelling immobility. The reason 
is that in Santiago there could be a larger proportion of families living in the metropolitan edge 
with an above-average belief about the magnitude of the impact of better urban transport 
accessibility on their socioeconomic conditions relative to the same proportion of families living 
in cities with a low dwelling immobility. 
The external validity of the results related to crime (Chapter 6) depends on the type of crime. 
The results of Chapter 6 on crime to immobile targets such as burglary are more applicable to 
contexts with a high degree of dwelling immobility. One potentially relevant mechanism for the 
effect of better urban transport accessibility on burglary in cities with a high degree of dwelling 
mobility could be through a change in the socioeconomic composition of residents due to the 
transport improvement. For example, wealthier residents are likely to invest more in security 
(decreasing burglary) and their dwellings are more attractive targets for burglars (increasing 
burglary). However, the channel of changes in the composition of residents is less likely to be 
relevant in cities with a high dwelling immobility. The results of Chapter 6 on crime to mobile 
targets are also more applicable to contexts with a high degree of dwelling immobility. Wealthier 
residents, insofar they commute by car (as opposed to public transport) are less likely to be 
robbed as pedestrians, but their car is more likely to be robbed relative to poorer residents.   
This chapter also provides a snapshot of the socioeconomic conditions in Chile and Santiago 
before, during and after the period of interest (early and mid 2000s). Economic inequality is 
persistent in Chile and Santiago. Despite a sizable reduction in its poverty rate using an absolute 
cut-off and an important reduction in economic inequality experienced by Chile in the last three 
decades, the country is still within the 12 per cent of the most unequal countries in the world 
according to its Gini coefficient. Moreover, Santiago is even more unequal compared to Chile 
in terms of household income.  
In addition, in 2001—the baseline year for Chapter 4—Chile’s employment rate was one of the 
lowest in the OECD. A low employment rate among women and individuals in the lowest 
income quintiles relative to other Latin American middle-income countries drove Chile’s low 
employment rate. Moreover, in 2009, Chile exhibited extremely high ‘employment inequality’ 
measured as the ratio of the employment rate in the richest tenth to the employment rate in the 
poorest tenth. As argued by Velasco and Huneeus (2012), Chile’s high employment inequality 
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is suggestive evidence that inequality in access to employment between advantaged and 
disadvantaged households is one of the main factors behind Chile’s high income inequality. 
On the other hand, Chile has one of the highest correlations between socioeconomic status and 
test scores in ninth grade (for 15-year-olds) among all countries who took the PISA in 2009 and 
2012. Moreover, this correlation is even higher in Santiago than in Chile. Given the centrality 
of human capital accumulation in future earnings (Card and Krueger 1992; Angrist and Krueger 
1991), the previously described high correlation suggests that Chile and its capital city are 
currently trapped in a cycle of inequality in access to employment, income, and human capital 
acquisition. Chetty, Hendren, Kline and Saez (2014) conclude that high residential segregation, 
income inequality and worse primary schools among other factors decrease intergenerational 
mobility. As discussed in this chapter, these three factors are present in Chile’s context. Hence, 
my preliminary findings that portray an unequal distribution of current and future income 
generation are consistent with the findings of Chetty et al.  
In addition, individuals of lower socioeconomic status in Chile not only have to endure living 
in a highly unequal society in terms of income, employment, and schooling, but also are more 
likely to perceive that crime is increasing in their neighbourhoods relative to the perception of 
individuals of higher socioeconomic status. This, most likely, decreases the well-being of 
individuals of lower socioeconomic status. 
In this bleak picture of socioeconomic and spatial inequality, are there any policies that could 
improve socioeconomic outcomes in Santiago? One policy option could be to provide low 
income-households with subsidised housing in neighbourhoods nearer to employment and 
better schooling opportunities. Another policy option could be to decrease commuting costs 
(including travel time) from low-income neighbourhoods on the periphery of the city to areas 
of high employment density and better schooling opportunities. It is the second option that 
Santiago chose to implement beginning in 2001.  In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I explore whether a 
massive improvement in Chile’s subway network had any impact in labour market, academic 
achievement and crime outcomes. 
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     Chapter 3 
3. Methods 
3.1 Measurement issues 
The definition of transport accessibility which the British Department for Transport (2011) uses 
is the ‘extent to which individuals and households can access day to day services, such as 
employment, education, healthcare, food stores and town centres.’ (2011, 2). According to this 
definition, accessibility is intimately related to the cost (in time, money, and effort) incurred by 
individuals when accessing their routine activities. In this thesis, the relevant day-to-day activities 
are workers’ access to employment, students’ access to nearby schools, and potential offenders’ 
access to targets for crime. The impact on these activities will be discussed in detail in Chapters 
4, 5, and 6 respectively.  
The British Department for Transport’s definition of accessibility implies costs in terms of time, 
money, and effort to get from origin to destination. I call this ‘destination accessibility’. Ahlfeldt 
(2013) uses destination accessibility when considering the change in travelling distance of 
workers to all potential employers. However, to apply the destination accessibility concept to 
the present study, I should model the whole transport network with its different modes (walking, 
car, bus, subway) and car availability during different periods of the day. Alternatively, I could 
assume that each individual has only two modes of transport available: subway or walking (and 
a combination of both modes). I call ‘subway accessibility’ to an indicator that is inversely 
proportional to the average time that each individual would take to every potential employer in 
the city when the only available modes of transport are subway and walking. In the context of 
Chapter 4, to calculate a subway accessibility measure for each individual, I would need the 
location of every employer (or cluster of employers) in Santiago.  In Chapter 5, I would need to 
define all schools at a feasible commuting distance for each student. In Chapter 6, I would need 
the location of the residence of criminals in Santiago. Unfortunately, the criteria for defining 
‘feasible commuting distance’ for students in Chapter 5 requires a very specific knowledge about 
individuals. In the context of Chapter 4, I do not know of datasets with the addresses of 
employers (or clusters of employers) for Santiago. In addition, in the context of Chapter 6, I do 
not have the criminals’ address.  
A third option is to use the distance between each worker’s residence, school or crime area and 
the nearest subway station as a proxy for access. I call this ‘station accessibility’. The advantage 
of using station accessibility is that it does not require knowledge, data or assumptions about 
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modes of transport other than the subway. In the context of the impact of better urban transport 
accessibility on property prices, Ahlfeldt (2013) finds similar results using both definitions of 
accessibility. Because of data availability, in this thesis I use the station accessibility definition. 
3.2 Methodological framework 
This section discusses the methods for quantifying the impact of better urban transport 
accessibility on socioeconomic outcomes. To provide a basic reference point I start by 
describing a simple cross-section regression for studying such relations. Then I describe an 
individual fixed-effects regression that accounts for unobserved fixed characteristics of each 
worker, school or crime area depending on the chapter. Finally, I address the general issues that 
could bias my fixed-effects estimates of the impact of better urban transport accessibility on 
socioeconomic outcomes. 
I start by describing a simple regression model relating the outcome of interest to urban 
transport accessibility proxied by proximity to the subway network. The outcomes of interest 
are labour market outcomes, education test scores, or property crime rates. Below is the model 
that has been often used to study the relation between accessibility and socioeconomic 
outcomes (see, for example, Dickerson and McIntosh (2013) for an application to education):  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡               (𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁;  𝑡 = 1, . . , 𝑡),  (3.1) 
In (3.1), 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the outcome of an individual or area i in period t, 𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the distance between unit 
i and its nearest subway station at time t, 𝑓𝑖 are individual unobserved characteristics that are 
fixed over time, 𝑔𝑡 are general time effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is equation (3.1)’s error term. The key 
parameter in equation (3.1) is 𝛽, the effect of proximity to the subway network on the outcome 
of interest. 
The problem with equation (3.1) is that there could be unobserved characteristics such as a 
worker or student’s ability, or the area’s attractiveness for property crime that could be 
correlated both with the outcome of interest and the proximity to the subway network. This 
could happen if, in Chapter 5 for example, schools with a high proportion of students from 
higher socioeconomic status households were located nearer to the subway stations compared 
to schools with a high proportion of students from lower socioeconomic households. If this 
were the case, an analysis based on (3.1) would suffer from omitted variable bias.   
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To account for unit i’s unobserved fixed characteristics whose effects do not change over time 
(variable 𝑓𝑖 in equation (3.1)) I work with time differences instead of a cross-section. To study 
the effects of variation in the key variable (accessibility or distance between schools and their 
nearest subway stations), models based on time differences need variation in the key variable 
that—conditional on the regressors—is uncorrelated with the dependent variable’s (test scores) 
trend. As I explain in Chapter 2, one of the largest changes in Santiago’s subway network 
occurred in the mid-2000s. This subway expansion consisted of a new 24-km subway line (Line 
4) that goes from the central business district to the south of Santiago, plus extensions of 
existing subway lines in the northern and southern peripheries of Santiago (Lines 2, 4A and 5). 
This massive change in transport accessibility decreased the distance from the nearest subway 
station for more than 50 per cent of households in Santiago. I exploit these transport 
innovations as well as large-scale panel datasets described in each chapter to identify the impact 
of proximity to the subway network on socioeconomic outcomes. 
A convenient way to estimate equation (3.1) is to rewrite it in time-differenced form: 
(𝑦𝑖1 − 𝑦𝑖0) = (𝑑𝑖1 − 𝑑𝑖0)𝛽 + (𝑔1−𝑔0) + (𝜀i1 − 𝜀i0) (3.2) 
In contrast with equation (3.1), equation (3.2) does not contain the unit i’s unobserved 
characteristics that are time-invariant (𝑓𝑖) yet still contains the parameter of interest, 𝛽. The two 
periods are before the construction of the new subway stations (t=0) and after their construction 
(t=1).  
Equation (3.2) is an explicit way of specifying a ‘before and after’ analysis that enables us to 
identify the key parameter 𝛽 accounting for invariant characteristics of individuals: ?̂? is the 
fixed-effects estimator. The identifying assumption for an unbiased estimate of the effect of 
closer proximity to the subway network on each socioeconomic outcome is that, conditional on 
individuals’ invariant characteristics, the change in unobservables for an individual, student or 
crime area (𝜀𝑖1 − 𝜀𝑖0) must be uncorrelated with the distance reduction to the subway network 
(𝑑𝑖1 − 𝑑𝑖0). This assumption could be violated if, between the baseline and post-subway 
expansion periods, differential shocks on socioeconomic outcomes could have affected 
individuals who would experience different magnitudes of distance reduction to the subway 
network. For example, in Chapter 4, the identifying assumption would be violated if individuals 
who would experience a large distance reduction to the subway network in the mid-2000s 
experienced a sustained increasing trend in the probability of being employed before and after 
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the opening of the new subway stations relative to the same probability for individuals who 
would not experience such a distance reduction to the subway network. 
One way of relaxing the identifying assumption is to assume that the change in unobservables 
affecting outcomes is uncorrelated with the distance reduction to the subway network only for 
units of similar baseline characteristics. To implement this assumption, in equation (3.2), I 
control for several baseline characteristics. These controls for baseline characteristics of the 
individuals allow the fixed effects estimator to compare the outcomes of specific individuals not 
with the whole sample, but only with those individuals with similar baseline characteristics. For 
example, in the case of labour market outcomes (Chapter 4), the baseline characteristics of 
individuals are comprised of salary at the individual’s main job, total household income, years 
of schooling, whether the contract was indefinite or fixed-term, marital status, type of health 
insurance, whether the person had health problems during any of the four years before the 
interview, type of home tenure, number of rooms in the household, and the perception of those 
interviewed about the evolution of their neighbourhood during the past five years with respect 
to business premises, schools, streets, and sidewalks. All regressions include the linear and 
quadratic terms of continuous variables and dichotomous variables for discrete characteristics. 
After controlling for these baseline characteristics, the empirical specification is as follows: 
𝑦𝑖1 − 𝑦𝑖0 = (𝑑𝑖1 − 𝑑𝑖0)𝛽 + (𝑔1 − 𝑔0) + 𝑥𝑖0
′ γ+ (𝜀𝑖1 − 𝜀𝑖0)           (𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁), (3.3) 
where 𝑥𝑖0
′  is a vector that contains all previously mentioned baseline characteristics.9 
A more general specification allows for the possibility that a distance reduction to the subway 
network for a unit (worker, student, or crime target) that ends up at a certain threshold distance 
(e.g. walking distance) from a subway station could have a larger impact than the same distance 
reduction for a unit that ends up several kilometres away from the subway network. To allow 
for such flexibility, in the spirit of Gibbons and Machin (2005), I interact the distance from the 
subway network with an indicator function that takes value one when the unit is at a maximum 
threshold from the new subway stations and zero otherwise. In Chapters 5 and 6, I choose two 
kilometres as the threshold distance by considering feasible walking distances to the nearest 
subway station (0-3 km) and maximising the equation’s R-squared in 0.5 km grids. This ended 
up being the same threshold (walking) distance used by Gibbons and Machin (2005) and 
Ahlfeldt (2013). Following the same procedure in Chapter 4, where I work with distances 
                                                 
9 Including 𝑥𝑖1
′ in the equation in first differences is equivalent to incorporating ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ in the levels equation where 
ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝐼{𝑡 = 1} is an indicator function that takes value one during the first period, zero otherwise. 
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aggregated at the municipality level, the resulting threshold distance is one kilometre. Defining 
the indicator function as ℎ𝑖𝑡 =  𝐼(𝑑𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒), where 𝐼(… ) equals one when the 
condition in parentheses is true and zero otherwise, I have 
(𝑦𝑖1 − 𝑦𝑖0) = (𝑑𝑖1 − 𝑑𝑖0)ℎ𝑖1𝛽1 + (𝑑𝑖1 − 𝑑𝑖0)(1 − ℎ𝑖1)𝛽2 + 𝑥𝑖0
′ 𝛾 + (𝑔1−𝑔0)
+ (𝜀i1 − 𝜀i0) 
(3.4) 
 
In equation (3.4), 𝛽1 is the impact of closer proximity to the subway network on the outcome 
of interest. 
 
Equations (3.1) through (3.4) assume that the effect of distance reduction to the subway network 
(𝑑𝑖1 − 𝑑𝑖0) on the outcome variable is linear (i.e. the marginal effect is the same for units which 
experience a one or a ten kilometre distance reduction). However, there are no theoretical 
reasons to assume that such effect is linear. One way for allowing non-linear effects is to 
categorise units according to their distance reduction. In this case, the time-differenced model 
that allows for non-linear effects of distance reduction on each outcome of interest is: 
(𝑦𝑖1 − 𝑦𝑖0) = ∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝑗
ℎ𝑖1𝛽1𝑗 + ∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝑗
(1 − ℎ𝑖1)𝛽2𝑗 + 𝑥𝑖0
′ 𝛾 + (𝑔1−𝑔0) + (𝜀i1 − 𝜀i0) 
(3.5) 
In (3.5), 𝑐𝑗 are dummy variables, one for each of the 𝑗 non-reference categories of distance 
reduction.  
3.3 Identification strategy 
I argue that changes in proximity to Santiago’s subway network in the mid-2000s are a shock 
to urban transport accessibility that is exogenous to changes in each of the outcome variables 
(labour market, academic achievement and property crime as discussed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 
respectively). This argument is conditional on baseline observable characteristics such as 
distance from the pre-expansion subway network and other baseline characteristics that the 
literature has previously identified as predictive of the dependent variable. Hence, the change 
in proximity experienced by Santiago’s workers, students and crime areas enables me to 
identify the impact of better urban transport accessibility on labour market outcomes, 
academic achievement and crime. 
One could claim that a source of endogeneity in the relation between the increase in proximity 
to the subway network and the socioeconomic outcomes could be the capacity of the 
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municipality’s mayors to lobby for the subway to pass through their municipalities. If this 
capacity to lobby is correlated with the mayor’s ability to improve (or worsen) the 
socioeconomic outcomes in the municipality, the previous concern would be a source of bias 
in my estimates. In each chapter, using different methods, I control for this potential source of 
endogeneity. In Chapter 4, I control for citizens’ perceptions of the improvement of their 
neighbourhoods in several dimensions (access to schools, access to shopping facilities, and 
streets) so this should account for the mayor’s capacity to lobby for the subway. In addition, I 
provide a placebo experiment where I run the fixed-effects analysis using data from two periods 
before the subway expansion. In Chapter 5, in the first differences regression, I control for the 
municipality where the school of each student is located, so the concern about endogeneity 
between proximity to the subway network and academic achievement is not an issue. Finally, 
the police in Chile are managed at a centralised level so, at least from the point of view of the 
action of the police on crime, the skills of a mayor or capacity to get more funding should not 
have a causal impact on the crime indicators in a municipality.  
Additionally, as explained earlier, the identification of the effect of proximity to the subway 
network on socioeconomic outcomes rests on the assumption that there are no variables that 
are correlated both with the changes in outcomes due to the subway expansion and the distance 
reduction to the subway network induced by the subway expansion. This assumption could be 
violated if, for example in Chapter 4, there is a pre-existing trend in which the likelihood of 
employment for workers with more years of education would be increasing more than the 
likelihood of employment for workers with fewer years of education. If the citizens’ years of 
education is correlated with the magnitude of the future reduction to the subway network this 
would bias my estimates.  
With suitable data, I can address the previously mentioned concern about the internal validity 
of the fixed-effects estimates in chapters 4, 5 and 6. To deal with potential pre-existing outcome 
trends that depend on the pre-subway expansion level of the covariates, in the three empirical 
chapters I control for several baseline characteristics. The baseline variables for which I control 
for in each individual fixed-effects regression are discussed in each empirical chapter (Sections 
4.2.2, 5.2.2, and 6.2). 
In practice, the model that addresses the potentially non-parallel trends for individuals of 
different baseline characteristics exploits the relation between distance reduction and variation 
in the outcome variable only for units with the same initial level of baseline characteristics. 
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Hence, the identifying assumption for the resulting model is that, controlling for baseline 
characteristics, there are no omitted variables that are correlated with the outcome variable and 
the distance reduction to the subway network. 
The interpretation of the coefficient of interest in equation (3.5) is the intention to treat effect 
for a national planner who has no control over associated investments. Most of the investments 
that could have occurred around the new stations such as improvements to parks, streets, and 
lighting are decided by local governments. Local governments in Chile are elected separately 
from the central government, so the decisions of the former are autonomous with respect to 
the decisions of the latter. Other investments such as commercial investment is partly decided 
by the local governments through each municipality's land use planning and partly by the private 
firms who decide their own location. Although it would be interesting to explore whether 
additional investment around the new subway stations are relevant mechanisms for the 
socioeconomic effects of better urban transport accessibility, to my knowledge, there is no 
dataset with the information of park improvements, commercial investment or other relevant 
infrastructure investment in Santiago during the mid-2000s.    
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Chapter 4 
4. Better Urban Transport Accessibility 
Improves Labour Market Outcomes 
4.1 Introduction 
Many governments and non-governmental organisations spend huge amounts of effort and 
resources trying to improve their citizens’ labour market outcomes. All this effort raises an 
important question about which policies have a causal impact on improving these outcomes. 
The usual suspects are training schemes, employment subsidies, employment agencies, and 
policies that affect workers’ accessibility to employment. 
This chapter investigates specifically the relation between urban transport accessibility and 
labour market outcomes. As discussed in Chapter 1, sound theoretical considerations supported 
by evidence suggest that better transport accessibility at the worker’s place of residence 
improves their labour market outcomes. These considerations are related to labour supply, 
labour demand and the matching between workers and firms. 
Several strands in the literature have attempted to determine whether transport accessibility 
affects labour market outcomes. One strand explores the relation between job proximity and 
labour market outcomes. Åslund, Östh, and Zenou (2010), using data from Sweden, find that 
there is a significant impact of job proximity on individual employment and yearly total earnings. 
They claim that they are able to overcome the endogeneity of the association between 
commuting time and employment rate by using the policy that refugees in Sweden in the early 
90s were allocated in a supposedly random way (conditional on observables characteristics) to 
locations with different degrees of job accessibility. However, their argument is not totally 
convincing, because the refugees’ locations were in part determined by their desired locations 
and these desired locations were not part of Åslund et al.’s dataset.   
A second strand in the literature analyses the impact of commuting time on labour market 
outcomes. Gimenez Nadal and Molina (2011) conclude that, conditional on place of residence, 
one hour of commuting time increases daily working hours by 35 minutes. These authors use 
lagged and future regional housing costs as instruments for commuting time. However, as these 
authors note, this study has the limitation that it does not account for potential unobserved 
heterogeneity between workers (for instance, those commuting more could be more talented). 
Some authors have found that commuting time is negatively correlated with female labour force 
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participation (see Black, Kolesnikova, and Taylor (2014), who use US data aggregated at the city 
level) even more than with males in the labour force  (Cogan 1981, Gordon 1989). This 
heterogeneity in the elasticity between commuting time and female employment rate, suggests 
that in this chapter I should explore the impact of better urban transport accessibility on female 
labour market outcomes separately from the same impact on the entire working-age population. 
A third strand in the literature focuses on the effect of transportation costs on labour market 
outcomes. Gibbons and Machin (2003) conclude that the opening of the Jubilee Tube Line in 
South East London at the end of the 1990s slightly increased the number of jobs in firms near 
the new subway stations in certain economic sectors (e.g. the financial sector). However, 
transport innovations could affect labour market outcomes not only by increasing firms’ 
demand for workers, but also by decreasing commuting costs to workers living near the new 
tube line stations. Because Gibbon and Machin’s dataset included only firm-level data and not 
residence-related employment data, the authors could not analyse the effect of the new tube line 
on the employment rate. Some other researchers have analysed the effect of better transport 
accessibility on the employment rates of minority workers. Holzer, Quigley and Raphael (2003) 
conclude that the expansion of the San Francisco rail system increased the hiring of Latinos—
but not of African-Americans—by firms near the new stations compared to the hiring of 
Latinos by firms farther from these stations. They use the rail expansion as a natural experiment 
that increased transport accessibility for workers to the firms near the new stations. Phillips 
(2012), using data from a randomised field experiment in Washington DC, finds that a transport 
subsidy increased the probability that an unemployed job-seeker becomes employed in nine 
percentage points. Phillips also finds evidence that the mechanism through which workers 
increased their probability of being employed was an increased intensity and spatial scope of job 
search. 
A fourth strand in the literature analyses whether road construction has an impact on labour 
market outcomes. Michaels (2008) finds that increased access to the US highway system 
between 1959 and 1975 led to an increase in the demand for skill. To avoid a potential 
endogeneity between road construction and demand for labour, Michaels uses the unintended 
connection to the US highway system of economically small cities as an exogenous shock to 
accessibility to highways. In addition, Duranton and Turner (2012) find that increases in a city’s 
stock of (interstate) highways in the USA increase employment over the next 20 years in those 
areas. To avoid the potential endogeneity between road construction and employment, they use 
planned routes, railroads and exploration maps as instruments for the actually built routes. On 
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another example, Sanchis-Guarner (2012) finds that, while increases in accessibility from work 
have a positive effect on wages and hours worked, increases in accessibility from home do not 
have an effect on either outcome. Sanchis-Guarner exploits the construction of new roads in 
Great Britain in the 2002–2008 period holding workers’ home and work locations constant.  
In order to measure any impact of transport accessibility on labour market outcomes, I use the 
average distance between the individuals’ municipalities of residence and the nearest subway 
station (‘municipality–subway distance reduction’).   
The main contribution of this chapter is to use a convincing identification strategy to show that 
individuals’ labour market outcomes (employment status, hours of work, and labour earnings) 
respond causally to improvements in transport accessibility at their place of residence. My 
identification strategy exploits changes in transport accessibility induced by a large expansion of 
the subway network in Santiago (Chile) in the mid-2000s. For a detailed explanation of the 
subway expansion and my identification strategy, see Sections 2.1.4 and 3.3 respectively. In 
accordance with program evaluation literature, I refer to the individuals affected by the transport 
innovation as my ‘treated group.’ My evaluation method is an individual fixed-effects model that 
allows for differential trends in labour market outcomes along pre-treatment observed 
covariates. To allow for such differential trends, as explained in Section 3.3, I incorporate several 
personal and municipal predetermined characteristics in an ordinary least squares first-
differences framework. I also check that the assumption of parallel trends for individuals who 
experienced different degrees of municipality–subway distance reduction holds in a period 
before the expansion of the subway network. 
My regression estimates are based on an individual panel dataset of people living in the Santiago 
Metropolitan Region (‘Santiago’) in Chile. Santiago is an interesting and feasible place for 
conducting this study because of several reasons. First, as explained in Section 2.1.4, between 
March 2004 and March 2006, with the inauguration of a new 24-km subway line and eight 
additional new stations in other lines, Santiago experienced the most important improvement 
of its urban transport network in thirty years. Second, as explained with more detail in Section 
2.2.1, at the time of the subway network expansion, Santiago had an unusually low employment 
rate, compared both to other Latin American countries and to OECD countries. These two 
factors make Santiago useful for exploring whether difficulties in access to jobs explain part of 
the low employment rate in the city. Third, I have a detailed individual panel dataset with the 
employment status, income, and background characteristics of workers and non-workers living 
in Chile measured both before and after the subway network expansion. The fact that I work 
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with an individual panel dataset enables me to avoid changes in the composition of individuals 
in municipalities due to better transport accessibility. I avoid such composition (or selection) 
effects by estimating the effect on the group that would have received the treatment if the 
subway stations would have been inaugurated at the same time when they were announced (the 
announcement was in 2001). In other words, the municipality of residence is determined by the 
individuals’ address information in the pre-treatment period (2001) rather than in the post-
treatment one (2006). This kind of estimation is known as an intent-to-treat analysis (Little and 
Yau 1996). Moreover, in this chapter the focus on intent-to-treat estimates is necessary because 
the panel has no address information for the post-treatment period. 
I find that the employment rate, hours of work, and individual monthly earnings from labour 
for individuals in the treatment group relative to individuals in the control group increased 
substantially. In line with the program evaluation terminology, I identify as the ‘treated group’ 
those individuals whose municipality experienced an average municipality–subway distance 
reduction greater than one kilometre and who ended up at a minimum average distance of less 
than one kilometre from the subway network . In contrast, individuals whose municipality did 
not experience an average municipality–subway distance reduction and whose municipality  in 
both periods was farther than one kilometre from the subway network comprise the ‘control 
group.’ The employment of individuals in the treatment group increased 8.4 percentage points 
relative to the employment of workers in the control group. This is 14.3 per cent of the baseline 
employment rate of workers in the treated municipalities. I also find that hours of work for 
individuals in treated municipalities increased 29.4 hours per month relative to individuals in 
control municipalities. This is 30 per cent of the average baseline hours of work and, on average, 
represents 1.4 hours per weekday. Finally, I also find that, on average, the individual monthly 
earnings from labour for treated individuals increased by US$192 relative to the individual 
monthly income from work for control individuals.   
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 explains my methods. 
Although these were broadly explained in Section 3.2 and above, Section 4.2 shows the 
estimation equation and the identification issues that are specific to this paper. Section 4.3 
describes the data and the empirical implementation. Section 4.4 presents and discusses my 
results. Finally, Section 4.5 presents concluding remarks. 
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4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Methodological Framework 
In this chapter, my estimation equation is as follows: 
𝐸𝑖1 − 𝐸𝑖0 = 𝑑𝑖
′ℎ𝑖1𝛽1 + 𝑑𝑖
′(1 − ℎ𝑖1)𝛽2 + (𝑔1 − 𝑔0) + 𝑥𝑖0
′ γ+ (𝜀𝑖1 − 𝜀𝑖0)      
(𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁)  
(4.1) 
where 𝐸𝑖𝑡 is either employment status (a 0–1 dummy variable), hours of work, or labour earnings 
in year 𝑡; 𝑑𝑖
′ is a vector that contains dummy variables: one for each of the non-reference 
distance reduction to the subway network categories; ℎ𝑖1 =  𝐼(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑤𝑎𝑦 ≤
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒), where 𝐼(… ) is an indicator function that equals one when the condition 
in the parenthesis is true is and zero otherwise; 𝛽1 is now also a vector of the same length as 
vector 𝑑𝑖
′; and 𝑥𝑖0
′  is a vector that contains all baseline characteristics of individuals. In equation 
(4.2), the impact of better transport accessibility on labour market outcomes is given by 𝛽1; 𝑔𝑡 
captures overall employment trends in Santiago during the sample period of my study; the 
inclusion of individual baseline characteristics 𝑥𝑖0
′  in equation (4.1) enables me to relax the usual 
fixed-effects identifying assumption by enabling differential employment trends for individuals 
with different initial characteristics; and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents individual-specific transitory shocks to 
their employment status. 
4.2.2 Identification issues in this individual fixed-effects model 
As explained in Section 3.3, the identification of the effect of closer proximity to the subway 
network on socioeconomic outcomes rests on the assumption that there are no variables that 
are correlated both with the changes in outcomes due to the subway expansion and the distance 
reduction to the subway network induced by the subway expansion. This assumption could be 
violated by at least two reasons. First, if the improvement in subway proximity induces selection 
due to movement of workers in initially non-treated municipalities into treated areas in the post-
treatment period. The individuals’ municipality of residence in the CASEN panel dataset 
corresponds to the municipality of residence in the initial year of the panel (1996). Because the 
new subway line was announced in 2001, the municipality of residence is not subject to selection 
due to heterogeneous returns from proximity to the subway network. As pointed out in Section 
4.1, in this chapter I estimate an intent-to-treat effect.  
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Second, as pointed out in Section 3.3, this chapter’s identification assumption could also be 
violated if labour market outcomes (this chapter’s dependent variables) did not follow a parallel 
trend in treated municipalities with respect to control municipalities should the subway network 
expansion (the treatment) not have taken place. To relax this assumption, as pointed out in a 
generic way in Section 3.3, in this chapter I control for workers’ and their municipalities’ baseline 
characteristics. The baseline characteristics of workers include the worker’s initial labour market 
outcomes (excluding the outcome of interest for avoiding the lagged dependent variable bias 
issue), years of schooling, age, gender, marital status, health problems, number of rooms of their 
dwelling, housing tenure, perception of improvement of their neighbourhood, whether the 
dwelling is in a rural area. The baseline characteristics of worker’s municipality include the 
average initial distance between households in the worker’s municipality and the nearest subway 
station. 
4.3 Data and empirical implementation 
4.3.1 Data 
To identify the effect of better intracity transport accessibility on labour market outcomes we 
would ideally need a random allocation of individuals in places with different levels of transport 
accessibility. In reality, individuals and their households sort within a city depending on their 
individual characteristics. Even though we can control for the individuals’ observed 
characteristics, there will always be unobserved characteristics (like ability and high preference 
for shorter commutes) that may bias cross-section results. A way to control for unobserved 
individual characteristics is by having individual panel data before and after a large change in 
urban transport accessibility that, after controlling for predetermined characteristics, is as good 
as random. Ideally, we would want a large dataset with individual addresses and socio-
demographic information. I am not aware of publicly available panel datasets with individual 
addresses in contexts of large urban transport innovations in Chile. Given privacy issues, it is 
much more common to have individual panel datasets with the individual address approximated 
at some kind of administrative division within a metropolitan area.  
I use a detailed individual panel dataset on labour market outcomes and information about 
individuals’ municipalities of residence (35 municipalities in my dataset), level of schooling, 
health, demographic characteristics, housing, and perceptions of the neighbourhood. This 
dataset is Chile’s 1996, 2001, 2006 Casen Panel dataset (henceforth, ‘Casen Panel dataset’. While 
the 1996 wave was administered in November and December, the 2001 wave was administered 
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in October and November, and the 2006 wave, between November 2006 and February 2007. I 
restrict my sample to the working age population (15 years old and above as defined by Chile’s 
statistics authorities (Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas, Chile 2010)) in Santiago Metropolitan 
Region (’Santiago’) who responded to the Casen Panel survey in 2001 and 2006, and who were 
not studying full-time in 2001. I also restrict the sample to predominantly urban municipalities 
by setting the city limit at 30 km from Santiago’s subway network in 2006.10 The final dataset 
for my main results is a balanced two-period panel with 2,454 individuals representing 
approximately 3,349,800 citizens in Santiago.  
The Casen Panel dataset is a follow-up of the 1996 cross-section Casen survey. In 1996 and 
2001, the Casen Panel dataset sample sizes were 20,948 and 15,038. Hence, there was an attrition 
rate of 28.2 per cent. In 2006, the sample size was 10,370. Therefore, the 1996 –2006 attrition 
rate was 50.5 per cent (Bendezú, Denis, and Zubizarreta 2007).  
Although the bias due to attrition depends on the context and survey methods, based on 
previous evidence from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (‘PSID’), this 
proportion of attrition is not evidence by itself that the Casen Panel lost representativeness. 
Fitzgerald et al. (1998) found that after 21 years, the PSID had experienced an cumulative 
attrition rate of 50 per cent. These authors found that despite this attrition rate, the PSID 
remained a representative sample of the US population. Moreover, the Casen Panel dataset has 
longitudinal weights, which restore the representativeness dealing with potential selection on 
observables in the attrition. However, as in any study that uses panel data, selection on 
unobservables of attritors that could be correlated with both the treatment and the dependent 
variable, may limit the generalisation of the conclusions of this study to Santiago’s population. 
However, I have no reasons or knowledge to suppose that in the Panel Casen dataset there was 
a serious selection on unobservables of attritors. I am not aware of other panel datasets in Chile 
with labour market outcomes and the information about the municipality of residence with 
waves both before March 2004 and after March 2006. 
Alternatively, I could also use datasets with repeated cross sections before and after the 
transport innovation. However, because repeated cross-section surveys are administered to 
(potentially) different individuals in different periods, this type of dataset would not enable me 
to distinguish the effect of better transport accessibility on labour market outcomes due to 
                                                 
10 The criterion to set the city limits was to include those municipalities with a high proportion of urban 
residents. However, the results in this paper are robust to any city limit outside the boundaries of the 2006 
subway network. 
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compositional effects or place-based effects. Following D’Costa et al.’s terminology (2013), 
while people moving to locations of better accessibility cause the former effect—which may be 
potentially affected by selection bias—the causal effects on the individuals affected by the 
treatment are the latter type of effect. Because of their relevance to policy and the cost-
effectiveness evaluation of new subway lines, I am interested in identifying the place-based 
effect.  
4.3.2 Empirical implementation 
As pointed out in Section 4.2.1, to estimate the impact of better urban transport accessibility on 
labour market outcomes, ideally, I would need the distance between the residence of each 
individual and the nearest subway station. Although all household surveys—in particular, the 
Casen Panel dataset—record the address of each household, due to privacy issues, the 
information about the households’ specific address is not disclosed to researchers in Chile. As 
a proxy to the households’ address of residence, I use the households’ municipality of residence. 
As I mention in the data section, in my dataset, there are 35 municipalities in urban Santiago. 
Hence, the crucial spatial information about each household in my sample is the average 
distance between his or her municipality of residence and the nearest subway station.  
To calculate a measure of average distance between workers in each municipality and the subway 
network I need workers’ residential addresses. Because the Casen Panel dataset does not have 
individuals’ exact addresses (it only contains their municipalities), I need an alternative dataset 
with addresses. An alternative dataset that contains addresses is Chile's 2009 University Selection 
Test ‘PSU’. This dataset contains all the students who took Chile's University Selection Test in 
2009. Because the PSU dataset only contains households with students graduating from high 
school in 2008 who opted to take the PSU, the population of the PSU dataset is a subset of 
Santiago’s population. I used this dataset to calculate the average minimum distance of 
households in each municipality to the subway network before and after the inauguration of the 
new subway. By using this dataset, I assume that the average distance in each municipality 
between households with and without a student who took the PSU in 2009 and the closest 
subway station does not differ systematically. To obtain the previously mentioned household–
subway network minimum distances I calculated the Euclidean distance between each of the 
more than 100,000 households in Santiago in the PSU dataset and each subway station in the 
city.  
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4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of treated and control municipalities. This figure shows that, 
if I define treated and control municipalities following the criteria described in section 3.2, there 
is one treated municipality (Macul) and four control municipalities (Pedro Aguirre Cerda, 
Pudahuel, Cerro Navia and Lo Barnechea). The fact that the number of treated and control 
municipalities is small could raise concerns on my capacity to carry out causal inference. 
However, allowing correlation between the labour market outcomes of individuals within the 
same municipality should solve a potential source of underestimation of standard errors due to 
spatial correlation between the regression errors. Hence, in all specifications I cluster the 
standard errors at the municipality level.    
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Fig. 4.1 Treatment and control municipalities in Santiago 
Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics for my sample of individuals with weights that make the 
sample more representative of Santiago’s population. Columns (1) through (4) describe the 
characteristics of all non-student individuals in Santiago aged 15 and over in 2005. 3.3 per cent 
of individuals in Santiago lived in treated municipalities. The treated municipalities are those 
that, on average, experienced a distance reduction greater than one kilometre to the subway 
network and ended up closer than one kilometre from the subway network in 2005. On the 
other hand, 11.6 per cent of individuals in Santiago lived in control municipalities. Individuals 
living in municipalities that did not experience a distance reduction to the subway network and 
were farther than one kilometre from the new subway network in both periods compose the 
latter group.  
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Relative to individuals in the control group, individuals in the treated group had 2.2 more years 
of schooling and were 4.1 kilometres farther from the central business district. In addition, on 
average, treated individuals were 2.8 km closer to the subway network in 2001 than control 
individuals. The 2001 employment rates of individuals in the treated and control groups were 
almost the same: 58.6 per cent and 57.9 per cent respectively and the difference is not significant 
at conventional test levels. In 2006, the employment rate had increased to 67.9 per cent in the 
treatment group and to 58.5 per cent in the control group. Hence, the difference in the 
employment rates between the two groups in 2006 was of about 9.4 percentage points but is 
not significant at the five per cent level. This may be due to small sample size. These figures 
suggest a slight improvement in Santiago’s labour market during the 2001–2006 period. While 
hours of work in 2001 were slightly less in the treatment than in the control group (two hours 
per month), in 2006 individuals in the treated group, on average, worked 31 more hours per 
month. However, these differences are not statistically significant at conventional levels. In 
2001, individuals in the treated group earned US$147 (in 2001 dollars) per month more than 
individuals in the control group did. This represents a 93 per cent of the average monthly labour 
earnings in the control group. However, such difference is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. In 2006, individuals in the treated group, on average, earned US$382 more 
per month compared to individuals in the control group. Even though the difference in earnings 
widened, this difference was not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics—means and standard deviations for individuals in Santiago 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Entire 
population 
[s.d] 
Treated 
population 
[s.d] 
Control 
population 
[s.d] 
Diff.  
(2)–(3)  
(s.e.) 
Share of each group in the entire population 100% 3.3% 11.6%  
Predetermined covariates (2001)     
Years of schooling 9.989 11.31 9.057 2.253** 
[0.176) [0.956] [0.588] (1.123) 
Age 44.64 41.79 45.37 -3.574 
[0.605) [3.084] [1.688] (3.516) 
Female 0.533 0.520 0.525 -0.00471 
 [0.0127) [0.0988] [0.0248] (0.102) 
Number of rooms 2.706 2.846 2.781 0.0651 
[0.0613) [0.138] [0.157] (0.210) 
Municipality–CBDa distance (km) 12.94 6.964 11.10 -4.135*** 
[0.501) [0] [0.272] (0.272) 
Urban household 0.986 1 1 0 
 [0.00273) [0] [0] (0) 
Categories of distance reduction     
0-km distance reduction 0.161 0 1  
[0.0170) [0] [0]  
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km 0.385 0 0  
[0.0227) [0] [0]  
1 km< distance reduction 0.454 1 0  
[0.0220) [0] [0]  
Municipality–subway distance (km)     
2001 6.723 1.972 4.757 -2.785*** 
 [0.461) [0] [0.344] (0.344) 
2006 5.348 0.936 4.757 -3.821*** 
 [0.448) [0] [0.344] (0.344) 
Employment rates     
2001 0.574 0.586 0.579 0.00737 
 [0.0174) [0.0865] [0.0493] (0.0995) 
2006 0.576 0.679 0.585 0.0943 
 [0.0165) [0.0782] [0.0480] (0.0917) 
Hours of work per month     
2001 99.08 99.23 101.5 -2.286 
 [3.111) [19.18) [9.734] (21.51) 
2006 89.38 118.7 87.38 31.35 
 [3.420) [22.67] [10.23] (24.88) 
Monthly labour earnings (2001 US$)    
2001 177.8 305.5 158.7 146.8 
 [11.72) [91.08] [34.40] (97.36) 
2006 218.4 555.0 173.3 381.7 
 [20.69) [335.4] [41.42] (338.0) 
Number of individuals in the sample 2,501 97 351 448 
Number of individuals in the subpopulation 3,428,915 112,368 398,959 511,327 
Notes: Individuals in the treated sample resided in municipalities that experienced a distance reduction to the 
subway network in 2005 greater than one kilometre and ended up nearer than one kilometre from the subway 
network. Individuals in the control sample resided in municipalities that did not experience a distance reduction 
to the subway network in 2005 and in both periods were farther than one kilometre from the subway network. 
The sample is restricted to working-age population (15 years and older in 2005) who responded to both waves 
of the Casen Panel Survey and were not full-time students in 2001. All observations are weighted by their 
longitudinal weights. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
a. Central Business District. 
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4.4.2 Main results 
Employment rate 
In this section, I analyse the impact of transport accessibility on labour market outcomes. First, 
to uncover the direction of possible biases, I start with a naive cross-section OLS specification 
(as in equation (3.1)). Then, to quantify the differences in employment rates, hours of work, and 
income for individuals living in treated and control municipalities observed in Table 4.1, I 
estimate fixed-effects models that control for the effects of unmeasured individual-specific 
characteristics like individual ability (as in equation (4.1). In addition, as I explain with more 
detail in Section 4.2.2, and since I use a panel and an intent-to-treat estimator, I control for the 
potential migration of individuals with high employability to areas that experienced a distance 
reduction to the subway network. Table 4.2 reports the estimates assuming a linear effect of 
proximity to the subway network on employment status and using the sample of all individuals 
aged 15 and above and excluding full-time students in 2001. Using a basic cross-section OLS 
specification, column (1) shows the association between proximity to the subway network and 
the employment rate. Although positive, this association is not statistically significant. Column 
(2) includes socioeconomic, demographic, and geographic controls. This turns the association 
between proximity to the subway network and the employment rate negative, but still non-
significant in statistical terms. Column (3) allows for heterogeneity in the previously described 
association. These estimates are still not distinguishable from zero.     
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Table 4.2 The effect of municipality–subway distance reduction on employment status: linear models 
Dependent variable. 
Columns (1) through (3): 
employment status in 2001; 
columns (4) through (6): 
change in employment status 
2001 to 2006 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cross-section association Individual fixed effects 
Basic 
model 
As (1) plus 
predetermi
ned 
covariates 
As (2), plus 
heterogeneit
y in school-
subway 
distance 
Basic 
model 
As (4) plus 
predetermi
ned 
covariates 
As (4), plus 
heterogeneit
y in school-
subway 
distance 
Proximity to the nearest 
subway station (km) 
0.0884 -0.167   0.572 0.299   
(0.116) (0.116)  (0.492) (0.694)  
Proximity to the nearest 
subway station (km) | 
distance ≤ 1 km 
  0.491   3.395 
  (0.535)   (5.833) 
Proximity to the nearest 
subway station (km) | 
distance > 1 km 
  -0.125   0.243 
  (0.130)   (0.687) 
Control variables (2001) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 2,511 2,464 2,464 2,500 2,453 2,453 
R-squared 0.000 0.966 0.966 0.000 0.362 0.363 
Notes: The table reports regression coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 100 to give the % effect of a 
one-point change in explanatory variables. The key variable in columns (1) through (3) is the negative of the 
minimum distance to the individual’s municipality of residence and the nearest subway station. The key 
variable in columns (4) through (6) is the distance reduction to the nearest subway station because of the new 
stations between final and initial periods. The dependent variable in columns (1) through (3) is individuals' 
employment status in 2001. The dependent variable in columns (4) through (6) is individuals’ post-treatment 
(2006) minus pre-treatment (2001) employment status—where people who worked during the previous week 
are coded with a one, zero otherwise. Hence, columns (4) through (6) provide an individual fixed effects 
estimate. The sample includes individuals aged 15 and over in 2005 who were not full-time students in 2001. 
Regressions are run at the individual level and are weighted by the survey’s longitudinal weights. The controls 
are at the individual and municipality levels. At the individual level, these regressions control for the linear and 
quadratic pre-treatment levels of individual monthly income from work, household total income (including 
social transfers), years of schooling, age and number of rooms in the dwelling. These regressions also include 
individual dummies for gender; whether the individual lived in a rural area; five categories of type of contract; 
six marital status categories; eight health insurance categories; whether the individual had health problems in 
each of the last five years; twelve home tenure categories; and four categories for each variable of perception 
of improvement of the neighbourhood during the last five years. At the municipality level, these regressions 
control for the linear and quadratic average distance between households in each municipality and the central 
business district (Plaza Baquedano) and the pre-treatment average distance between households in each 
municipality and their nearest subway station. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in 
parentheses. Sample restricted to schools at a maximum distance of 30 km from the post-treatment subway 
network. All regressions include an intercept (not shown). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Column (4) is a fixed-effects model with no controls and exhibits the results for specification 
(3.2). The results in this column show that there is a positive but non-significant association 
between municipality–subway distance reduction and the 2001–2006 change in the employment 
rate. Column (5) of Table 4.2 shows the estimates of specification (3.3), which allows for 
differential trends for the extensive set of predetermined covariates mentioned in Section 4.2.2. 
In qualitative terms, the estimate of the coefficient on distance reduction in column (5) does 
not differ with respect to the estimate in column (4). In column (6), I allow for heterogeneity in 
the effect of distance reduction depending on how close the municipality was to the 2006 
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subway network (specification depicted by equation (4.1)). In this column, the coefficient on 
distance reduction increases substantially to 3.4 percentage points per kilometre of additional 
proximity to the subway network (a coefficient of 3.395). This is suggestive evidence that the 
cross-section estimates are biased downwards. In addition, because the standard error increases 
almost ten-fold between columns (5) and (6) of Table 4.2, the estimate on column (6) is not 
statistically significant. One reason for these large standard errors could be that the linear 
specification potentially masks important non-linearities in the effects of municipality–subway 
distance reduction on the employment rate. These results are robust to the use of two kilometres 
as the distance threshold (as in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6; see Table A10.1 in the Appendix). 
Table 4.3 shows the estimates from equation (4.1), which allows for a non-linear relation 
between municipality–subway distance reduction and the employment rate. Column (1) 
considers all working age individuals in 2005 who were not full-time students in 2001. According 
to this estimate, the effect of the treatment is an increase in probability of employment by 7.3 
percentage points in 2006 (a coefficient of 7.265). This is extremely high if we consider it is a 
12.4 per cent of the employment rate in 2001 of treated individuals (the employment rate of 
treated individuals in 2001 was 58.6 per cent).  
In the introductory section to this chapter (Section 4.1), I mentioned that there is previous 
evidence that the elasticity between commuting time and employment rate is higher for females 
than for the whole population. Additionally, in Chapter 2, I show that Chile’s female 
employment rate in 2001 (this chapter’s baseline year) was the lowest in the OECD and one of 
the lowest in Latin America. Due to the previous evidence and how low the female employment 
rate in Chile was, in 4.3’s column (2) I analyse the impact of proximity to the subway network 
on the female employment rate. The results in this column show that the estimate of the key 
coefficient on distance reduction when the sample is restricted to women is 18 percentage points 
(a coefficient of 17.78). Interestingly, the key coefficient in Table 4.3’s column (3) (coefficient 
of –1.888) shows that the increase in the employment rate for men is not statistically significant. 
This is suggestive evidence that the positive effect of distance reduction on the employment 
rate is driven by the effect on women. 
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Table 4.3 The effect of municipality–subway distance reduction on employment status: 
nonlinear models 
Dependent variable: change in employment status 2001 
to 2006  
(1) (2) (3) 
All 
individuals 
Women Men 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance ≤ 1 km 
1 km< distance reduction  7.265** 17.78*** -1.888 
(3.502) (4.595) (5.488) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km -2.352 -1.785 -5.025 
(6.603) (7.931) (5.669) 
0 km distance reduction 4.455 6.176 -3.668 
(3.944) (5.151) (4.736) 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance > 1 km 
1 km< distance reduction  0.863 2.537 -1.262 
(2.943) (4.922) (3.005) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km -4.832* -5.811 -4.236 
(2.798) (4.790) (3.709) 
0 km distance reduction (reference category) 0 0 0 
 
(0) (0) (0) 
Observations 2,453 1,361 1,092 
R-squared 0.366 0.343 0.502 
Notes: As for Table 4.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Hours of work 
To provide a more complete picture about the effects of  better transport accessibility on labour 
market outcomes I also explore the impact on hours of  work. Table 4.4 depicts the effect of  
municipality–subway distance reduction on the intensive margin of employment. In this table, 
I consider that the non-employed population works zero hours. Column (1) of Table 4.4 shows 
the estimates for the whole population. The coefficient on the treated group is 28.71 hours per 
month. This means that the effect of the inauguration of the new subway stations implied an 
increase of 29 hours of work per month. Since this represents a 30 per cent of the average 
baseline hours of work and, on average, represents 1.4 hours per weekday, the effect on hours 
of work is large.  
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Table 4.4 The effect of municipality–subway distance reduction on hours of work: nonlinear models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: change in monthly hours of work 
2001 to 2006 
All 
individuals 
Women Men As in (1) 
restricting 
sample to 
employed in 
both periods 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance ≤ 1 km   
1 km< distance reduction  28.71*** 57.98*** 6.632 39.00*** 
(7.333) (9.975) (13.92) (10.29) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km 8.270 19.51 -8.778 6.785 
(11.73) (16.33) (8.919) (11.47) 
0 km distance reduction 23.31 29.06 -6.929 33.79 
(14.51) (18.84) (10.26) (22.44) 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance > 1 km  
1 km< distance reduction  3.891 9.654 -0.700 -4.015 
(6.930) (10.03) (8.707) (8.710) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km -3.953 -0.128 -9.485 11.02 
(5.566) (9.292) (6.795) (8.529) 
0 km distance reduction (reference category) 0 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Observations 2,078 1,210 868 744 
R-squared 0.274 0.293 0.391 0.213 
Notes: As for Table 4.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
One could argue that this estimate is confounding the effect of distance reduction on the 
extensive margin of employment (employment status) with the effect on the intensive margin 
of employment (hours of work). In other words, the increase of hours of work may be solely 
due to the increase in the employment rate and not due to increases in weekly hours of work 
for treated individuals. To explore the validity of this critique to the estimate in column (1), I 
restrict my sample to those individuals who worked in both periods (2001 and 2006; see column 
(4) of Table 4.4). Not only does the coefficient on hours of work not go down, but it actually 
goes up. However, this coefficient should be interpreted with caution because the sample 
selection is endogenous to the treatment (i.e. we know that the distance reduction affected the 
employment rate of the treated group in 2006).   
Labour earnings 
I also explore the effect on individual labour earnings. In Table 4.5, I assign zero labour earnings 
to the non-working population. An alternative way would have been to constrain my sample to 
workers with positive earnings in both years. The problem of this alternative approach is that 
this sample would suffer from selection. We know from the subsection on the employment rate 
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that one effect of increased proximity to the subway network was an increase in the employment 
rate for treated individuals. Column (1) in Table 4.5 shows that the effect of the treatment 
assigning zero labour earnings to the non-working population was to increase average earnings 
in the treated group by US$185.4. Since this is 61 per cent of the average treated group’s baseline 
individual income from work, the effect of the treatment on labour earnings was substantial.  
Table 4.5 The effect of municipality–subway distance reduction on individual labour 
earnings: nonlinear models 
Dependent variable: change in monthly individual labour 
earnings 2001 to 2006 (in 2001 US$) 
(1) (2) (3) 
All 
individuals 
Women Men 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance ≤ 1 km 
1 km< distance reduction 185.4*** -116.8*** 481.0*** 
(37.96) (32.90) (103.8) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km -21.29 -66.31 15.58 
(37.41) (42.12) (57.00) 
0-km distance reduction -14.83 -11.80 -1.654 
(36.01) (40.97) (43.28) 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance > 1 km 
1 km< distance reduction -23.97 -12.06 -22.57 
(30.30) (40.47) (41.13) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km -2.841 -40.84 49.26 
(26.17) (35.44) (34.06) 
0-km distance reduction (reference category) 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Observations 2,464 1,366 1,098 
R-squared 0.147 0.268 0.233 
Notes: As for Table 4.2.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
On the other hand columns (2) and (3) in Table 4.5 show that, while women’s average income 
from work decreased by US$116.8 per month, the same figure for men increased by US$481.0 
per month. In section 4.4.4, I discuss some evidence that might explain these two contrasting 
results. 
Hence, there is a consistent effect of municipality–subway distance reduction on individuals’ 
employment status, hours of work, and income from work.  
4.4.3 Robustness analysis 
There are at least two reasons why my preferred estimates in the previous section could be 
biased. First, there could be pre-existing labour market trends in treated areas. Second, if the 
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attrition in the sample is correlated with unobservables, and these unobservables are correlated 
with the outcome variables, this could also be biasing my results. 
4.4.3.1 Falsification check: there were no pre-existing differing trends between treated and control areas 
A pre-subway expansion increasing-trend in the employment rate of women in municipalities 
that would experience a large increase in proximity to the subway network could be biasing my 
results. To test for such possibility, I run the same analysis as in Table 4.3 using data before the 
subway expansion. This is known as a falsification check or placebo experiment in the program 
evaluation literature. 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show the same regression depicted in column (1) of Tables 4.3 and 4.4, but 
using the 1996–2001 pre-intervention data. Column (1) in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 shows the 
estimates of the specification in equation (4.1). The coefficient on the treated category (a 
municipality–subway distance reduction larger than one kilometre and a distance from the 
subway network smaller than one kilometre) is not significant at conventional levels. This means 
that the increase in the employment rate (Table 4.6) and hours of work (Table 4.7) after the 
expansion of the subway network in the mid-2000s in Santiago is not explained by a pre-existing 
trend that could be violating the differences-in-differences common trends assumption between 
treated and control individuals. 
Table 4.6 Falsification check using data before the inauguration of new subway stations 
only: employment status 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: change in employment status 1996 to 2001 
All 
individuals 
Women Men 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance ≤ 1 km 
1 km< distance reduction  1.864 -5.009 7.611* 
(4.535) (4.423) (4.345) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km 0.467 6.597 -7.351 
(4.861) (5.467) (5.842) 
0-km distance reduction 3.658 -3.232 12.51 
(7.224) (7.078) (7.569) 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance > 1 km 
1 km< distance reduction 2.161 4.066 -2.582 
(4.421) (4.342) (4.402) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km 1.579 0.598 2.156 
(5.125) (5.039) (5.735) 
0 -km distance reduction (reference category) 0 0 0 
  (0) (0) (0) 
Observations 3,361 1,843 1,518 
R-squared 0.267 0.319 0.287 
Notes: As for Table 4.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.7 Falsification check using data before the inauguration of new subway stations 
only: hours of work 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: change in monthly hours of work 1996 to 
2001 
All 
individuals 
Women Men 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance ≤ 1 km 
1 km< distance reduction  4.947 -9.463 20.88*** 
(6.192) (7.616) (6.438) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km 8.616 16.86* 1.506 
(9.397) (8.506) (14.54) 
0-km distance reduction 13.60 -13.78 45.69*** 
(8.101) (9.515) (9.609) 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance > 1 km 
1 km< distance reduction  3.898 10.98 -7.281 
(6.201) (7.751) (6.607) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km 4.944 6.898 0.470 
(7.872) (7.750) (10.45) 
0-km distance reduction (reference category) 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Observations 3,337 1,835 1,502 
R-squared 0.200 0.263 0.197 
Notes: As for Table 4.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 4.8 shows the same falsification check in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 but using labour earnings as 
a dependent variable. The key coefficient in column (1) indicates that there was an increasing 
trend in individual labour earnings for treated individuals. On average, individuals in 
municipalities that would be treated in 2005 increased their earnings in US$89 per month 
(coefficient of 89.14) between 1996 and 2001.  
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Table 4.8 Falsification check using data before the inauguration of new 
subway stations only: individual labour earnings 
Dependent variable: change in monthly 
individual labour earnings 1996 to 2001 
(1) (2) (3) 
All 
individuals 
Women Men 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance ≤ 1 km 
1 km< distance reduction  89.14*** 51.81*** 152.1*** 
(16.76) (11.01) (33.33) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km 65.14** 27.85 121.4** 
(27.88) (17.86) (55.25) 
0-km distance reduction 36.05* -8.918 105.6** 
(20.49) (17.68) (39.44) 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance > 1 km 
1 km< distance reduction  13.35 3.907 10.76 
(24.42) (13.72) (45.56) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km 22.86 5.066 51.65 
(20.64) (12.30) (38.12) 
0-km distance reduction (reference category) 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Observations 3,306 1,820 1,486 
R-squared 0.569 0.353 0.650 
Notes: As for Table 4.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Is the pre-treatment increasing trend in labour earnings of the treated group large enough to 
question the statistical significance of the conclusions from Table 4.3? One way to respond this 
would be to estimate a difference-in-difference-in-difference model subtracting the pre-
treatment trend to the calculated effect in Table 4.3. The analysis underlying the generation of 
Table 4.9 implements this idea. Column (1) shows that the average effect of a large (more than 
one kilometre) increase in proximity to the subway network for workers in those municipalities 
that on average ended up closer than one kilometre from the subway network is still large in 
economic terms (US$119.5 per worker per month, a 39 per cent of the baseline salary of the 
treated group) but marginally significant (only at the 10 per cent of significance level). Hence, 
considering jointly the result in Tables 4.8 and 4.9, the positive effect of the treatment on 
individual labour earnings shown in Table 4.5 is not an extremely robust result. 
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Table 4.9 The effect of municipality–subway distance reduction on individual labour 
earnings: nonlinear difference-in-difference-in-difference models 
Dependent variable: change in monthly individual labour 
earnings 2001 to 2006 minus 1996 to 2001 (in 2001 US$) 
(1) (2) (3) 
All 
individuals 
Women Men 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance ≤ 1 km 
1 km< distance reduction 119.5* -234.5*** 498.9*** 
(66.35) (56.76) (169.7) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km -26.49 -53.07 -0.228 
(69.30) (60.78) (119.0) 
0-km distance reduction 23.54 45.47 33.93 
(51.76) (66.99) (104.5) 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance > 1 km 
1 km< distance reduction -100.1* -63.80 -119.9 
(49.75) (73.38) (71.04) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km 18.66 -69.65 128.9* 
(43.82) (61.42) (66.61) 
0-km distance reduction (reference category) 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Observations 2,413 1,346 1,067 
R-squared 0.085 0.198 0.123 
Notes: As for Table 4.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
To what extent where the characteristics of treated and control populations balanced in the year 
before the placebo experiment (1996)? Given that difference-in-difference methods assume 
parallel trends in the outcomes of treated and control populations (not equal cross-section 
outcomes) should the treatment would have not taken place, the answer to the previous question 
is not critical to the validity of my robustness check in this subsection. However, it is always 
illustrative to show a balancing test for the pre-placebo characteristics of treated and control 
populations. Table A9 in Appendix 9 shows that most covariates were balanced in 1996.    
4.4.3.2 Using an unweighted sample 
Are the results presented in section 4.4.2 robust to the omission of weights in the regressions?  
If the results using and omitting weights would be similar, this would decrease the concern 
about unobservables that could be correlated both with attrition and labour market outcomes. 
Table A8.1 and Table A8.2 in the Appendix show that the estimates of the effect of distance 
reduction to the subway network on women’s employment status and hours of work using an 
unweighted sample are qualitatively similar to the effect using weights. This is, closer 
accessibility to the subway network implies an increase in the affected women’s probability of 
employment and hours of work. However, Table A8.3 in the Appendix shows that the effect of 
closer proximity to the subway network on labour earnings for both men and women is negative 
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(coefficients of USD 41.58 and 37.68 per month respectively). Hence, the effect on labour 
earnings in Table 4.5 is not robust to the omission of weights.      
4.4.4 Why does the worker–subway distance matter? 
An understanding of the economic story underlying the effects reported in this chapter is 
crucial. Table 4.10 shows that a large proportion (more than 70 per cent) of the increase in 
employment in treated women was in elementary occupations (such as domestic workers, 
manufacturing labourers and unskilled sales women). This provides suggestive evidence that 
the effect of the subway expansion on the employment rate was mainly on non-skilled women 
with a low income-generation capacity. This is consistent with the fact that skilled women may 
be less affected by a subway expansion relative to low-skilled women because the former may 
have other available modes of transport apart from public transport such as car.  
Table 4.10 Occupations of treated female workers  
Description 
Totals per group 2006 minus 
2001 
Proportion of 
increased labour 
force 2001 2006 
1. Professionals 0 1 1 14% 
2. Technicians and associate professionals 1 1 0 0% 
3. Clerical support workers 1 2 1 14% 
4. Service and sale workers 4 3 -1 -  
5. Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery 
workers 0 0 0 0% 
6. Craft and related trades workers 0 0 0 0% 
7. Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0 0 0 0% 
8. Elementary occupations 1 6 5 71% 
Total 7 13 6  
Notes: The denominator of the proportion of the increased labour force is the sum of the non-
negative changes in each category (i.e. excludes changes of employment status for service and sales 
workers). 
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4.5 Summary and conclusions 
Better transport accessibility raises labour market participation rates, hours of work, and labour 
earnings. In the case of labour market participation, the effect is concentrated on women who 
perform elementary occupations such as domestic workers. This is consistent with an economic 
story where a decrease in transport costs is more likely to increase labour supply for those 
individuals with a higher ‘transport-costs to reservation-wage’ ratio. I use the panel data 
structure of my dataset to eliminate potential confounding effects that unmeasured 
characteristics of workers and common shocks to Santiago’s employment rate could have had 
on my analysis. I show that a substantial improvement in labour market outcomes for individuals 
living in municipalities that ended up near to the subway network occurred after the explosive 
growth in the network during the mid-2000s. Moreover, during the period prior to the subway 
expansion (1996–2001), we do not observe the improvement effect observed in the period 
2001–2006. 
The results of this chapter are pertinent to the discussion about the relevance of commuting 
costs on labour market outcomes. To my knowledge, this is the first research that uses a 
convincing empirical strategy to conclude that better transport accessibility has a causal effect 
on labour market participation rates, working hours, and labour earnings.  
This study may illuminate the evaluation of the impact of building public transport infrastructure 
on labour market outcomes. In future studies, data with individual addresses would be able to 
provide a more accurate measure of the effects discussed in this chapter because with such data 
the proximity to the subway network may be measured in an exact way. 
My results suggest that further extensions in Santiago’s subway network may further increase 
labour market participation rates, hours of work and labour earnings. Given that the Chilean 
government recently announced another major extension of Santiago’s subway network (Latin 
Correspondent 2014), this will be a good opportunity to test furthermore the robustness of 
the results in this chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
5. Better Urban Transport Implies Lower High School Test Scores 
5.1 Introduction 
High cognitive achievement is closely associated with outcomes such as higher future wages 
(Neal and Johnson 1996), higher schooling in childhood, marriage rates and not going on 
welfare (Herrnstein and Murray 2010). However, empirical evidence is not conclusive about the 
main factors affecting student achievement. Researchers have typically focused on traditional 
schooling inputs such as teaching quality (see, for example, Rockoff (2004)) or class size 
(Krueger and Whitmore 2001). Theoretically, better school accessibility could affect student 
supply because it decreases the student’s generalised cost and effort to access certain schools. 
Because of spending less time and effort in commuting, if part of the additional time and effort 
is invested studying, students may improve their performance. In addition, better school 
accessibility could modify teacher supply (increasing it or decreasing it depending on whether 
initially most teachers live near or far from the specific schools). An increase (decrease) in 
teacher supply could increase (decrease) a school’s value added by facilitating (making more 
difficult) the choice of high quality teachers by the school. Despite these links between school 
accessibility and student performance, little attention has been given to the effect of school 
accessibility on student outcomes. 
Chile is an interesting place to study the effect of school accessibility on student outcomes for 
several reasons. First, more than 50 per cent of schools in Santiago experienced an increase in 
accessibility when a new 24-km subway line and six additional stations on an existing line were 
inaugurated in 2005. Such large and discrete change in school accessibility is currently unusual 
in OECD countries. Second, Chilean schools’ institutional context enables school accessibility 
to have an effect on student outcomes through changes in school enrolment. Chile’s educational 
system allows families to choose any school within their budget constraint (i.e. there are no 
catchment areas); in turn, changes in enrolment imply changes in schools’ income given a 
government subsidy for public and private (voucher) schools which is proportional to the 
number of students attending the school. 
Third, I have a detailed administrative individual panel dataset with students’ test scores in 
Chile’s national standardised test (SIMCE) one year before and one year after the inauguration 
of the new subway stations in Santiago. The panel nature of the dataset enables me to control 
for students’ fixed characteristics and to avoid the contamination of my estimates with effects 
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of changes in school composition due to better accessibility. I do this by considering as my 
treated population all students who attended treated schools during the pre-intervention period 
(regardless of whether they remained in treated schools after the transport innovation). This 
type of estimator has been called an intent-to-treat estimator (Little and Yau 1996). 
To the best of my knowledge, there are no previous studies exploring the impact of school 
accessibility on student performance. On related topics, two studies have explored the impact 
of school accessibility (proxied by distance from school and commuting time) on post-
compulsory education enrolment and graduation from upper-secondary schools. Using British 
data, Dickerson and McIntosh (2013), found that less distance between the students’ homes 
and their closest school (measuring distance ‘as the crow flies’) is positively related to the 
probability that ‘young people who are on the margin of participating in post-compulsory 
education (according to prior attainment and family background) continue into post-
compulsory education’ (Dickerson and McIntosh 2013, 742). This is consistent with Falch et 
al.’s (2013) finding, which concluded that reduced commuting time has a positive effect on 
graduation from upper secondary schools in Norway and that this effect is larger for students 
in the second and third quartiles of prior academic achievement.  
These two papers have limitations. Dickerson and McIntosh's (2013) estimate of the impact of 
school accessibility on post-compulsory education enrolment may be biased upwards because 
of omitted variables such as household income. Falch et al.’s (2013) paper explores the impact 
of school accessibility on upper secondary school graduation, not on test scores as this chapter 
does. Test scores are of interest because they could signal the impact of school accessibility not 
only on students with low or median prior achievement but on the whole distribution of 
students. 
Although there are no studies on the direct link between school accessibility and academic 
achievement, there is evidence about several potential mechanisms by which better school 
accessibility could affect test scores. Some of these mechanisms operate through changes in the 
value-added provided by schools. These mechanisms include increases in class sizes, increased 
competition between schools, increased school disruption due to higher pupil turnover, peer 
effects due to movers and stayers experiencing better or worse-performing peers, and teacher 
effects due to movements to schools with better or worse teachers. On the other hand, other 
mechanisms may affect student performance by channels not mediated by schools. These 
mechanisms include changes in neighbours’ characteristics, increased truancy or changes in 
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commuting time. In Chapter 1, I discuss each of these potential channels and their evidence. In 
the context of an intent-to-treat estimate, all these mechanisms are potentially relevant. 
Several features in this chapter are useful when estimating the impact of school accessibility on 
student achievement. The first is the use of a convincing empirical strategy to show that student 
test scores respond to sizable improvements in school accessibility (proxied by school–subway 
network distance). To obtain a causal estimate I exploit the inauguration of new subway stations 
in Santiago in 2005 and argue that, conditional on a variety of controls for potential differential 
test score trends, the transport innovation is an exogenous shock to school accessibility.  
This chapter’s second feature is demonstrating the robustness of the conclusions. The analysis 
is as follows. I incorporate in my models a variety of student and spatial fixed-effects that 
account for test score differential trends. In addition, I explore not only the effect of linear 
school–subway network distance reduction (henceforth, distance reduction) but also the non-
linear effects of the same variable by introducing distance reduction categories. Moreover, I am 
also able to distinguish the heterogeneous effects of school–subway network distance reduction 
depending on the distance from the new subway network. I also check that there is no evidence 
that unobservables are driving my results by carrying out a placebo test with a proposed line 
that had not yet been inaugurated in the post-expansion period (2006). Additionally, to avoid 
the assumption of no spatial correlation between the regression errors in my OLS time-
differenced estimates I implement a permutation test on the school–subway network distance 
reduction category that is exact regardless of the presence of spatial correlation. Furthermore, 
in contrast to an important part of the literature that uses ‘as the crow flies’ distance (e.g. 
Dickerson and McIntosh (2013)), I measure school–subway station distances using walking 
distance. The latter is arguably a more accurate measurement of distance than the former 
because incorporates the shape and connectivity of streets in Santiago in the distance 
calculation.  
A final feature of this chapter is that I establish my findings using administrative, individual 
panel data for all students in the same cohort rather than a cross-section of survey data. As 
stated before, the individual nature of the panel data enables me to calculate an intent-to-treat 
effect that avoids selection of students into treated or non-treated areas induced by the transport 
innovation. In addition, because I use data for the whole student population in Santiago, I am 
able to introduce detailed spatial controls (1 kilometre rings around the pre-treatment subway 
network, 42 municipalities in urban Santiago) that account for unobserved test score trends for 
small spatial units. 
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I find that school–subway network distance reductions of 4.7 km or more for students whose 
school ends up nearer than 2 km from the new subway stations worsen those students’ scores 
by 11 per cent of a standard deviation. Conversely, on average, distance reductions of the same 
magnitude for schools at a 2 km distance or farther from the new subway stations have no effect 
on test scores. Moreover, on average, schools that experienced large distance reductions to the 
subway network also experienced an increase in their enrolled students. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 explains my method when the 
outcome of interest is academic achievement. Hence, this section complements the generic 
explanation of my methods in Chapter 3. Section 5.3 describes the institutional context in 
education and data. Section 5.4 presents and discusses my results. Finally, Section 5.5 
summarises this chapter and presents concluding remarks. 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Methodological framework applied to results on academic achievement 
In this chapter, the fixed-effects model explained generically in Section 3.2 controls for 
unobserved characteristics of students such as the average ability of its students or skills of its 
teachers that could be correlated with both the changes in proximity to the subway network and 
changes in test scores before and after the subway expansion. In line with my preferred empirical 
specification depicted in equation (3.5), my main estimation equation in this chapter is:   
(𝑦𝑖1 − 𝑦𝑖0) = ∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝑗
ℎ𝑖1𝛽1𝑗 + ∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝑗
(1 − ℎ𝑖1)𝛽2𝑗 + 𝑥𝑖1
′ 𝛾 + (𝑔1−𝑔0) + (𝜀i1 − 𝜀i0) (5.1) 
In (5.1), 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is student i ’s mathematics test score in period t; 𝑐𝑗 are dummy variables, one for 
each of the four non-reference categories of distance reduction; ℎ𝑖1 =  𝐼(𝑑𝑖1 ≤ 2𝑘𝑚), where 
𝐼(… ) equals one when the condition in the parenthesis is true and 𝑑𝑖1 is the distance between 
student i´s school and its nearest subway station after the subway expansion; 𝛽1 is the impact 
of better school accessibility on student test scores; 𝑥𝑖1
′  are baseline (pre-subway expansion) 
characteristics of students; 𝑔𝑡 are shocks to test scores for all students in Santiago in year 𝑡, and 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 is equation (1)’s error term. To uncover the impact of urban transport accessibility on student 
achievement, I work with mathematics test scores—rather than language ones—because the 
former are more susceptible to modification by school inputs (Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 
2011).  
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5.2.2 Identification issues in the student fixed-effects model 
As explained earlier, identification of the effect of better school accessibility on student 
performance rests on the assumption that there are no variables that are correlated both with 
students’ test scores and with the 2005 school–subway network distance reduction. This 
assumption could be violated for five reasons. First, the identifying assumption would be 
violated if the shock (improvement) in school accessibility provided by the new subway stations 
induces selection into schools in the post-treatment period. This would happen if, for example, 
brighter students migrate more to or from treated schools because of increased accessibility to 
their schools and/or their places of residence. Second, as explained generically in Section 3.3, 
there may be a pre-existing test score trend where initially worse (better) performing students 
would improve differently from better (worse) performing students even in absence of the new 
subway stations. If the previous test score trend is correlated with the magnitude of the future 
school–subway network distance reduction this would bias my estimates.  
 
Third, the assumption would also be violated if students in schools administered by different 
entities (municipality, municipal corporation, voucher or private entity) have differential average 
test score trends and the type of administration is correlated with the distance reduction 
magnitude. Fourth, the assumption would be violated if the mayors of certain municipalities 
could be better at lobbying to get the new subway lines to pass through their jurisdictions and 
these same mayors were pursuing educational policies that improved the quality of education 
and student achievement in schools in their jurisdiction. Fifth and finally, the identifying 
assumption would be violated if there were pre-existing spatial test score trends related to the 
school–subway network distance before the construction of the new subway stations. In the 
following paragraph, I address these identification issues. 
With suitable data, I can address each of the five concerns about the internal validity of the 
fixed-effects estimates. The key idea is to control for test score differential trends. To deal with 
the first issue, the change in school accessibility inducing selection into schools, I estimate 
equation (5.1) calculating an intent-to-treat effect (Lachin 2000). I do this by considering that 
students are always attached to their pre-subway expansion school, regardless of their post-
treatment actual school. This avoids selection into treated and non-treated schools due to the 
new subway lines and a potential resulting bias in the estimated effect of increased school 
accessibility. To deal with the second issue, a pre-existing test score trend that depends on the 
initial test score, I control for students’ pre-intervention test scores in equation (5.1) to address 
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pre-existing test score trends depending on students’ initial scores. To deal with the third issue, 
I address pre-existing test score trends of students depending on their schools’ type of 
administration by including in equation (5.1) the student’s school type of administrative entity.  
To deal with the fourth issue I address potential differential test score trends for students in 
schools in different municipalities by including municipality dummy variables in equation (5.1). 
There are 42 municipalities in urban Santiago, so I control for such potential differential trends 
by including 41 dummy variables, one for each (non-reference) municipality, in equation (5.1). 
In my preferred specifications (column (4) in Tables 5.2 and 5.3), I control for the interacted 
school-type-of-administration and municipality to control for test score differential trends for 
each type of administration in each municipality. To deal with the fifth identification issue, to 
address potential pre-existing differential test score trends for students in schools located at 
different distances from the old subway network, I include distance from the pre-intervention 
subway network in equation (5.1). A robust way to control for such trends is to do it non-
parametrically in distance reduction by including one dummy variable for each kilometre of 
school–pre-treatment network distance. 
In practice, the model that addresses the five identification issues exploits the relation between 
distance reduction and variation in students’ test score progression only for students with similar 
initial test scores and the same administrative entity, in the same municipality, and within the 
same school-pre-intervention-subway-network distance band (one for each kilometre). Hence, 
the identifying assumption for the resulting model is that, controlling for test score trends along 
the five described variables, there are no omitted variables that are correlated with schools’ 
average test scores and the 2005 distance reduction to the subway network. 
5.3 Chile’s institutional context in education and data 
5.3.1  Chile’s educational context 
I provided background information about Chile’s institutional context in education in Chapter 
2. Since one relevant hypothesised channel for the impact of school accessibility on student 
achievement is through interactions between schools via changes in school enrolment or 
competition for teachers, it is also relevant to describe Chile’s schools’ funding mechanisms 
here. Municipal and voucher schools’ budget constraints in Chile during the 2004-2006 period 
were mainly determined by the income from the student-per-capita per-day-subsidy. However, 
municipalities transferred resources from schools that were more profitable (generally larger 
schools with good pupil attendance) to less profitable ones. Moreover, municipalities were 
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allowed to transfer resources from their general budget to their schools. Hence, the budget 
constraint was softer in municipal schools than in voucher schools.  
5.3.2 Data 
I use three main sources of data. First, Chile’s SIMCE dataset contains an individual panel with 
test scores in eighth and tenth grades for students who were in eighth grade in 2004. Both in 
2004 (for eighth graders) and in 2006 (for tenth graders), the SIMCE test was taken in 
November. This dataset contains language and mathematics test scores in both grades, as well 
as eighth grade social science and natural science test scores, and household income. SIMCE is 
Chile’s standardized test that, during the period of study, was taken every year in fourth grade 
and some years in eighth or tenth grades.  
Second, I then merged the SIMCE test information with the schools’ georeferenced addresses 
and other administrative information such as the schools’ type of administration (municipality, 
municipal corporation, voucher and private school). To obtain the schools’ locations I 
normalised and geocoded the schools’ addresses from Chile’s Ministry of Education (publicly 
available) 2004 and 2006 archive. Third, I use the addresses of each subway station in Santiago. 
The pre-expansion subway network includes those stations that were inaugurated before the 
date of the baseline test (this is, on or before October 2004). The post-expansion subway 
network includes the pre-expansion subway network and all the subway stations inaugurated on 
or before the beginning of the academic year in 2006 (this is, between November 2004 and 
March 2006). Using Ozimek and Miles’ (2011) traveltime command in Stata which connects to 
Google Maps, I found the walking distance between every school in Santiago and its nearest 
subway station.  
Ideally, to offer a more comprehensive view of the effects of better transport accessibility on 
academic achievement, this study would have benefitted from having the individual addresses 
of the students. In Section 7.4, I reflect on the advantages that would imply having this type of 
data.  
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Summary statistics for schools in urban Santiago are shown in Table 5.1. The first two columns 
summarize the information about the zero school–subway-distance reduction subsample (the 
‘zero distance reduction’ or ‘untreated’ sample), and the next two columns describe the positive 
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school–subway-distance-reduction subsample (‘positive distance reduction’ or ‘treated’ 
subsample). The eighth grade pre-intervention average SIMCE score of  students in schools in 
urban Santiago whose schools did not (did) experience a distance reduction was between 29–34 
per cent (2–7 per cent) of  a standard deviation above the national mean. In contrast, the average 
number of  students in eighth grade in non-treated and treated schools is quite similar: 66.7 and 
64.1 respectively.  
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics of schools in urban Santiago 
  Zero distance 
reduction sub-
sample 
 Positive distance 
reduction sub-
sample 
  Mean s.d.  Mean s.d. 
Number of schools 667   768  
Number of students 45,103   49,980  
Average standardised SIMCE 2004 scores      
Mathematics 33.6% 70%  6.6% 5.8% 
Language 30.2% 60%  4.5% 5.2% 
Social Science 28.9% 60%  2.4% 5.3% 
Natural Science 29.3% 66%  3.9% 5.6% 
Average number of students in same school 
and grade who took the SIMCE test in 2004. 
66.7 62.9  64.1 43.7 
Household median income (2004 US$) 421.0   252.1  
Type of Administration      
Municipal 19.7%   19.5%  
Municipal Corporation 15.7%   15.1%  
Voucher 46.5%   56.1%  
Private 18.1%   9.2%  
Minimum school–subway network distance in 
2004 (km) 
4.24   6.70  
Proportion of schools at a maximum distance 
of 2 km from the 2006 subway network 
41% 49%  42% 49% 
Distance reduction (km) 0   3.47 2.79 
Categories of positive-distance-reduction 
schools 
     
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1.6 km    25.5%  
1.6 km< distance reduction ≤ 2.3 km    27.9%  
2.3 km< distance reduction ≤ 4.7 km    22.3%  
4.7 km< distance reduction ≤ 10.7 km       24.3%  
Notes: The pre-intervention and post-intervention years are 2004 and 2006 respectively. Test scores are 
measured as z-scores standardised at the national level with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
one. Statistics are at the school level and (except for the ‘students in same school’ variable) are weighted 
by the number of students enrolled in 2004 who also took the SIMCE test in 2006. Zero (positive) 
distance reduction subsample refers to those schools who did not (did) experience a school–subway 
network distance reduction due to the subway stations inaugurated in 2005. The sample is restricted to 
those schools at a maximum distance of 20 km from the 2006 subway network with no missing values in 
all the described variables. 
Monthly household median income is higher in the untreated subsample (US$421 per month) 
than in the treated subsample (US$252.1). Voucher schools represent a 9.6 percentage points 
higher proportion in the treated subsample compared to the untreated subsample. Conversely, 
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private schools represent an 8.9 percentage point lower proportion in the untreated compared 
to the treated subsample. Hence, in terms of  income and school type, students in the treated 
subsample are more vulnerable than in the untreated sample. This highlights the importance of  
controlling for differential test score trends for different socioeconomic groups and for type of  
school in my preferred specifications in Section 4.2. As expected, the average minimum school–
subway network distance in 2004 was substantially lower for untreated schools compared to 
treated schools (4.2 km and 6.7 km respectively). The average distance reduction experienced 
by treated schools was 3.5 km.  
5.4.2 Fixed-effects estimates 
In this section, I analyse the impact of school accessibility on student outcomes using empirical 
specifications (3.2), (3.3), and (5.1) and accounting for identification issues in the ways discussed 
earlier.  
Controlling for unobserved fixed student characteristics such as students’ ability and families’ 
socioeconomic status, better accessibility to schools is associated with worse student outcomes. 
Recall that in the empirical specification depicted in equation (3.2) I assume a linear and 
homogeneous effect of distance reduction on mathematics test scores regardless of the final 
school–subway distance. The coefficient on distance reduction in column (1) in Table 5.2 (–
1.186) suggests that, for each kilometre of distance reduction to the subway network, students' 
average test score worsens by 1 per cent of a standard deviation. After accounting for differential 
test score trends depending on student pre-treatment characteristics (size of the student’s school 
eighth grade, language, natural and social science SIMCE average score, income category of 
each household, and the student’s school type of administration), the coefficient on distance 
reduction in column (2) in Table 5.2 (–1.201) does not change significantly in magnitude.  
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Table 5.2 The effect of school–subway distance reduction on mathematics test scores: linear model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: individual change in standardised 
test score 2004 to 2006 
Basic 
model 
As (1) 
plus 
school 
covariates 
As (2), plus 
heterogeneity 
in school-
subway 
distance 
As (3), 
plus 
spatial 
controls 
Distance reduction (km) -1.186*** -1.201***   
(0.163) (0.162)   
Distance reduction (km) | distance ≤ 2 km   -1.186** -1.341** 
  (0.296) (0.525) 
Distance reduction (km) | distance > 2 km   -1.231** -0.844 
  (0.301) (0.795) 
Baseline characteristics     
Number of students in same school and grade in (log) No Yes Yes Yes 
Language, natural and social science quintile No Yes Yes Yes 
Household income No Yes Yes Yes 
School type of administration No Yes Yes No 
Municipality x School type of administration No No No Yes 
Proximity to the old subway network No No No Yes 
Observations 68,160 67,026 67,026 67,026 
R-squared 0.002 0.018 0.018 0.032 
Notes: The table reports regression coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 100 to give the % effect of a 
one-km change in distance reduction to the subway network. The dependent variable is post-treatment (2006, 
10th grade) minus pre-treatment (2004, 8th grade) individual difference in standardised average language test 
scores; hence, this is a fixed-effects estimate. Test scores are measured as z-scores standardised at the national 
level with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Regressions are run at the individual level. To get 
an intent-to-treat effect I assign students to their initial school even if the student changed school between 
initial and final periods. Distance reduction means distance reduction between the school and the nearest 
subway network because of the new stations between final and initial periods in kilometres. There are 15 
categories of household median income; these categories are calculated obtaining the household median 
income in each school. Municipalities in the (urban) studied area are 42 and school type of administration 
categories are four (municipal, municipal corporation, voucher and private schools).  Proximity to the old 
subway network is a set of 12 dummy variables; one for each km of school-subway distance (plus an omitted 
category).  Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the Municipality level in all regressions. Sample 
restricted to schools at a maximum distance of 20 km from the new subway network. The largest distance 
reduction is 10.5 km. All regressions include an intercept (not shown). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The estimates in columns (3) and (4) correspond to the model specified in equation (3.3). This 
specification allows for heterogeneous effects of distance reduction on test scores depending 
on whether the distance between the school and the post-treatment subway network is less-or-
equal or more than 2 km. The coefficients on distance reduction in Column (3) in Table 5.2 for 
students in schools at a distance both smaller-or-equal and larger than 2 km are of the same 
magnitude and significance (–1.186 and –1.231 respectively). This suggests that the effect of 
distance reduction on mathematics test scores is homogeneous in school–subway post-
treatment distance. However, once I add spatial controls (school administration types in each 
municipality and proximity to the pre-treatment subway network fixed effects), the distance 
reduction effect on mathematics test scores for students in schools that end up at a maximum 
distance of 2 km from the subway network (see column (4) in Table 5.2) increases in absolute 
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terms to –1.3 per cent of a standard deviation per kilometre (coefficient equal to -1.341). By 
contrast, the distance reduction effect for students in schools that end up farther than 2 km 
from the subway network turns statistically insignificant (coefficient equal to –0.844). 
When estimating equation (3.3) for obtaining the results in Table 5.2, I assume that the effect 
of the treatment (distance reduction) on test scores is linear; an alternative way to analyse the 
results is to allow for non-linear effects of distance reduction on test scores (still under a student-
fixed-effects framework). Non-linearities can be introduced into equation (3.3) by using 
categories of distance reduction as treatment variables. I used five categories. Students in the 
first category are those whose school did not experience a distance reduction to the nearest 
subway station after the 2005 subway expansion (667 schools; 46 per cent of all schools). The 
other four categories are formed by dividing those schools that experienced a positive distance 
reduction into quartile groups. There are approximately 360 schools in each group. To be 
precise, the five categories of distance reduction are (1) null, (2) between 0.1 and 1.6 km 
inclusive, (3) between 1.6 and 2.3 km inclusive, (4) between 2.3 and 4.7 km inclusive, and (5) 
between 4.7 and 10.7 km.11 In the regressions, the first category is the reference category.  
Non-linear estimates suggest that the causal effect of a large school–subway distance reduction 
(larger than 4.7 km) for students in schools that ended up at a maximum distance of 2 km from 
the subway network is to worsen test scores in a policy-relevant way (see Table 5.3). The point 
estimates in column (1) show significant negative effects for the first (coefficient of –9.758), 
second (–7.461), and fourth (–4.952) distance reduction categories: a worsening between 5.0 
and 9.6 per cent of a standard deviation compared to those students in schools that did not 
experience a distance reduction and were always farther than 2 km from the subway network). 
Controlling for pre-treatment student and students’ school characteristics does not change the 
results in qualitative terms (see column (2) in Table 5.3)). (See Table 5.3’s notes for a detail of 
these characteristics.) 
  
                                                 
11 Google maps approximates distances to 100 m. 
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Table 5.3 The effect of school–subway distance reduction on mathematics test scores: nonlinear models 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: individual change in 
standardised test score 2004 to 
2006 
Basic 
model 
As (1) 
plus 
student 
covariates 
As (2), plus 
heterogeneity 
in school-
subway 
distance 
As (3), 
plus 
spatial 
controls 
4.7 km< distance reduction -9.578*** -10.48***   
(2.441) (2.260)   
2.3 km< distance reduction ≤ 4.7 km -7.461** -7.959**   
(3.252) (3.101)   
1.6 km< distance reduction ≤ 2.3 km -5.294* -5.207*   
(3.120) (2.990)   
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1.6 km -4.952** -4.929**   
(2.332) (2.106)   
0-km distance reduction (reference category for 
coefs. in columns (1) and (2)) 
0 0   
(0) (0)   
School-subway distance < 2 km     
4.7 km< distance reduction   -12.08*** -11.14** 
  (3.247) (4.913) 
2.3 km< distance reduction ≤ 4.7 km   -3.530 2.278 
  (2.935) (3.362) 
1.6 km< distance reduction ≤ 2.3 km   -2.881 2.485 
  (4.789) (4.259) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1.6 km   0.000660 -2.339 
  (2.843) (3.363) 
0-km distance reduction   2.099 -7.021 
  (1.890) (5.315) 
School-subway distance > 2 km     
4.7 km< distance reduction   -5.997** -2.428 
  (2.531) (3.142) 
2.3 km< distance reduction ≤ 4.7 km   -12.10*** -5.988 
  (3.628) (5.675) 
1.6 km< distance reduction ≤ 2.3 km   -4.838 -1.990 
  (3.663) (4.179) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1.6 km   -6.190** 3.046 
  (2.319) (2.278) 
0-km distance reduction (reference category for 
coefs. in columns (3) and (4)) 
  0 0 
  (0) (0) 
Predetermined covariates (2004)     
Sex No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of students in same school and grade 
(log) No Yes Yes Yes 
Quintile group of baseline score in language, 
social science, and natural science 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Household income No Yes Yes Yes 
School type of administration No Yes Yes No 
School has secondary school. No Yes Yes No 
Municipality x Type of administration No No No Yes 
Proximity to the old subway network No No No Yes 
Observations 68,160 67,026 67,026 67,026 
R-squared 0.003 0.021 0.022 0.034 
Notes:  As for Table 5.2. Distance reduction categories are five: one zero-distance reduction school 
(reference) category and four categories divided along quartiles of students in the non-zero distance 
reduction schools. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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As in Table 5.2, the specification in Table 5.3, column (3), allows for heterogeneity in the 
treatment effect. I allow such heterogeneity by interacting the distance reduction categories with 
the distance from the new subway stations. The size of the coefficient on the first category of 
distance reduction in column (3) is –12.08. The interpretation of this coefficient is the treatment 
effect for students in schools nearer than 2 km from the new subway stations that experienced 
a distance reduction larger than 4.7 km. Hence, controlling for all relevant covariates, test scores 
of students who before the inauguration of the new subway stations were in the latter group of 
schools worsened in 12.1 per cent of a standard deviation compared to students in schools that 
did not experience a distance reduction.  
Table 5.3, column (4) shows my preferred estimates. Compared to column (3) these incorporate 
spatial controls: 42 dummy variables for municipalities and 12 dummy variables for each 
kilometre from the old subway network. The estimates in column (4) imply that the effect on 
test score of greater proximity to the subway network for students in schools that experienced 
more than 4.7 km of distance reduction and ended up nearer than 2 km from the new subway 
stations is –11 per cent of a standard deviation (coefficient of –11.14; see Table 5.3, column 
(4)). On average, students in schools that ended up farther than 2 km from the new subway 
stations and experienced large distance-to-the-subway-network reductions did not experience a 
significant change in their test scores after the inauguration of the new subway stations. Hence, 
the negative effect of better transport accessibility on test scores is driven by students in schools 
that ended up nearer than 2 km from the new subway stations. (All coefficients in the post-
treatment school–subway distance greater than 2 km category are non-significantly different 
from zero.)   
5.4.3 Robustness analysis  
5.4.3.1 Robustness to a pre-existing test score trend at the municipal level 
If there would be a pre-existing decreasing trend in treated students’ test scores, this would bias 
my estimates. Because municipal schools are managed from within each municipality, the most 
likely pre-existing trend is at the municipal level. Since I am controlling for each municipality in 
the first differences specification depicted in equation 6.1, this controls for differential test score 
trends across municipalities. Hence, bias due to pre-existing differential test score trends should 
occur at an intra-municipality level. On the other hand, to test for the common test score trends 
assumption for test scores of treated and control students, I would need data for at least two 
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periods before the subway expansion. Unfortunately, this data (for standardised tests) does not 
exist in Chile. 
5.4.3.2 Robustness to a pre-existing test score trend correlated with future subway lines: placebo subway line 
The common trends assumption would also be violated if an unobserved shock between the 
pre-subway expansion and post-subway expansion tests would affect the academic achievement 
of treated and control students in different magnitudes. For example, during 2006, secondary 
school students in Chile carried out the largest student demonstrations in Chile’s last three 
decades (BBC News 2006). During 2006, almost 800,000 secondary students in Chile used 
strikes and demonstrations as a way of demanding a better quality of schools. The strikes, some 
of them lasting for months, may have had a significant effect on academic achievement. On the 
other hand, most of the new the new stations that opened in the mid-2000s were located along 
the main streets.  Hence, if the proportion of students participating in strikes in a school 
correlated with the distance between the school and the nearest main street, the student strikes 
and demonstrations in 2006 could have biased my estimates.  
A placebo experiment may falsify the previous concern. As I described in detail in Section 2.1.4 
on Santiago's transport system, in 2001, a potential subway line to Maipú was competing with 
the line to Puente Alto for the central government's funding. Because the line to Maipú was not 
built at the time, I use it as a placebo subway line. Table 5.4 shows that the coefficients on all 
distance reduction categories are non-significant and extremely low in practical terms (all of 
them are smaller than five per cent of a standard deviation). Hence, there is no evidence that 
unobserved shocks like the student demonstrations affected treated students differently from 
control students and, thus, could be driving the significance of the results in my preferred 
specification (Table 5.3 column (4)).   
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Table 5.4 The effect of school–placebo subway distance reduction on mathematics test scores: 
nonlinear models 
Dependent variable: individual change in standardised test score 2004 to 2006 
School–placebo distance < 2 km  
4.7 km< distance reduction to placebo 0.179 
(3.742) 
2.3 km< distance reduction to placebo ≤ 4.7 km -0.700 
(3.615) 
1.6 km< distance reduction to placebo ≤ 2.3 km 2.099 
(3.325) 
0 km< distance reduction to placebo ≤ 1.6 km 2.222 
(4.668) 
0-km distance reduction to placebo  -4.572 
(5.550) 
School–placebo distance > 2 km  
0 km< distance reduction to placebo ≤ 1.6 km -0.435 
(2.363) 
1.6 km< distance reduction to placebo ≤ 2.3 km -1.182 
(4.199) 
2.3 km< distance reduction to placebo ≤ 4.7 km -0.316 
(4.424) 
4.7 km< distance reduction to placebo ≤ 10.7 km 2.921 
(3.330) 
0-km distance reduction (reference category) 0 
(0) 
Observations 61,993 
R-squared 0.033 
Notes and covariates: As for Table 5.3. In this table, ‘placebo’ stands for ‘placebo 
subway network’. I exclude treated students from this sample. Treated students are 
those who experienced a distance reduction from the subway network larger than 
4.7 km and ended up nearer than two km from the subway network. 
 
5.4.3.3 Robustness to spatial correlation between the regression errors: permutation test 
In this section, I also analyse the robustness of the results to different assumptions about spatial 
correlation between the students’ test scores. In my preferred specification (Table 5.3, column 
(4)), I cluster standard errors at the municipality level. However, the regression errors could also 
be correlated across adjacent municipalities.  
To consider the impact of spatial correlation between the regression errors I implement a 
permutation test of the treatment variable coefficient’s standard error that is exact regardless of 
the presence of spatial correlation of the regression errors (and sample size). This tests derive 
from Fisher’s (1935) exact test and have been further developed by researchers like Welch (1990) 
and applied by Abadie and Dermisi (2008). To implement such a test, I first produce 10,000 
random permutations of the treatment variable (categories of distance reduction for column (4) 
in Table 5.3). Each permutation forces the null hypothesis—that the treatment is uncorrelated 
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with the dependent variable—to be true by delinking the treatment and dependent variables. 
Second, I run the regression depicted in equation (4) with each permuted set of treatment 
variables. Third, I calculate the proportion of the permuted treatment variable coefficients that 
are greater in absolute value than the estimate calculated using the actual treatment (𝛽1,5̂). This 
proportion is a robust version of the p-value calculated under parametric assumptions in Table 
5.3, column (4).  
Only 1.3 per cent of the estimated coefficients are larger in absolute value than the ones in Table 
5.3, column (4). This robust p-value is to be compared to the p-values implicit in column (4) in 
Table 5.3 obtained under parametric assumptions (1.5 per cent). Hence, regardless of the 
regression errors’ spatial correlation, there is an extremely small probability of obtaining the 
results in my preferred specification (Table 5.3, column (4)) if the null hypothesis that there is 
no impact of better school accessibility on student test scores is true. 
5.4.3.4 Robustness to a spurious correlation: use of language test scores 
Despite the high statistical significance in the effect in column (4) of Table 5.3, it could be 
argued that the effect is only attributable to the natural variability in the data. If this were the 
case, we should not observe an effect of closer proximity between schools and the subway 
network when using another outcome variable. The specifications that generated Table 5.5 are 
identical to the ones that generated my preferred results (Table 5.3, which allows for non-
linearities in the effect) but use language test scores as dependent variable. In Table 5.5, we also 
observe a significant effect of closer proximity between a school and the subway network. Even 
though the key coefficient in column (4) is significant only at the 10 per cent significance level 
(coefficient of –8.652), the decrease in statistical significance for the key coefficients in column 
(4) relative to the significance of the coefficient in column (3) (coefficient of –9.874 ) is mainly 
due to the increase in the standard errors when including spatial controls (not due to an a sharp 
decrease in the size of the coefficient).  
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Table 5.5 The effect of school-subway distance reduction on language test scores: 
nonlinear models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: 2006-2004 language 
average test score 
Basic 
model 
As (1) 
plus 
school 
covariates 
As (2), plus 
heterogeneity 
in school-
subway 
distance 
As (3), 
plus 
spatial 
controls 
4.7 km< distance reduction  -7.927*** -8.008***   
(1.812) (1.558)   
2.3 km< distance reduction ≤ 4.7 km -3.303 -3.264   
(2.072) (1.986)   
1.6 km< distance reduction ≤ 2.3 km -2.038 -2.958   
(3.453) (2.656)   
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1.6 km -1.354 -1.546   
(2.165) (1.697)   
0-km distance reduction (reference category 
for coefs. in columns (1) and (2)) 
0 0   
(0) (0)   
School-subway distance < 2 km         
4.7 km< distance reduction   -9.874*** -8.652* 
  (2.636) (5.011) 
2.3 km< distance reduction ≤ 4.7 km   -1.809 2.434 
  (1.538) (2.324) 
1.6 km< distance reduction ≤ 2.3 km   -1.210 1.660 
  (4.611) (5.828) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1.6 km   -1.097 3.181 
  (1.697) (2.769) 
0 km distance reduction   1.301 0.0894 
  (1.736) (3.579) 
School-subway distance > 2 km     
4.7 km< distance reduction   -3.796** -0.996 
  (1.847) (4.368) 
2.3 km< distance reduction ≤ 4.7 km   -4.004 2.118 
  (2.952) (4.361) 
1.6 km< distance reduction ≤ 2.3 km   -2.760 -0.465 
  (3.243) (2.845) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1.6 km   -0.916 3.807 
  (2.148) (2.319) 
0 km distance reduction (reference 
category for coefs. in columns (3) and (4)) 
  0 0 
  (0) (0) 
Predetermined covariates         
Sex No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of students in same school and 
grade in 2004 (log) No Yes Yes Yes 
Quintile group of baseline score in 
language, social science, and natural science 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Household income No Yes Yes Yes 
School type of administration No Yes Yes No 
School has secondary school. No Yes Yes No 
Municipality x Type of administration No No No Yes 
Proximity to the old subway network No No No Yes 
Observations 68,031 67,115 67,115 67,115 
R-squared 0.001 0.194 0.195 0.201 
Notes:  As for Table 5.3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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5.4.4 Does the school–subway network distance really matter? 
One way in which increased school accessibility could have had a non-causal impact on student 
outcomes is through changes in student dropout and repetition rates. This could have induced 
sample selection where worse performing students decreased their likelihood of dropping out 
from high school due to the accessibility improvement. My estimates in Section 5.4.2 are an 
intent-to-treat calculation where the students’ post-treatment test scores are attached to their 
pre-treatment school. The new subway stations were inaugurated during the students’ first year 
in high school (ninth grade). Hence, if better school accessibility increased the chance that 
students with worsening performance took the post-treatment (2006) test, this could induce a 
biased negative impact of distance reduction on individual test scores.  
Table A5.1 in Appendix 5 shows that there is no evidence that distance reduction had an effect 
on the probability that a student who took the SIMCE test in 2004 would also take the test in 
2006. Hence, there is no indication supporting the hypothesis that the negative effect of better 
accessibility on test scores was due to a decrease in dropout and repetition rates among the 
treated students. Therefore, I find no evidence of a non-causal explanation underlying my 
results. 
5.4.5 Why does school–subway network distance matter?  
The school–subway network distance reduction could affect student test scores through at least 
five mechanisms. First, schools that experienced large reductions in school–subway network 
distance could have received more students due to better accessibility after the inauguration of 
the subway stations compared to schools that did not experience such accessibility 
improvement. This, in turn, leads to an increase in the student–teacher ratio and to disruption 
for non-moving students in the treated schools. Both factors are associated with worse test 
scores. (See, for example, Krueger (1999) for the effect of smaller classes on student 
performance and Gibbons and Telhaj (2011) for the effect of pupil mobility and school 
disruption on test scores.) 
Table 5.6 shows the effect of school–subway network distance reduction on the number of 
students per grade in each school. The dependent variable in Table 5.6 is the number of students 
in tenth grade in each school in the post-treatment period (2006) minus the number of students 
in tenth grade in the same school in a pre-treatment year (2003). I used 2003 as the pre-treatment 
year because this is the closest year before the inauguration of the subway stations in 2005 when 
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students in tenth grade took the SIMCE test. As in all previous analyses, my preferred 
specification is depicted in column (4).  
Table 5.6 The effect of school–subway distance reduction on the size of each school's cohort: nonlinear models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: students in each 10th grade 
cohort in each school in 2006 minus students in 
2003  
Basic model 
As (1) plus 
school 
covariates 
As (2), plus 
heterogeneity in 
school–subway 
distance 
As (3), plus 
spatial 
controls 
0-km distance reduction (ref. category) 0 0   
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1.6 km -13.81** -14.47*   
(5.404) (6.523)   
1.6 km< distance reduction ≤ 2.3 km -13.70 -14.36*   
(8.819) (6.640)   
2.3 km< distance reduction ≤ 4.7 km 0.621 -1.156   
(4.100) (1.682)   
4.7 km< distance reduction ≤ 10.7 km 9.450** 6.942**   
(4.298) (2.075)   
School–subway distance > 2 km         
0-km distance reduction (ref. category)   0 0 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1.6 km   -17.57 -15.34* 
  (9.946) (8.552) 
1.6 km< distance reduction ≤ 2.3 km   -15.27 -20.81 
  (12.88) (14.90) 
2.3 km< distance reduction ≤ 4.7 km   4.777*** 3.803 
  (0.736) (4.206) 
4.7 km< distance reduction ≤ 10.7 km   5.103 4.959 
  (2.456) (5.814) 
School–subway distance ≤ 2 km     
0-km distance reduction   1.503 2.444 
  (4.814) (9.123) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1.6 km   -9.769 -6.112 
  (6.583) (7.770) 
1.6 km< distance reduction ≤ 2.3 km   -11.10 -6.382 
  (5.781) (5.349) 
2.3 km< distance reduction ≤ 4.7 km   -5.233 -7.422 
  (7.592) (5.218) 
4.7 km< distance reduction ≤ 10.7 km   9.998*** 9.105** 
    (1.010) (3.886) 
Quintile of number of students in same school and 
grade in 2003 fixed effects 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Quintile of average school score in language and 
maths in 2003 fixed effects 
No Yes Yes Yes 
School type of administration fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Proximity to the old subway network fixed effects No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.030 0.240 0.245 0.257 
Notes: As for Table 5.3. Regressions are run at the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
Controlling for all relevant covariates, schools that experienced a large reduction in their 
distance from the subway network had an average increase of nine more students in tenth grade 
compared to schools that did not experience any distance reduction. Hence, there is evidence 
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that one of the mechanisms through which the reduction in school–subway network distance 
affected test scores negatively is via an increase in the number of students per grade in the 
treated schools compared to the number of students per grade in the control group. In addition, 
this increase in the number of students per grade in the treated schools most likely implied 
disruption to the incumbent pupils in those schools. 
A second mechanism through which a reduction in school–subway network distance could have 
affected test scores is through the effect of families choosing to change schools on achievement. 
Changing schools implies adaptation costs and, potentially, higher commuting times if the 
changes are to schools farther from the students’ homes. Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) 
conclude that the effect of families choosing to change schools on achievement is modest and 
negative (around 1 per cent of a standard deviation in terms of the annual gain in mathematics 
achievement).  
I find no evidence that the school–subway network distance reduction experienced by some 
schools implied a higher probability that students in those schools would move to another 
school. Column (4) in Table A5.2 in Appendix 5 depicts the results of a regression of students’ 
own movement (whether the student changed school after the inauguration of the subway 
stations) on distance reduction categories. In this regression, the coefficients on large distance 
reductions are not statistically significant and have a low absolute value in practical terms. 
Therefore, most likely, the negative impact of distance reduction on test scores is not driven by 
an increase in the probability that students in treated schools would change schools. 
A third mechanism through which closer school–subway network proximity could have affected 
academic achievement is through changes in the parents’ labour market outcomes. For example, 
lower labour earnings or more hours of work could have affected students’ test scores 
negatively. Appendix 10 shows the main specification in Chapter 4 using the same distance 
threshold as in this Chapter (two kilometres). Using the distance threshold of two kilometres 
implies that the impact of school–subway network distance on employment status and hours of 
work (particularly women’s) is positive but non-statistically significant (see column 2 in Tables 
A10.2 and A10.3). The policy or economic significance of these estimates is considerable (7 
percentage points in employment status and 23 hours of work per week). On the other hand, 
on average, using a two-kilometre distance threshold implies that the effect of closer school–
subway network proximity on labour earnings is negative, but not statistically significant.  
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Hence, changes in the labour market are potentially relevant mechanisms through which closer 
proximity to the subway network implied lower test scores. The fact that the size of the 
previously discussed coefficients is not statistically significant could be due to low power of my 
estimates due to a high spatial aggregation of the data in Chapter 4 (as described in section 
4.3.1). Future work with individual addresses could improve the precision of these estimates. 
A fourth mechanism through which closer proximity to the subway network could have affected 
test scores is through changes in peers experienced by treated individuals. Table 5.7 shows the 
change in the 2004 test score of each student’s classmates between 2004 and 2006. This change 
in test scores is a proxy for whether the ability of each student’s peers improved between 2004 
and 200612. Column (3) in Table 5.7 shows that this improvement is not statistically significant. 
Hence, there is no evidence supporting the hypothesis that peer effects were a relevant channel 
for the effect of the treatment. However, the caveat of this finding is that the fact of whether a 
student moved or stayed at their school during the 2004–2006 period could have been affected 
by the treatment status. The reason is that closer proximity to the subway network could have 
induced some students to move to another school, while inducing other students to remain at 
their primary school (due to fewer slots in some schools).13  
Table 5.7 Descriptive statistics exploring peer effects channel 
 Dependent variable: change in the 
2004 test score of students’ classmates 
between 2004 and 2006 
(1) 
Control 
students  
[s.d] 
(2) 
Treated 
students  
[s.d.] 
(3) 
Diff. (2)–(1) 
(s.e.) 
Stayers 4.30 1.03 -3.27 
 [13.03] [18.63] (3.17) 
Movers 12.54 13.00 0.46 
  [50.08] [49.25] (4.5) 
Notes: The table reports regression coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 100 to 
give the % association in terms of standard deviations of Chile's SIMCE test. Sample 
constrained to the one in the main specification (Table 3, column 4). *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
A fifth mechanism through which closer proximity to the subway network could have affected 
academic achievement is through the effect of better or worse teachers. Unfortunately, to my 
knowledge, during the studied period there are no datasets with measures for teacher quality. 
An (imperfect) proxy for teacher quality could be the value-added provided by schools. Because 
                                                 
12 The reason why I use pre-intervention (2004) test scores and not post-intervention ones is that the latter ones 
could be affected by the effect of closer proximity to the subway network. 
13 This possibility is compatible with the fact that, on average, the treatment did not increase the probability that a 
treated student would move to another school during the 2004–2006 period. 
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I want to avoid value added measures being contaminated by a potential effect of closer 
proximity to the subway network, I use the ‘contextual average student performance’ estimated 
with 2004 data in section 2.3.2 as a proxy for each school’s value added. A problem of this 
measure is that it is only feasible to calculate for schools with eighth grade. Out of the 655 
schools with students in the sample of my preferred specification (the one that generated Table 
5.3, column (4)), it was not feasible to calculate the ‘contextual average student performance’ 
for a 22 per cent of these schools (145 schools).  
Table 5.8 shows the change in the 2004 ‘contextual average student performance’ for students 
who moved to another school between eighth and tenth grade. Column (3) shows that students 
in the control group experienced a greater increase in the proxy for their school’s value added 
(coefficient of 12.35 percentage points of one standard deviation) relative to students in the 
treated group (coefficient of 4.57). However, this difference is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. Hence, there is no conclusive evidence supporting the hypothesis that the 
effect of closer proximity to the subway network was due to treated students moving to worse 
schools relative to control students. As in the previous paragraph, a caveat for this conclusion 
is that whether a student moved to another school between 2004 and 2006 could have been 
affected by closer proximity between their school and the subway network. 
Table 5.8 Descriptive statistics exploring teacher effects channel 
Dependent variable: change in the 2004 
“contextual average student performance” 
(proxy for value added) of the student’s 
school between 2004 and 2006 
(1) 
Control 
students  
[s.d] 
(2) 
Treated 
students  
[s.d.] 
(3) 
Diff. (2)–(1) 
(s.e.) 
Movers 12.35 4.57 -7.78 
  [51.13] [53.57] (5.1) 
Notes: As for Table 5.6. . *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
5.5 Summary and conclusions 
The main purpose of this chapter is to establish whether improvements in school accessibility 
have a causal effect on student test scores. This is an important policy question because many 
developing countries are investing resources in improving their urban transport networks, 
though the consequences for human capital accumulation have often not been considered.  
This chapter carefully addresses the identification of the impacts of better school accessibility 
on academic achievement. First, I use a detailed individual administrative test score dataset with 
information before and after the transport innovation, and thus avoid selection bias and changes 
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in school composition by calculating an intent-to-treat effect. Second, I account for potential 
biases in my fixed effect estimates by controlling for test score differential trends in relevant 
dimensions. Third, I carry out robustness checks to unobserved differential shocks to treated 
and control student test scores and spatial correlation between the regression errors.   
My main finding is that there is a large negative effect of school–subway distance reduction on 
test scores. Students in schools that experience a large decrease (of more than 4.7 km) in the 
distance from the nearest subway station, and ended up at a walking distance from the subway 
network, had average test scores that were lower by some 11 per cent of a standard deviation 
compared to test scores of students in schools that did not experience a distance reduction to 
the subway network.  
The magnitude of this finding is large. In a review of 18 randomised evaluations reporting test 
score outcomes in developing countries, Kremer et al. (2013) reported that the upper bound of 
all 90 per cent confidence intervals of the average effect of educational programs was less than 
9 per cent of a standard deviation.  
I also find evidence that the negative effect of distance reduction on test scores is due to an 
increase in the number of students in schools that were now significantly closer to the subway 
network. Understanding the channels through which better school accessibility affects student 
performance is of key importance if policy makers wish to avoid undesired effects of new 
transport infrastructure on human capital accumulation.   
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Chapter 6 
6. Better Urban Transport  
Increases Robbery and Larceny in the Public Space 
6.1 Introduction 
Because of their effect on legitimate labour market outcomes and on accessibility to illegal 
activities, changes in transport connectivity may have a sizable impact on property crime rates 
at the neighbourhood level and, more generally, on the spatial distribution of crime within a 
city. 
This chapter examines to which extent urban transport accessibility has an impact on property 
crime rates in areas near the transport improvements. In line with Becker (1968) and Ehrlich 
(1973), I assume that offenders, potential victims, and law enforcement authorities are rational 
individuals who interact in a ‘market for offenses’. At an individual level, following Freeman 
(1999), an individual engages in crime if: 
(1 − 𝑝)𝑈(𝑊𝑐) − 𝑝𝑈(𝑆) > 𝑈(𝑊) (6.1) 
where 𝑝 is the probability of being apprehended, 𝑊𝑐 is the monetary gain from committing an 
offence, 𝑆 is the sanction for being apprehended, and 𝑊 is the monetary gain from legal work.  
In this framework, greater proximity to the subway network may affect the supply of crime by 
affecting different variables in equation (6.1). First, greater proximity to the subway network 
lowers the (generalised) cost of access of the area to potential offenders. In those types of crime 
where the offenders might use the subway to reach their targets (such as robbery and thefts), 
the decrease in the cost of transport increases 𝑊𝑐, the net payoff of these property crimes. This, 
in turn, increases property crime in that specific area.  
Second, as seen in Chapter 4, greater proximity to the subway network increases 𝑊, the affected 
workers’ labour earnings from legal activities. This has at least two consequences. On the one 
hand, in the medium and long term, an increase in labour earnings of potential victims increases 
their wealth. This increases the attractiveness of these potential victims as targets of crime, 
raising 𝑊𝑐. An increase in the payoff of property crime increases the amount of property crime. 
At the same time, an increase in the potential victims’ wealth increases their payoff and 
willingness to pay for private security measures like burglar alarm systems or safety deposit 
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boxes (Bennett and Wright 1984; Skogan and Maxfield 1981). An increase in security measures 
decreases property crime either by increasing the probability of apprehension 𝑝 or by decreasing 
the payoff from an attempt of a property crime offence. On the other hand, if, as concluded by 
Brantingham and Brantigham (1984), offenders act locally, an increase in their expected labour 
earnings from legal activities (𝑊) increases the opportunity cost of engaging in criminal 
activities; this decreases the amount of property crime.  
Third, when an area increases its proximity to the subway network due to better urban transport 
accessibility, the area becomes a more attractive place to live in. Proof of this greater 
attractiveness is the well-established fact that greater proximity to the subway network implies 
higher property prices (see, for example, Gibbons and Machin 2005). This, in turn, attracts 
wealthier citizens to the area with improved transport access (Pagliara and Papa 2011). 
Following the same logic as in the previous point, a greater wealth of residents might imply 
either an increase or decrease in the equilibrium quantity of property crime in the area. Fourth, 
a greater proximity to the subway network implies a greater flow of pedestrians (Miranda-
Moreno, Morency, and El-Geneidy 2011). This has at least two implications. On the one hand, 
using Jacobs’ (1961) language, a greater flow of pedestrians implies that there are more ‘eyes on 
the street’, which, in turn, may increase the probability that an ongoing criminal act is denounced 
to the police. This implies an increase in the probability that the police catch the offender, 𝑝. 
This, in turn, reduces the equilibrium amount of property crime. On the other hand, a greater 
flow of pedestrians implies that the concentration of potential targets of crime increases. This, 
in turn, decreases the effort exercised by a criminal in finding a profitable victim. This increases 
the payoffs from property crime in the area (𝑊𝑐), increasing the (short-term) equilibrium 
quantity of property crime to pedestrians such as robbery and larceny. Fifth, greater proximity 
to the subway network may also increase the frequency at which the police patrol the 
surroundings of the new subway stations (TriMet 2013). This increases the probability of 
burglars, robbers, and thieves being caught (𝑝), making these places less attractive to them. This, 
in turn, decreases the equilibrium quantity of crime. 
Considering all these potential effects of greater proximity to the subway network on the 
amount of property crime, the different types of property crimes (burglary, robbery, or larceny) 
could increase, remain at the same level, or decrease. Hence, the question that motivates this 
study is an empirical one. 
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Some studies have explored the effects of subway lines on the spatial distribution of crime. 
Block and Davis (1996), using data from Chicago, find that crime rates in low-crime districts 
are highest at 300 m distance from subway stations. The researchers explain their finding arguing 
that this distance is far enough from the station security personnel, but still close enough that 
the density of commuters is not too low. 
Using data from Atlanta in the USA, Poister (1996) concludes that reported crime increased 
after a rapid rail station opening in 1993. However, after several months, crime returned to its 
earlier levels. One problem with this study is that there is no control group for the area 
surrounding the station; hence, the observed increase and decrease in reported crime rate may 
just have a spurious relation with the station opening.  
Liggett et al. (2003) conclude that the inauguration of a light rail line in Los Angeles did not 
increase (and in some cases decreased) crime rates in the relatively poor neighbourhoods near 
the new rail stations. Moreover, they also conclude that the line did not increase crime in more 
affluent neighbourhoods that, being already close to the light rail before its expansion, feared 
an increase in crime due to the line opening. One limitation of this study is that it uses the crime 
rate in the county of the new rail stations as a counterfactual to the crime rate in the 
neighbourhood near the new rail stations. Because in absence of the new rail line, the crime 
rates in the station’s county and in the station’s vicinity could have been different. In this study, 
the difference-in-differences common trends assumption does not necessarily hold. 
In the research most closely related to the present study, Billings et al. (2011) find that the 
announcement of a light rail line in 2007 in Charlotte (North Carolina) decreased robbery, 
burglary and larceny in the neighbourhoods around the new train stations by 32.4 per cent, 26.3 
per cent and 25 per cent respectively, relative to control neighbourhoods. Hence, crimes to both 
moving (robbery and larceny) and non-moving targets (burglary) decreased after the 
announcement of a light rail line in Charlotte. In this study, Billings et al. (2011) control for 
unobserved neighbourhood fixed effects using panel data and use neighbourhoods around 
alternative corridors that were not built as a control group.  
The main contribution of the present chapter is to use a convincing empirical strategy to 
estimate the effect of greater proximity to the subway network on the spatial distribution of 
property crime rates. To control for pre-existing crime trends across municipalities I control for 
each municipality in the first-differences regressions. In addition, I check that there is no 
evidence of unobservables such as a potential differential increase in mobile phone (a target of 
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crime) use in treated and control areas that could be biasing my results. Second, this chapter 
uses georeferenced data for every crime reported to the police in Santiago in 2005 and 2007, the 
years before and after the expansion of the subway network in Santiago. To my knowledge, this 
is the first study in a developing country context using this level of detail in the data. Third, the 
treatment variable in this chapter is the distance reduction to the subway network experienced 
by each crime area in Santiago. All previous research use distance bands around the new subway 
stations as treatment variables. This approach does not acknowledge the fact that the intensity 
of the treatment varies for locations that end up near the subway network but experience 
different distance reductions to the subway network. 
I define treated areas to be those that became more than two kilometres nearer to the subway 
network and ended up at a walking distance from it (this is, less than two kilometres) due to 
Santiago’s subway expansion in the mid-2000s. I define the control areas to be those that were 
farther than two kilometres from the subway network before the subway expansion and did not 
experience any distance reduction to the subway network in the mid-2000s.  
I find that, on average, robbery and larceny in treated areas increased by 18 per cent and 43 per 
cent respectively after the inauguration of the new subway stations relative to the change in the 
same type of crime experienced by the control areas. By contrast, burglary did not change 
differently in treated and control areas.  
There are no theoretical reasons why greater proximity to the subway network should have a 
linear effect on property crime rates. Previous studies using other outcome variables have 
identified that there is an effect insofar the affected location ends up at a maximum threshold 
distance from the subway network. While Gibbons and Machin (2005) and Ahlfeldt (2013) 
found that this threshold for the effect of greater proximity to the subway network on property 
prices was two kilometres, in Chapters 4 and 5 I find that this threshold is two and one 
kilometres respectively. Hence, I expect that there could be a heterogeneous effect of distance 
reduction to the subway network on property crime rates depending on the distance from the 
subway network after the subway expansion.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.2, I describe the application of the 
generic estimation equation 3.5 derived in Chapter 3 to the particular case when the outcome 
of interest are different types of property crime. In Section 6.3, I describe the data. Section 6.4 
describes the descriptive statistics, main results and robustness analysis. Finally, Section 6.5 
provides conclusions to this chapter. 
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6.2 Method 
To study the effect of proximity to the subway network on property crime rates, I use a fixed-
effects model using crime areas as unit of observation. To simplify the notation, I now show 
the specification for just one type of crime (for example, burglary). In line with the general case 
outlined in specification (3.5), my estimation equation is  
(𝑦𝑖1 − 𝑦𝑖0) = ∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝑗
ℎ𝑖1𝛽1𝑗 + ∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝑗
(1 − ℎ𝑖1)𝛽2𝑗 + 𝑥𝑖0
′ 𝛾 + (𝑔1−𝑔0) + (𝜀i1 − 𝜀i0) (6.1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the property crime rate for crime area 𝑖 at time 𝑡; 𝑐𝑗 are dummy variables, one for 
each of the three categories of distance reduction (0 km, 0 km< distance reduction ≤ 2 km and 
Distance reduction > 2 km); ℎ𝑖𝑡 =  𝐼(𝑑𝑖𝑡 ≤ 2 𝑘𝑚), where 𝐼(… ) equals one when the condition 
in the parenthesis is true and zero otherwise; 𝛽1𝑗 is the effect of proximity to the subway 
network on crime outcomes; 𝑥𝑖0
′  is a vector that contains area 𝑖's baseline characteristics such 
as the baseline year's property crime rates (excluding the dependent variable's specific category 
of property crime) and average distance from the subway network before the network's 
expansion; 𝑔𝑡 are general time effects that account for changes to the property crime rate during 
a specific year in the whole city; and  𝜀𝑖𝑡 is equation (6.1)’s error term. 
6.3 Data 
I use data on all crimes reported to the police in Santiago in the pre-intervention and post-
intervention years (2005 and 2007 respectively). A crucial strength of police-recorded crime is 
that the police record the location of each of the reported offenses. This is the case in my 
dataset. Another strength of police-recorded crime is that it provides a lengthy time-series 
dataset.  
One weakness of police-recorded crime is that counting rules—such as how to count repeated 
offenses within a short period—may change (Maguire 2012). This may be due to changes in the 
official way to aggregate offenses (Maguire 2012). An additional weakness of police-recorded 
crime is that the criteria with which the police define which crimes to record are subject to a 
certain degree of discretion, and the way the police exercise this discretion may change over 
time (Maguire 2012). Another weakness of police-recorded crime is that the official ‘list’ of 
offenses may change (Maguire 2012). To my knowledge, between 2005 and 2007, Chile’s police 
did not change any of the rules for counting or recording crime, the way in which the police 
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exercised discretion on which crimes to record, or in the official list of offenses. Finally, the 
willingness of the public to report crime may change in time (Maguire 2012). In Section 6.4.4, I 
test whether my results are robust to changes in the public’s willingness to report crime.  
A second source of data on crime widely used nowadays is victimisation surveys. One advantage 
of these surveys is that they count incidents not reported to the police and that they are not 
subject to changes in counting rules, official lists of crime, or the way the polices exercises 
discretion in counting procedures. Chile’s main victimisation survey is the ‘Encuesta Nacional 
Urbana de Seguridad Ciudadana’ (‘National Survey of Urban Public Safety’ or ‘ENUSC’ in Spanish). 
For my research, the main disadvantage of the ENUSC is that, due to confidentiality issues, I 
was not allowed access to the addresses of the respondents. In addition, these kinds of surveys 
would generally not record the address where the robbery and thefts suffered by the respondents 
occurred. 
The police recorded each reported crime and Chile’s Undersecretary of Crime Prevention 
(‘Subsecretaría de Prevención del Crimen’) georeferenced the dataset. As a way to check the accuracy 
of the georeferencing process, I checked whether all georeferenced crimes were located within 
the limits of Santiago’s urban area (see Appendix 7 for this definition). All georeferenced crimes 
passed this test. 
In this chapter, the unit of analysis is a crime area. These are small spatial units with an average 
surface of one hectare. Chile’s Undersecretary of Crime Prevention uses crime areas as an 
administrative territorial division to monitor the crime levels in each locality in Chile. In Chile’s 
Metropolitan Region of Santiago (‘Santiago’), there are 8,022 crime areas with data in 2005 and 
2007. On average, there are approximately 200 crime areas per municipality in Santiago. To get 
the average distance between any specific crime area and the 2005 and 2007 subway networks, 
I used the average distance from the nearest subway station of all crimes in a crime area in 2005 
to the subway networks in 2005 and 2007 respectively. For specific details about the 
construction of the different crime categories, see Appendix 6. 
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6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 6.1 reports summary statistics on crime rates and distance reduction to the subway 
network in Santiago. While 13 per cent of crime areas are treated areas, 35 per cent are control 
areas. Hence, a 52 per cent of crime areas are neither treated or control areas. Treated areas are 
those that experienced a significant distance reduction to the subway network in the mid-2000s 
(greater than two kilometres) and ended up at a ‘walking distance’ from the new subway stations 
(two kilometres or less). The threshold of two kilometres as a walking distance is the one that, 
using intervals of 500 metres, maximises the R-squared of the regression in column (1) of Table 
6.2. The use of a walking distance to allow heterogeneity in the effect of proximity to the subway 
network on property crime rates is important because we should expect that all the potential 
mechanisms discussed in Section 6.1 should apply to areas that end up at a walking distance 
from the subway network. There is no theoretical reason to suppose that the potential channels 
discussed in Section 6.1 should apply to those areas that end up farther away than walking 
distance from the subway network. In addition, this threshold is the same as the walking distance 
used in Gibbons and Machin (2005) and in Chapter 5 of this thesis. On the other hand, control 
areas are those who did not experience any distance reduction to the subway network and were 
always farther away than two kilometres from the subway network. In 2005, both treated and 
control areas were at almost the same average distance from the subway network (5.6 km). In 
2007, due to the expansion of the subway network, the average distance from the subway 
network of treated crime areas decreased sharply to one kilometre. 
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Table 6.1 Summary statistics on crime rates and distance reduction to the subway network in Santiago 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  All areas in 
Santiago [s.d] 
Treated areas  
[s.d] 
Control areas  
[s.d] 
Diff. (2)–(3) 
(s.e.) 
Share of each group out of all crime 
areas 
1.00 0.13 0.35  
Categories of distance reduction     
Distance reduction > 2 km 0.23 1 0  
[0.42] [0] [0]  
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 2 km 0.18 0 0  
[0.38] [0] [0]  
0 km distance reduction 0.59 0 1  
[0.49] [0] [0]  
Municipality–subway distance (km)     
2005 4.34 5.61 5.59 0.02 
 [3.12] [2.49] [2.75] (0.09) 
2007 3.16 0.99 5.59 -4.60*** 
 [2.79] [0.51] [2.75] (0.05) 
Robbery in the public space     
2005 6.09 5.37 4.38 0.99*** 
 [9.46] [7.23] [6.75] (0.26) 
2007 6.34 5.69 4.24 1.46*** 
 [11.2] [9.26] [7.44] (0.32) 
Larceny in the public space     
2005 0.73 0.52 0.41 0.11** 
 [3.02] [1.17] [1.16] (0.04) 
2007 0.54 0.39 0.28 0.11*** 
 [2.5] [1.26] [1.05] (0.04) 
Burglary     
2005 3.01 3.64 2.72 0.92*** 
 [2.91] [2.83] [2.84] (0.10) 
2007 2.44 2.75 2.05 0.70*** 
 [2.43] [2.32] [2.12] (0.08) 
Domestic violence     
2005 3.98 4.60 4.08 0.52*** 
 [4.91] [4.42] [5.63] (0.17) 
2007 3.37 3.76 3.33 0.44*** 
 [3.86] [3.5] [4.17] (0.13) 
Number of crime areas in each 
subgroup 
8,022 1,061 2,819 3,880 
Notes: Columns (1) to (3) report sample means with standard deviations in brackets. Column (4) reports the 
difference between columns (2) and (3) with standard errors in parentheses. There are 8,022 crime areas in 
Santiago with data in both periods (2005 and 2007). Distance reduction means average distance reduction 
between every crime in 2005 (year before the subway network expansion) in each crime area and the nearest 
subway network because of the new stations between final and initial periods. The largest distance reduction is 
10.5 km. Treated crime areas experienced a distance reduction to the subway network greater than two 
kilometres and ended up nearer than two kilometres on average from the subway network in 2005. Control 
crime areas did not experience a distance reduction to the subway network in 2005 and in both periods were 
farther than two kilometres from the subway network. See glossary of terms for the definition of burglary, 
robbery, theft, domestic violence and violence in the public space. The sample includes all crimes in the 
Santiago metropolitan urban area (see Appendix 7 for limits). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 6.1 also shows that in 2005 there were more property crimes in treated than in control 
areas. In 2005, on average, there were 0.99 more robbery in treated than in control areas; in 
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2007, this difference increased to an average of 1.46 more robbery per crime area per year. By 
contrast, both in 2005 and 2007, treated areas had 0.11 more larcenies per area per year relative 
to control areas. In addition, in 2005 treated areas had 0.92 more burglary per area per year 
relative to control areas. However, in 2007 this difference decreased to 0.70 more burglary per 
area per year relative to control areas. Finally, in 2005, treated areas had 0.52 more reports of 
domestic violence relative to control areas. Even though the level of domestic violence 
decreased in 2007, treated areas still had 0.44 more reports of domestic violence relative to 
control areas.  
These differences suggest that the opening of the new subway stations in the mid-2000s in 
Santiago led to a reduction in burglary and domestic violence and an increase in robbery in 
treated relative to control crime areas. However, are these differences substantive? Could non-
observed (by the econometrician) characteristics of the treated areas such as the municipal 
mayor’s lobbying capacity have affected both the location of the new subway stations and the 
fight against crime relative to control areas? Similarly, could previously existing spatial trends be 
driving the differences seen in Table 6.1? I explore these questions in the next section. 
6.4.2 Main results 
My main results follow equation (6.1) that is my preferred empirical specification. To account 
for unobserved fixed characteristics of the crime areas such as the local mayor’s capacity to 
lobby for the subway to pass by her municipality and lobbying the police to be more effective 
in her municipality, I use crime-area fixed-effects models. Table 6.2 shows the results of my 
preferred specification. In this specification, I allow for heterogeneity in the effect of greater 
proximity to the subway network on property crime rates depending on whether the area ended 
up at a walking distance from the nearest subway station. In addition, I allow for non-linearities 
in the previous effect. Controlling for the municipality of each crime area, the pre-expansion 
proximity to the subway network and central business district, and the pre-subway expansion 
levels of property and violent crime, robbery and larceny in the public space increase in treated 
relative to control crime areas. The effect on the treated areas is 0.97 (coefficient of 0.966) more 
robbery per area per year (see column (1)). This represents an increase in 18 per cent of robbery 
with respect to the 2005 level of robbery in treated areas.  
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Table 6.2 The effect of crime area–subway distance reduction on crime rates: nonlinear models allowing for 
heterogeneity in walking distance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: change in number of crimes 
per crime area 2005 to 2007 
Robbery in 
the public 
space 
Larceny in 
the public 
space 
Burglary Domestic 
violence 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance ≤2 km 
Distance reduction > 2 km 0.966** 0.226*** -0.228 0.226 
(0.463) (0.0815) (0.189) (0.353) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 2 km 0.271 0.145* -0.288 -0.0897 
(0.604) (0.0738) (0.186) (0.225) 
0-km distance reduction -0.471 -0.0215 -0.219 -0.200 
(0.296) (0.0670) (0.159) (0.219) 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance > 2 km 
Distance reduction > 2 km 0.769* 0.136 0.0905 0.274 
(0.447) (0.0929) (0.206) (0.639) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 2 km 0.633 0.146* 0.150 -0.157 
(0.452) (0.0842) (0.172) (0.257) 
0-km distance reduction (ref. cat.) 0 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
R-squared 0.163 0.129 0.082 0.180 
Notes: The coefficient in each row represents the change in the number of crimes per crime area between 
2005 and 2007 relative to the control areas. The control areas did not experience a distance reduction to the 
subway network between 2005 and 2007 and in both periods were farther than walking distance (two 
kilometres) from the subway network. The dependent variable is the number of crimes per area reported to 
the police in the post-treatment (2007) minus the same number in the pre-treatment (2005) periods. The 
sample includes all crimes in the Santiago metropolitan urban area (see Appendix 7 for its definition). 
Regressions are run at the crime area level. There are 8,022 crime areas with observations in both periods in 
Santiago. Distance reduction means average distance reduction between every crime in 2005 in each crime 
area and the nearest subway network because of the new stations between final and initial periods. All 
regressions control for the linear and quadratic pre-treatment levels of robbery in the public space, larceny in 
the public space, burglary, injuries and violence in the public space and domestic violence, excluding the 
regressor of the same category as the dependent variable in each column. At a spatial level, these regressions 
control for proximity to the pre-intervention subway network and proximity to the central business district 
(located in Plaza Baquedano). Proximity to the pre-intervention subway network is implemented through a 
set of 12 dummy variables, one for each km of crime area–subway distance (plus an omitted category). 
Proximity to the central business district enters in the regression through its linear and quadratic terms. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. All regressions include an intercept 
(not shown). The largest distance reduction is 10.5 km. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
In addition, the effect of closer proximity to the subway network on treated areas is 0.23 
(coefficient of 0.226) more larceny in the public space per crime area per year (see column (2)). 
This is a 43 per cent increase in larceny with respect to the 2005 level of larceny in treated areas. 
On the other hand, closer proximity to the subway network had a negative but non-statistically 
significant effect on the yearly rate of burglary (see column (3)). Similarly, closer proximity to 
the subway network had a positive but non-statistically significant effect on the yearly rate of 
domestic violence (see column (4). As expected theoretically, the crime rates in areas that 
experienced large distance reductions to the subway network (more than two kilometres) but 
ended up farther than two kilometres from the subway network, did not change significantly 
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relative to the property crime rates in the control areas. To avoid bias due to serial 
autocorrelation (see Nickell (1981)), in all regressions specified by equation 6.1 (whose 
coefficients are displayed in Table 6.2), I exclude the baseline covariate crime category of the 
dependent variable. However, the inclusion of this crime category does not have any impact on 
my findings (results not shown, available on request).  
To simplify the analysis, in Table 6.3, I assume a linear relation between proximity to the subway 
network and the amount of property crime. Hence, the treatment variable in this specification 
is distance reduction to the subway network. In a similar fashion to the specification used in 
Table 6.2, the specification in Table 6.3 allows for heterogeneity in the effect of the treatment 
for those crime areas that ended up closer and farther than two kilometres from the subway 
network. The results in Table 6.3 are consistent with the ones in Table 6.2. 
The coefficient on the interaction between distance reduction to the subway network and ending 
up at a post-treatment walking distance from the subway network (less than two kilometres) in 
0’s column (1) indicates that, after controlling for all covariates already mentioned in 0, an 
additional kilometre of proximity to the subway network is associated with a 0.26 (coefficient 
of 0.255) increase in the number of robbery per crime area per year. This is an increase of 4.7 
percentage points in the number of robbery in the public space in 2005 per kilometre of 
proximity to the subway network. In addition, the coefficient on Table 6.3, column (2)'s 
interaction between distance reduction to the subway network and ending up at a post-treatment 
walking distance from the subway network indicates that an additional kilometre of proximity 
to the subway network is associated with a 0.03 (coefficient of 0.0335) increase in larceny per 
crime area per year. This represents an increase of 6.4 percentage points in the number of larceny 
in the public space in 2005 per kilometre of closer proximity to the subway network. By contrast, 
column (3) (column (4)) shows that an additional kilometre of proximity to the subway network 
is associated with a non-statistically significant decrease (increase) in burglary. In addition, as 
expected, the coefficients on the interaction between distance reduction to the subway network 
and ending up farther than a walking distance from the subway network in columns (2) and (3) 
are small in economic terms and not significant. The fact that the coefficient in column (1) is 
significant (coefficient of 0.232) suggests that closer proximity to the subway network could 
have a positive effect on robbery even beyond the two-kilometre cut-off.  
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Table 6.3 The effect of crime area–subway distance reduction on crime rates: linear models 
allowing for heterogeneity in walking distance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: change in 
number of crimes per crime area 
2005 to 2007 
Robbery in the 
public space 
Larceny in the 
public space 
Burglary Domestic 
violence 
Distance reduction (km) | 
distance ≤ 2 km 
0.255*** 0.0335* -0.0193 0.0578 
(0.0793) (0.0189) (0.0404) (0.0999) 
Distance reduction (km) | 
distance  > 2 km 
0.232** 0.0245 0.0119 0.0150 
(0.0927) (0.0234) (0.0505) (0.173) 
R-squared 0.163 0.128 0.081 0.179 
Notes: As for Table 6.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
6.4.3 Robustness analysis 
One potential concern about the validity of my estimates is that an increasing trend in robbery 
and/or larceny prior to the subway expansion could be biasing my estimates. As mentioned 
earlier, if a specific mayor would have been good at lobbying for the subway to pass through 
the municipality and at implementing changes that could decrease crime (such as improving 
street lighting), this could bias the previous estimates. Because I am introducing in all my first-
differences specifications a dummy for each municipality, the ‘active mayor’ as a cause for bias 
is controlled for.  
Another potential threat to identification would be citywide shocks that could have a differential 
effect on the crime rates of places more prone to be benefitted with new subway stations 
because of unobserved (to the econometrician) characteristics. For example, during 2005 and 
2007, the usage of mobile phones in Chile increased almost 20 percentage points (Ministerio de 
Economía, Gobierno de Chile 2009). In addition, Harrington and Mayhew (2001) report 
alarmingly high figures of mobile phone robbery and larceny. If individuals who became users 
of a mobile phone during the 2005–2007 period were more likely to transit through places more 
prone to be benefitted by future subway lines, this could be biasing upwards the calculated 
impact of closer proximity to the subway network on robbery or larceny. To check that my 
estimates are not prone to this type of bias, I run a placebo experiment. The placebo subway 
line should also be in Santiago and its citizens or crime areas should share similar characteristics 
in terms of the likelihood of being a victim of crime of treated citizens.  
As explained in Section 2.1.4 on Santiago’s transport system, my placebo experiment consists 
of running the analysis depicted by equation (6.1), but using a subway line with similar 
characteristics to the subway lines of the expansion in the mid-2000s. The placebo line must not 
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have been built during the post-expansion period (2007). In an analysis of the effect of railway 
lines on development in Ghana, Jedwab and Moradi (2011) also use train lines not yet built at 
the time of the data collection as a placebo experiment to test for unobservables that could be 
driving their results. If there are no unobservables driving my results, we should also expect that 
the effect of the placebo experiment should be non-significant both in statistical and practical 
terms. Under no omitted variable bias, I expect a non-significant association between closer 
proximity to the potential subway network and the crime areas in the placebo experiment 
because we would be analysing the effect of a potential subway expansion that did not occur by 
the time of the data collection. Table 6.4 shows that the association between accessibility and 
property crime rates in the placebo experiment is non-significant. 
Table 6.4 The effect of distance reduction to a placebo subway line on property crime rates: 
nonlinear models allowing for heterogeneity in walking distance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: change in number of crimes 
per crime area 2005 to 2007 
Robbery in 
the public 
space 
Larceny in 
the public 
space 
Burglary Domestic 
violence 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance ≤2 km 
Distance reduction > 2 km -0.270 0.170 -0.156 0.226 
(0.374) (0.109) (0.368) (0.353) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 2 km -0.811** -0.137 -0.526** -0.0897 
(0.366) (0.109) (0.227) (0.225) 
0-km distance reduction -0.313 0.0137 -0.209 -0.200 
(0.303) (0.0658) (0.149) (0.219) 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance > 2 km 
Distance reduction > 2 km -0.913* 0.193 0.258 0.274 
(0.485) (0.129) (0.353) (0.639) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 2 km -1.202*** -0.155* -0.298 -0.157 
(0.314) (0.0827) (0.189) (0.257) 
0-km distance reduction (ref. cat.) 0 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
R-squared 0.175 0.140 0.084 0.180 
Notes: As for Table 6.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
As in the two previous chapters, another potential concern about the estimates in this chapter 
is that I could be underestimating the standard errors of my estimates due to spatial correlation 
between the regression errors. To address this concern, I calculate robust p-values by 
implementing a permutation test. Using 10.000 permutations of the key variable (categories of 
distance reduction) the robust p-values for my estimates of the effect of closer proximity to the 
subway network on robbery and larceny (columns (1) and (2) respectively in Table 6.2) are 0 
and 0.009. These two robust p-values are lower than the 1 per cent significance level of the key 
estimates in columns (1) and (2) in Table 6.2. Hence, there is no evidence that the parametric 
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assumptions about the correlation between the regression errors (for example, that the 
correlation between these regression errors is only within municipalities) underlying the 
specification in Table 6.2 are underestimating the magnitude of the key coefficients’ standard 
errors. 
6.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter uses the inauguration of a 24-km new subway line and the extension of an existing 
one in Santiago in the mid-2000s to study changes in property crime rates. Using Chile’s police 
records, I find evidence that robbery increased by 18 per cent in treated areas (areas that became 
nearer to the subway network) relative to control areas. Similarly, larceny increased by 43 per 
cent in treated relative to control areas. On the other hand, burglary decreased and domestic 
violence increased in treated relative to control areas, but in a non-significant way.   
My results are consistent with the literature that states that property crime should increase when 
the profit—in the case of this study due to more commuters, potential victims of robbery and 
larceny—increases (Becker 1968 ; Fagan and Freeman 1999). In particular, my results are 
somehow consistent with the findings of Billings et al. (2011) who conclude that the 
announcement of a light rail in 2007 in Charlotte (North Carolina) decreased robbery and 
larceny around the new train stations.  
My finding that burglary is unresponsive to changes in the transport network is not in line with 
studies of burglary going down as a result of greater proximity to the subway network (Billings, 
Leland, and Swindell 2011). Similarly, this same finding of unresponsiveness of the burglary rate 
to better access to employments (see Chapter 4) is not in line with the studies that have found 
a negative association between job accessibility and crime rates (Ihlanfeldt 2002). More 
specifically, the result of a non-significant association between better transport accessibility and 
burglary are not in line with the findings of Wang and Minor (2002) that there is less crime in 
areas with good job accessibility. Because most crime is committed near the criminal’s domicile 
(Brantingham and Brantingham 1981 cited in Meaney 2004) and greater proximity to the subway 
network implies better labour market outcomes (see evidence in Chapter 4), an improvement 
in legal labour market outcomes in a certain neighbourhood could have reduced the incentives 
for residents to engage in illegal activities. I did not find evidence of a reduction in illegal 
activities.  
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The spatial incidence of crime (for example, as in crime hotspots) is different to the probability 
of being a victim. Although I find that robbery and larceny increased in treated areas, this does 
not necessarily imply that the probability of commuters in treated areas suffering a robbery or 
larceny increased. This is because the number of potential targets of robbery and larceny around 
the new subway stations increased after the inauguration of the subway stations. Hence, the 
probability of suffering a robbery or larceny could have also decreased if the proportional 
increase in the number of people transiting through the treated areas would have been larger 
than the proportional increase in property crime. 
One limitation of this study is that the data does not enable us to uncover the extent to which 
changes in property crime were because of changes in the behaviour of potential victims, 
potential criminals or the police. Data on investments on private security would enable us to 
test whether increased investment in private security due to increased urban transport 
accessibility was one of the mechanisms behind the documented effect on crime rates. For this 
analysis, I would use a two-stage least squares estimator. In the first stage, I would test whether 
increased urban transport accessibility affects investment in private security. If the coefficient 
on the first stage is highly significant, I would then test in the second stage whether the variation 
of investment on private security identified in the first stage affects property crime rates. 
In the case of unveiling the mechanisms underlying the increase in robbery in the public space, 
future studies would benefit from survey data on pedestrian flows. For uncovering the 
mechanisms underlying changes in both burglary and robbery, future studies would benefit from 
data on changes in the actions of the police in treated and control areas. 
More generally, my results point out that both the journey to property crimes by offenders and 
the commuting behaviour of potential victims of robbery are interesting venues of research into 
the key factors that affect property crime.  
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     Chapter 7 
7. Conclusions 
This thesis has examined the impacts of better urban transport accessibility in Santiago, Chile. 
In this chapter, I summarise my main findings and contributions, and I propose policy 
implications that are consistent with my findings. I also discuss ways of improving the 
robustness of my conclusions. 
7.1 The contributions of this thesis 
My thesis is the first research trying to identify the impacts of better urban transport accessibility 
on socioeconomic outcomes in a city in a middle-income country. In addition, in each of the 
empirical chapters I link large-scale datasets in employment, schooling and crime outcomes with 
the subway stations both before and after the expansion of the subway network in the mid-
2000s. This thesis shows that it is feasible to obtain individual panel spatial data that is good and 
is detailed in order to evaluate the impact of spatial policies in middle-income countries like 
Chile.  
Specifically regarding Chile, Chapter 2 is the first research to show an integrated view of a broad 
selection of the trends and spatial distribution of socioeconomic indicators in Santiago. Previous 
attempts have centred either on trends in socioeconomic indicators in Chile as a whole 
(Gammage, Alburquerque, and Dura ́n 2014) or on the spatial distribution of only educational 
outcomes in Santiago only (Elacqua et al. 2011). In addition, as opposed to Elacqua et al. (2011) 
who uses educational outcomes,  I use the schools’ ‘contextual performance indicator’ (average 
student performance in a school accounting for socioeconomic characteristics of the students’ 
parents) as a proxy for school valued-added. Hence, I am able to get nearer to being able to 
provide a map of educational opportunities in Santiago relative to previous research. 
Chapters 4–6 are the first looking at the impact of greater proximity to the subway network on 
the labour market, academic achievement, and property crime using individual data and a 
credible (experimentalist) identification strategy to build valid counterfactuals to the treated 
individuals and areas. The contribution of this thesis also rests on the robustness of its results. 
By using an intent-to-treat approach in Chapters 4 and 5, I avoid selection due to heterogeneous 
gains from proximity to the transport innovation. In addition, by controlling for baseline 
characteristics in the three empirical chapters, I allow for differential trends in the outcome 
variable for treated and control individuals along characteristics crucially correlated with each 
132 
 
 
of the outcome variables in each chapter. Moreover, by running a permutation test in Chapter 
5 that does not rely on parametric assumptions about the correlation structure of the regression 
errors when calculating a robust p-value, I make sure that the statistical significance of my 
estimates is not overestimated by unaccounted spatial correlation between the regression errors. 
Additionally, by running a placebo test in Chapter 4 during the period before the subway 
expansion, I provide suggestive evidence that pre-existing differential trends in labour market 
outcomes in treated and control municipalities do not bias this chapter’s estimates. Finally, by 
checking that a placebo subway expansion had no effect on academic achievement or property 
crime rates in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively, I show that my results are not driven by unobserved 
citywide shocks to academic achievement or property crime having a differential effect on 
treated and control individuals. 
More broadly, although it was not the main purpose of this thesis, Chapters 4, 5, and 6 provide 
hints about why households are willing to pay for closer proximity to the subway network. Due 
to the decrease in academic achievement, the schooling mechanism is not a good candidate. In 
addition, because of the increase in robbery and larceny, the crime mechanism is also not a good 
candidate to the question why households benefit from better urban transport. Considering that 
better urban transport accessibility increases labour earnings and the probability of being 
employed, out of the three analysed mechanisms, the labour market channel is the best candidate 
for why citizens appreciate better urban transport accessibility.   
7.2 The policy implications of my findings 
As I show in Chapter 2, neighbourhoods with poor accessibility to the subway network in 
Santiago in the early 2000s had low earnings, employment rates, and schooling outcomes. 
Hence, any policies that might improve the socioeconomic and crime outcomes in these more 
deprived areas are highly relevant for policy makers in Santiago and in other large metropolitan 
areas sharing similar socioeconomic outcomes. 
There are policy implications of three types. The first involves the intersection between urban 
transport and labour market outcomes. The findings of Chapter 4 show that investments in a 
city’s rapid transit system have promising potential to improve the employment, hours of work 
and labour earnings of women with previously bad accessibility to employment opportunities. 
This is extremely important for decreasing poverty and economic inequality in countries with 
low female labour market participation like Chile.  
133 
 
 
The second type of policy implications is in the intersection between transport and student 
achievement. Schools that are going to be affected by new subway lines should consider that 
greater proximity to the subway network could affect its students’ performance. Given the 
evidence presented in Chapter 5 about the greater enrolment in schools that are closer to the 
subway network, schools should make plans for not increasing the size of their classrooms 
above the desired student–teacher ratio. 
The third policy implications have to do with the interaction between transport and crime. As 
we saw in Chapter 6, greater proximity to the subway network results in a significant increase in 
robbery and larceny in public space. Due to the increase in potential targets around the new 
subway stations, the police should increase their patrolling efforts near new subway stations.  
A fourth type of policy implication crosscuts the three previous types, namely that cost-benefit 
analyses of transport projects undertaken by governments should consider not only the benefits 
in terms of time reduction, but also the wider benefits and costs in other dimensions such as 
labour market, academic achievement and property crime. Cost-benefit evaluations based on 
timesaving might yield different results than social impact evaluations based on socioeconomic, 
crime, and other social outcomes do. For example, a disadvantaged neighbourhood with 
mediocre labour market outcomes could benefit much more from a new subway line in 
employment terms relative to an advantaged neighbourhood with a high employment rate and 
labour earnings. In addition, a social cost-benefit evaluation based on timesaving does not 
consider equity; this is, the differential gains of different neighbourhoods relative to their 
baseline characteristics.  
7.3 Potential future research 
In this section, I explore potential future research. To stress the relevance of the proposed 
studies, conditional on certain results of the proposed research, I suggest possible policy 
implications to some of the proposed studies. 
It would be interesting to integrate into a single framework to what extent citizens value the 
different impacts of better urban transport accessibility. This imposes several challenges. What 
would be the metric of the overall impact? One possibility is to use property prices as a metric 
of how much citizens value better transport accessibility. This line of research would be related 
to the work of Gibbons and Machin (2005) or Ahlfeldt (2013) who evaluated the effect of new 
subway stations on property prices in London in the mid-1990s, or with the work of Agostini 
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and Palmucci (2008) who evaluated the effect of new subway stations in Santiago in the mid-
2000s in Santiago. The difference with their work is that I propose to elicit the mechanisms 
through which better urban transport accessibility affects property prices.  
Property prices reflect the citizens’ willingness to pay for certain amenities when the housing 
market is in equilibrium. However, as argued in section 2.4, given the suggestive evidence of 
dwelling immobility in Chile’s housing market, property prices in Santiago may not fully reflect 
its citizens’ willingness to pay for better urban transport accessibility.  
A complementary metric to property prices for capturing the benefits and disadvantages of 
better urban transport accessibility are measures of subjective well-being. This does not require 
housing markets being in equilibrium as a requisite to capture the full benefits and disadvantages 
of better urban transport accessibility. This approach consists of using survey data on subjective 
well-being before and after a change in urban transport accessibility to capture the impact of, 
for example, transport improvements on citizen’s subjective sense of well-being.  
Ideally, the data should be a panel interviewing the same individuals before and after the 
improvement in urban transport accessibility. As explained in Chapter 3, individual panel data 
enables us to control for unobserved individual fixed effects. Assuming no selection on 
unobservables such as the preference for better transport accessibility, we could also use cross-
section data. Although this assumption is not likely to hold, Van Praag and Baarsma (2005) used 
cross-section data and ordered probit models to evaluate the negative impact of airport noise 
on citizens’ well-being. Of course, potential future research of this nature would need data on 
the subjective well-being of citizens in affected and non-affected areas by improvements in 
urban transport accessibility.  
Layard (2011) and Kahneman and Krueger (2006) examine reasons why subjective well-being 
may be a relevant metric for policy makers, and present evidence supporting the relation 
between subjective well-being and relevant indicators of well-being like health. One advantage 
of using the property prices approach over the subjective well-being one is the availability of 
data and the well-defined way to aggregate the welfare effect of better urban transport 
accessibility using money as the metric. By contrast, a weakness in using the property prices 
approach is that when calculating aggregate effects of a transport policy, transport projects 
saving a similar amount of commuting time to citizens in wealthier and poorer neighbourhoods 
might yield much higher benefits in wealthier neighbourhoods. The underlying reason behind 
this is that wealthier citizens have a higher willingness to pay for timesaving compared to poorer 
135 
 
 
citizens (Mackie, Jara-Dı ́az, and Fowkes 2001). Hence, in terms of levels, the impact of better 
transport accessibility on property prices is likely to be higher in wealthier than in poorer 
neighbourhoods.  
A second challenge, closely related to the question of ‘to what extent do citizens value the 
different impacts of better transport accessibility’ is are there other impacts which should be 
considered? In this thesis, I have considered the impacts on the labour market, academic 
achievement, and property crime. With suitable data, other dimensions could be considered. 
Some evidence suggests that better urban transport accessibility could have a significant impact 
on health outcomes. For example, MacDonald el al. (2010) provide suggestive evidence that the 
opening of a light rail line in Charlotte, North Carolina (USA), significantly decreased (81 per 
cent) the probability of obesity on the affected citizens. However, their study may be subject to 
selection bias. The sample in the Charlotte study is restricted to individuals living in census tracts 
closer than one mile (1.6 km) from the new light rail line before it started operating. While the 
treatment group in this study are those individuals who used the light rail six to eight months 
after the light rail’s inauguration, the control group are those who did not use the light rail after 
its inauguration. Hence, one potential problem of this study is that, in the hypothetical case that 
the light rail would not have been opened, the estimates would be biased if health outcomes of 
the treated and control groups would not have followed parallel trends. This is likely to happen 
because the way the authors defined the treated and control groups enables self-selection into 
treatment14. 
On the other hand, it would be interesting to explore the effect of better urban transport on 
mental health and stress levels. Wener et al. (2003) study the effect on stress of the opening of 
a new train service in New York City in the late 1990s, stress measured by cortisol levels. They 
find that commuters who switched to the new service experienced lower commuting time and 
were less stressed relative to commuters who did not switch to the new service. Given the 
possible self-selection into the new route that could be correlated with changes in cortisol levels 
and thus bias the results, the authors conducted a second experiment in which they randomly 
                                                 
14 A better research design would have surveyed a wider region, including households farther than two km from 
the new light rail stations. In this research design, the treatment group would be households that experienced a 
distance reduction to the light rail network and ended up closer than two kilometres from the light rail network, 
regardless of whether they used the light rail once inaugurated. On the other hand, the control group would be 
households that did not experience a distance reduction to the light rail network and were always farther than 
two kilometres from the light rail network.  
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assigned students into the new (experimental) route and the old (control) group. The results of 
this randomised field experiment were consistent with their previous observational study.  
When integrating the impacts of better transport accessibility into a single framework that is 
able to uncover the main mechanisms by which well-being is affected, a third challenge is what 
method should be used. One possibility is to use a two-step framework. In the first step, the 
researcher determines the effect of better urban transport accessibility on different dimensions. 
This is what I have done in this thesis. These different dimensions could be socioeconomic, 
health, etc.. In the second step, the researcher analyses the impact of the changes in each 
dimension on the outcome of the overall metric (property prices, subjective well-being, income, 
etc.). This two-step process could be implemented using a two-stage least squares estimator. 
In future research, it would be interesting to uncover the mechanisms through which greater 
proximity to the subway network increases the female employment rate. If the increase in the 
female labour rate is related to commuting time-saving, then an alternative (and less expensive 
than subways) policy could be to invest in bus lanes that could save time for commuters residing 
in low-density areas not suitable for rapid transit systems (Levinson et al. 2003). Alternatively, 
if the increase in female labour supply is related to comfort and less sexual harassment (Smith 
2008), then an alternative policy to subways could be priority seats in buses during rush hours. 
To analyse which mechanism is most important, I would implement a more structural approach 
than the approach in Chapter 4 by modelling explicitly the effect of commuting time-saving, 
comfort and less sexual harassment on women’s decision to participate in the labour market. 
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7.4 Improving the robustness of my conclusions 
In this section, I explore what kind of data would have improved the robustness of my 
conclusions. 
In Chapter 2, when constructing a map of educational opportunities in Santiago in the early-
2000s (the period before the subway expansion), I would have benefitted from school value-
added measures. To obtain value-added measures that are not prone to composition bias due 
to students changing schools I need panels of students. Unfortunately, there are no panels with 
standardised test scores in Santiago during the early 2000s. The first panel with standardised test 
scores in Santiago was the one with students who took the SIMCE test in eighth and tenth grade 
in 2004 and 2006 respectively (panel I am using in Chapter 5). Average school value-added 
measures would have been an improvement over my measure of ‘contextual average student 
performance’ because the former measure is not affected by heterogeneity in students’ academic 
skills between schools. At least two characteristics of school systems increase the heterogeneity 
in students' academic skills between schools: the capacity of schools to select students by 
academic ability, and the non-existence of catchment areas. In school systems with no 
catchment areas, students have more freedom to self-select into higher performing and lower 
performing schools according to their academic skills relative to systems with catchment areas. 
As explained in Section 2.2.2, the two previously described characteristics are present in Chile's 
school system. Hence, appropriate data to calculate value-added measures could potentially 
improve the accuracy of the map of educational opportunity I present in Section 2.3.6. 
Unfortunately, to my knowledge, this data does not exist for Santiago during the early 2000s. 
Chapter 4 uses individual data with the workers’ residence aggregated at Santiago’s municipal 
level. The precision of estimates in this Chapter would benefit from a dataset with individual 
addresses and the same level of detail in covariates as in the Panel Casen dataset. With the 
location of workers’ residences aggregated at the municipal level, the spatial model situates each 
worker at the centroid of their municipality of residence. Using individual addresses would also 
enable me to allow for differential labour market trends for individuals residing in different 
municipalities (in a similar fashion to what I do in Chapters 5 and 6). In other words, individual 
addresses would enable me to remove any potential bias from a correlation between the mayors’ 
capacity to lobby for the new subway line and the implementation of municipal policies that 
could have stimulated the residents’ labour market outcomes. Unfortunately, due to 
confidentiality issues, I was not able to gain access to the addresses of individuals in the Panel 
138 
 
 
Casen dataset or other comparable datasets in Chile like the ‘Encuesta de Protección Social’ (‘Social 
Protection Survey’). 
With data on each student’s residential address, the results in Chapter 5 could have offered a 
more comprehensive view of the effects of urban transport accessibility on academic 
achievement. The address of each school enabled me to assess the effect of greater proximity 
between the school and the nearest subway station on academic achievement. On the other 
hand, having each student’s residential address would have enabled me to assess the effect of 
greater proximity between the students’ residential address and the nearest subway station on 
academic achievement. Bearing in mind that in 2002 the average distance between students in 
fourth grade and their school was 1.9 km (approximately what we defined as ‘walking distance’ 
in Chapter 5) (Gallego and Hernando 2009), not necessarily the effects of student–subway 
network proximity and school–subway network proximity are the same.  We can easily think 
about individual cases where the subway expansion increased the residence–subway proximity 
but not the school–subway proximity for many students. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, one way of improving the robustness of the conclusions in this 
thesis is by using instruments. It could be argued that, conditional on individual and place-based 
initial characteristics, the selection of the route of the new subway line and the location of the 
stations could be endogenous to residents’ socioeconomic outcomes. I could address this 
concern by using instruments that could only have affected socioeconomic outcomes by 
determining the route of the new subway line.  
One possibility of such an instrument is using the planned route instrumental variable. As 
mentioned in section 2.1.4, a master plan for Santiago’s subway network dating from 1968 
included a primitive layout for the city’s first five subway lines, including the new line (Line 4) 
and the extensions analysed in this thesis. I could use the distance reduction to the planned lines 
according to the 1968 plan as an instrument for the actual distance reduction to the subway 
network that took place in the mid-2000s. This ‘planned route IV’ (following Redding and 
Turner's (2014) terms for the different instrumental variable approaches) was pioneered by 
Baum-Snow (2007) who used planned portions of the US interstate highway system as an 
instrument for the actual increase in highways in the USA between 1950 and 1990. To 
implement an instrumental variables approach using this first approach I would need the exact 
route of each planned subway line. This data should be available from Chile's Government 
Transport Planning office. This approach could help solve a potential endogeneity between the 
chosen route for the new subway line and changes in socioeconomic outcomes. 
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A second potential instrument is given by what Redding and Turner (2014) call the 
‘inconsequential units approach’. To apply this approach to the setting of this thesis, I could 
connect the downtown of Puente Alto (the municipality in the south of Greater Santiago served 
by the new subway line) with a least cost path to the downtown of the municipality of Santiago. 
Assuming that the neighbourhoods in the middle of this ‘least cost path’ between both 
downtowns were ‘accidentally’ connected, I could use such path as an instrument for the actual 
route of the subway line that opened in the mid-2000s. This approach was pioneered by Chandra 
and Thompson (2000) in the analysis of the effect of highways on economic activity in the USA 
and has been applied more recently, among other, by Faber (2014) to study the effect of 
highways on economic activity in China.  
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Appendix 1: Sources for the Gini coefficient and harmonisation of the data 
1. Sources 
Data of the Gini coefficient for the UK, US, OECD, Chile 2006, 2009, 2011, Mexico 2000, 
2004, 2008, 2010, and 2012 come from OECD (2014a). The rest of the data for Chile and 
Mexico come from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean 
‘SEDLAC’ (2014a) 
2.  Harmonisation of the data for the Gini coefficient 
The SEDLAC data for the Gini coefficient has data for some years of Chile and Mexico’s 
Gini coefficient that is not in the OECD data. Both datasets explain in their notes that they 
use the same calculation for income in the Gini coefficient: household disposable equivalised 
income post-taxes and transfers. However, the Gini coefficients were n(that were did not 
appear in the OECD was not exactly the same in the OECD and SEDLAC datasets. Hence, 
before merging the information for Chile and Mexico from SEDLAC, I scaled the data in 
SEDLAC adding to it the average difference in each country between the data in both 
datasets. These average differences are small and do not change the trends in income per 
capita or inequality for Chile or Mexico. 
Appendix 2: Municipalities surveyed in the 1996, 2001, 2006 CASEN panel survey   
Chile’s 1996, 2001, 2006 CASEN Panel Survey is a follow up survey of the 1996 Casen survey. 
The 1996 Casen survey selected all municipalities in Chile with more than 40,000 inhabitants 
and randomly otherwise. Hence, the municipalities in Santiago included in the 1996 CASEN 
survey are: Calera de Tango, Cerrillos, Cerro Navia, Colina, Conchalí, Curacaví, El Bosque, 
Estación Central, Independencia, Isla de Maipo, La Cisterna, La Florida, La Granja, La 
Pintana, La Reina, Las Condes, Lo Barnechea, Lo Espejo, Lo Prado, Macul, Maipú, María 
Pinto, Melipilla, Ñuñoa, Paine, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, Peñaflor, Peñalolén, Providencia, 
Pudahuel, Puente Alto, Quinta Normal, Recoleta, Renca, San Bernardo, San Miguel, San 
Ramón, Santiago, and Talagante. This excludes the municipalities of Huechuraba, Pedro 
Aguirre Cerda, Quilicura, San Joaquín and Vitacura (Ministerio de Planificación 2005). 
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Appendix 3: Construction of the index of economic, social and cultural status (ESCS). 
According to PISA (2013), ‘The PISA index of economic, social and cultural status (ESCS) was 
derived from the following three indices: highest occupational status of parents (HISEI), highest 
educational level of parents in years of education according to [the International Standard 
Classification of Education] ISCED […], and home possessions […].  
The index of home possessions […] comprises all items on the indices of [family wealth15 …], 
[cultural possessions16 …] and [home educational resources17 …], as well as books in the home 
recoded into a four-level categorical variable (0-10 books, 11-25 or 26-100 books, 101-200 or 
201‑500 books, more than 500 books). 
The PISA index of economic, social and cultural status (ESCS) was derived from a principal 
component analysis of standardised variables (each variable has an OECD mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one), taking the factor scores for the first principal component as 
measures of the PISA index of economic, social and cultural status. ’ (p. 200). 
  
                                                 
15 ‘The index of family wealth […] is based on students’ responses on whether they had the following at home: a 
room of their own, a link to the Internet, a dishwasher (treated as a country-specific item), a DVD player, and 
three other country-specific items […]; and their responses on the number of cellular phones, televisions, 
computers, cars and the number of rooms with a bath or shower’ (PISA 2013, 201). 
16 ‘The index of cultural possessions […] is based on students’ responses to whether they had the following at home: 
classic literature, books of poetry and works of art’ (PISA 2013, 201). 
17 The index of home educational resources […] is based on the items measuring the existence of educational resources 
at home including a desk and a quiet place to study, a computer that students can use for schoolwork, 
educational software, books to help with students’ school work, technical reference books and a dictionary’ 
(PISA 2013, 201). 
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Appendix 4: Imputation of socioeconomic variables in the 2004 SIMCE dataset 
The missing values in the 2004 SIMCE dataset are as follows: household income (10.5 per cent), 
maternal level of education (34.6 per cent), paternal level of education (35.4 per cent), last grade 
completed by the student’s mother in her highest level of education (34.6 per cent) and last 
grade completed by the student’s father in his highest level of education (35.4 per cent). 
The steps I carried in the imputation of missing data were as follows. First, in cases where the 
father’s level of education was non-missing, I imputed the mother’s (father’s) level of education 
with the level of education of the father (mother). Second, in the remaining missing values, I 
imputed the level of education of the mother (father) with the median level of education of the 
mothers (fathers) of the cohort mates in the student’s same school. In addition, I also imputed 
the missing values of household income values with the median category of income in the 
students’ school. The theoretical basis for the imputations in the second step is the abundant 
evidence that schools in Chile are highly homogeneous in households’ socioeconomic 
characteristics (Mizala, Romaguera, and Urquiola 2007). Third, I imputed the missing values in 
maternal (paternal) last completed grade in her (his) highest educational level with the paternal 
(maternal) last grade in his (her) highest level of education. After this imputation process, the 
missing values decreased to 0.0 per cent in household income, maternal level of education, and 
paternal level of education, and to 28.9 per cent in the mothers and fathers’ last completed year 
in the highest educational level. Fourth, I created a new category for all the missing values in 
mothers and fathers last grade in their highest educational level. The aim of this last step is not 
dropping out of the sample individuals with the latter missing value. If I omit the fourth step, 
the map in Fig 0.21 does not change. 
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Appendix 5: Tables on why and how does school–subway network distance matter. 
Table A5.1     
The effect of school–subway distance reduction on the probability of remaining in high school: nonlinear models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: student remains in high school 
Basic model 
As (1) plus 
school 
covariates 
As (2), plus 
heterogeneity in 
school–subway 
distance 
As (3), plus 
spatial 
controls 
0-km distance reduction (reference category) 0 0   
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1.6 km –0.0870** –0.0126   
(0.0437) (0.0477)   
1.6 km< distance reduction ≤ 2.3 km –0.132*** 0.0618***   
(0.0356) (0.0227)   
2.3 km< distance reduction ≤ 4.7 km –0.0824* 0.00930   
(0.0433) (0.0311)   
4.7 km< distance reduction ≤ 10.7 km –0.166*** –0.0388   
(0.0430) (0.0312)   
School–subway distance ≤ 2 km     
0 km distance reduction (ref. category)   0 0 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1.6 km   0.0582* 0.165*** 
  (0.0346) (0.0515) 
1.6 km< distance reduction ≤ 2.3 km   0.0490* 0.107* 
  (0.0271) (0.0605) 
2.3 km< distance reduction ≤ 4.7 km   0.0270 0.133* 
  (0.0407) (0.0679) 
4.7 km< distance reduction ≤ 10.7 km   –0.00263 0.120 
  (0.0431) (0.0797) 
School–subway distance > 2 km     
0 km distance reduction   –0.0163 0.204 
  (0.0315) (0.133) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1.6 km   –0.155 0.00855 
  (0.104) (0.0686) 
1.6 km< distance reduction ≤ 2.3 km   0.0951** 0.170*** 
  (0.0409) (0.0572) 
2.3 km< distance reduction ≤ 4.7 km   –0.0152 0.0378 
  (0.0441) (0.0655) 
4.7 km< distance reduction ≤ 10.7 km   –0.0739* 0.0352 
  (0.0422) (0.0802) 
Number of students in same school and grade in 
2004 (log) 
 0.102*** 0.104*** 0.106*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0195) (0.0196) 
Individual score in language, maths, natural and 
social science in 2004 fixed effects 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Household income fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes 
School type of administration fixed effects No Yes Yes No 
Municipality x Type of administration fixed effects No No No Yes 
Proximity to the old subway network fixed effects No No No Yes 
Observations 93,798 83,668 83,668 83,668 
Notes: See notes in Table 2. Individual-level probit regressions. Dependent variable: whether students who took the test in eighth grade 
also took the test in tenth grade. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A5.2     
The effect of school–subway distance reduction on the probability of remaining in the same school: nonlinear models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: student remains in same 
school 
Basic 
model 
As (1) plus 
school 
covariates 
As (2), plus 
heterogeneity in school–
subway distance 
As (3), plus 
spatial 
controls 
0-km distance reduction (reference category) 0 0   
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1.6 km -0.365*** -0.243***   
(0.0825) (0.0743)   
1.6 km< distance reduction ≤ 2.3 km -0.515*** -0.170**   
(0.0986) (0.0701)   
2.3 km< distance reduction ≤ 4.7 km -0.146* 0.00315   
(0.0878) (0.0589)   
4.7 km< distance reduction ≤ 10.7 km -0.395*** -0.105   
(0.0858) (0.0707)   
School–subway distance > 2 km         
0-km distance reduction (reference category)  0 0 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1.6 km   -0.164** -0.188 
  (0.0778) (0.126) 
1.6 km< distance reduction ≤ 2.3 km   -0.144* -0.315** 
  (0.0852) (0.159) 
2.3 km< distance reduction ≤ 4.7 km   0.0977 0.126 
  (0.0771) (0.149) 
4.7 km< distance reduction ≤ 10.7 km   0.122 0.202 
  (0.0806) (0.180) 
School–subway distance ≤ 2 km     
0 km distance reduction | distance > 2 km   0.147** -0.337 
  (0.0659) (0.211) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1.6 km   -0.197 -0.549*** 
  (0.142) (0.194) 
1.6 km< distance reduction ≤ 2.3 km   0.0622 -0.130 
  (0.0956) (0.145) 
2.3 km< distance reduction ≤ 4.7 km   0.0466 -0.113 
  (0.0806) (0.149) 
4.7 km< distance reduction ≤ 10.7 km   -0.138 -0.0738 
    (0.0937) (0.181) 
Number of students in same school and grade in 
2004 (log) 
 0.196*** 0.209*** 0.143*** 
 (0.0356) (0.0336) (0.0315) 
Individual score in language, maths, natural and 
social science in 2004 fixed effects 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Household income fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality x Type of administration fixed effects No No No Yes 
Proximity to the old subway network fixed effects No No No Yes 
School type of administration fixed effects No Yes Yes No 
Observations 47,849 41,348 41,348 41,283 
Notes: See notes in Table 2. Individual-level probit regressions. Dependent variable: whether students who took the 2004 
test in eighth grade were in the same school in 2006 in tenth grade. Sample restricted to students whose schools had both 
primary and secondary levels. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  
158 
 
 
Appendix 6: Construction of crime variables 
I constructed the crime variables in the following way. First, I identified burglary by selecting all 
robbery (‘robo’) and larceny (‘hurto’) in households (‘domicilio particular’). Second, I identified 
larceny in the public space by selecting all larceny in the public space (‘via publica’). Third, I 
identified robbery in the public space by selecting all robbery in the public space. Fourth, I 
identified domestic violence by selecting all domestic violence reports (‘Violencia Intrafamiliar’), 
homicides (‘Homicidio’) and injuries (‘Lesiones’) where there was no specific amount stolen 
(‘aval_bien’ equals to ‘n/a’ or ‘Sin avaluo’). Hence, in this last variable construction, I assumed 
that any injuries inflicted at home where there was no theft was an act of domestic violence. 
Finally, I identified injuries in the public space by selecting all injuries, homicides and rapes 
(‘Violacion’) in the public space. 
Appendix 7: Definition of Santiago’s urban area  
The urban area of Santiago includes the following boroughs: Cerrillos, Cerro Navia, Conchalí, 
El Bosque, Estacion Central, Huechuraba, Independencia, La Cisterna, La Florida, La Granja, 
La Pintana, La Reina, Las Condes, Lo Barnechea, Lo Espejo, Lo Prado, Macul, Maipú, Ñuñoa, 
Pedro Aguirre Cerda, Peñalolén, Providencia, Pudahuel, Puente Alto, Quilicura, Quinta 
Normal, Recoleta, Renca, San Bernardo, San Joaquín, San Miguel, San Ramón, Santiago, and 
Vitacura. 
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Appendix 8: The effect of municipality–subway distance reduction on labour market 
outcomes: unweighted sample 
Table A8.1    
The effect of municipality–subway distance reduction on employment status using an 
unweighted sample: nonlinear models 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: 2006–2001 employment status 
All 
individuals 
Women Men 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance ≤ 1 km 
1 km< distance reduction 3.596* 7.898*** -1.352 
(2.048) (2.722) (2.756) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km -6.253** -10.09* -1.203 
(2.696) (5.375) (3.213) 
0-km distance reduction -3.437 -0.863 -8.599*** 
(2.083) (2.875) (2.908) 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance > 1 km 
1 km< distance reduction 1.412 7.932** -6.789** 
(2.536) (3.783) (3.113) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km -2.957 0.721 -7.395*** 
(2.242) (3.788) (2.236) 
0-km distance reduction (reference category) 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Observations 2,453 1,361 1,092 
R-squared 0.354 0.327 0.449 
Notes: Sample constrained to sample of specifications generating Table 4.3. Remaining notes, 
as for Table 4.2.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table A8.2     
The effect of municipality–subway distance reduction on hours of work using an unweighted sample: 
nonlinear models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: change in monthly hours of work 
2001 to 2006 
All 
individuals 
Women Men As in (1) 
restricting 
sample to 
employed in 
both periods 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance ≤ 1 km   
1 km< distance reduction 10.50 23.48*** -5.203 13.81* 
(6.506) (7.220) (7.548) (7.010) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km 1.636 -2.092 5.428 7.706 
(7.809) (12.62) (6.562) (10.70) 
0-km distance reduction -1.344 10.50 -28.60** 16.14 
(8.192) (9.251) (10.64) (14.18) 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance > 1 km  
1 km< distance reduction -0.605 10.42 -15.23 0.794 
(6.772) (8.224) (9.797) (6.844) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km -2.318 7.018 -18.24** 11.08* 
(6.244) (7.490) (6.950) (5.836) 
0-km distance reduction (reference category) 0 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Observations 2,078 1,210 868 744 
R-squared 0.267 0.259 0.340 0.112 
Notes: As for Table A8.1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A8.3    
The effect of municipality–subway distance reduction on individual labour earnings using an 
unweighted sample: nonlinear models 
Dependent variable: change in monthly individual labour 
earnings 2001 to 2006 (in 2001 US$) 
(1) (2) (3) 
All 
individuals 
Women Men 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance ≤ 1 km 
1 km< distance reduction -35.02*** -41.58** -37.68** 
(11.48) (15.98) (18.29) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km -16.57 -29.47* -3.766 
(19.16) (16.26) (29.76) 
0-km distance reduction -11.99 16.21 -49.73 
(21.04) (27.68) (31.70) 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance > 1 km 
1 km< distance reduction 0.554 10.27 -3.472 
(17.96) (20.31) (28.17) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 1 km -4.373 -14.95 11.13 
(16.69) (15.36) (25.19) 
0-km distance reduction (reference category) 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Observations 2,464 1,366 1,098 
R-squared 0.067 0.093 0.101 
Notes: As for Table A8.1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix 9: Balancing test for the placebo experiment in Chapter 4 
Table A9     
Descriptive statistics—means and standard deviations for individuals in Santiago in the pre 
and post-placebo periods (1996 and 2001 respectively) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Entire 
population 
Treated 
population 
Control 
population 
Diff. (2)–
(3) (s.e.) 
Share of each group in the entire 
population 
100% 2.4% 11.6%  
Predetermined covariates (1996)     
Years of schooling 9.459*** 9.277*** 8.536*** 0.741 
(0.178) (0.365) (0.612) (0.712) 
Age 41.87*** 44.11*** 42.88*** 1.231 
(0.605) (2.665) (1.553) (3.084) 
Female 0.541*** 0.626*** 0.564*** 0.0620 
 (0.0127) (0.0482) (0.0260) (0.0548) 
Number of rooms 2.645*** 3.278*** 2.755*** 0.523* 
(0.0746) (0.257) (0.160) (0.302) 
Employment rates     
1996 0.627*** 0.491*** 0.676*** -0.185** 
 (0.0167) (0.0596) (0.0415) (0.0726) 
2001 0.572*** 0.457*** 0.590*** -0.133* 
 (0.0172) (0.0523) (0.0498) (0.0722) 
Hours of work per month     
1996 113.6*** 92.40*** 126.0*** -33.64** 
 (3.243) (11.57) (8.092) (14.12) 
2001 83.63*** 72.00*** 79.62*** -21.09 
 (3.462) (13.30) (10.61) (13.93) 
Monthly labour earnings (2001 US$)     
1996 215.6*** 160.1*** 241.6*** -81.57 
 (18.16) (22.29) (48.33) (53.22) 
2001 185.6*** 245.7*** 167.4*** 78.36 
 (12.21) (88.48) (36.78) (95.82) 
Observations 2,303 83 325  
Subpopulation size 3,124,023 73,785 361,109   
Notes: Individuals in the treated sample resided in municipalities that experienced a distance 
reduction to the subway network in 2005 greater than one kilometre and ended up nearer than 
one kilometre from the subway network. Individuals in the control sample resided in 
municipalities that did not experience a distance reduction to the subway network in 2005 and 
in both periods were farther than one kilometre from the subway network. The sample is 
restricted to working-age population (15 years and older in 2000) who responded to both 
waves of the Casen Panel Survey and were not full-time students in 1996. All observations are 
weighted by their longitudinal weights. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix 10: Main specifications from Chapter 4 using two kilometres as distance 
threshold from the subway network when allowing a heterogeneous effect of school–
subway distance 
Table A10.1       
The effect of municipality–subway distance reduction on employment status using a distance threshold of two 
kilometres: linear models 
Dependent variable. 
Columns (1) through 
(3): employment 
status in 2001; 
columns (4) through 
(6): 2006–2001 
employment status 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cross-section association Individual fixed effects 
Basic 
model 
As (1) plus 
predetermined 
covariates 
As (2), plus 
heterogeneity 
in school-
subway 
distance 
Basic 
model 
As (4) plus 
predetermined 
covariates 
As (4), plus 
heterogeneity 
in school-
subway 
distance 
Proximity to the 
nearest subway 
station (km) 
0.0884 -0.167   0.572 0.299   
(0.116) (0.116)  (0.492) (0.694)  
Proximity to the 
nearest subway 
station (km) | 
distance ≤ 2 km 
  0.139   0.232 
  (0.129)   (0.790) 
Proximity to the 
nearest subway 
station (km) | 
distance > 2 km 
  -0.146   0.467 
  (0.113)   (1.245) 
Control variables 
(2001) 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 2,511 2,464 2,464 2,500 2,453 2,453 
R-squared 0.000 0.966 0.966 0.000 0.362 0.362 
Notes: As for Table 4.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A10.2    
The effect of municipality–subway distance reduction on employment status using a distance 
threshold of two kilometres: nonlinear models 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: change in employment status 2001 
to 2006 
All 
individuals 
Women Men 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance ≤ 2 km 
2 km< distance reduction  2.722 7.173 -2.204 
(4.138) (5.761) (4.764) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 2 km -1.301 -0.290 -1.569 
(4.275) (6.145) (5.010) 
0-km distance reduction 4.430 5.416 -3.164 
(3.929) (5.327) (4.647) 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance > 2 km 
2 km< distance reduction  1.039 3.168 -1.087 
(3.056) (5.234) (3.601) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 2 km -5.269* -6.271 -5.324 
(2.877) (4.921) (3.673) 
0-km distance reduction (reference category) 0 0 0 
 
(0) (0) (0) 
Observations 2,453 1,361 1,092 
R-squared 0.366 0.341 0.502 
Notes: As for Table 4.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A10.3     
The effect of municipality–subway distance reduction on hours of work using a distance threshold of two 
kilometres: nonlinear models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: change in monthly hours of work 
2001 to 2006 
All 
individuals 
Women Men As in (1) 
restricting 
sample to 
employed in 
both periods 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance ≤ 2 km   
2 km< distance reduction  8.793 23.73 -1.289 10.96 
(10.37) (14.07) (11.61) (11.62) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 2 km 10.92 24.54* -4.643 18.92 
(8.357) (13.70) (7.277) (13.78) 
0-km distance reduction 22.08 27.78 -7.728 31.89 
(15.05) (20.00) (10.94) (22.14) 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance > 2 km  
1 km< distance reduction  6.284 11.88 1.037 -4.971 
(7.153) (10.41) (10.28) (8.750) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 2 km -6.702 -2.736 -11.63 9.406 
(5.478) (9.276) (6.991) (9.391) 
0-km distance reduction (reference category) 0 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Observations 2,078 1,210 868 744 
R-squared 0.273 0.290 0.391 0.206 
Notes: As for Table 4.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A10.4    
The effect of municipality–subway distance reduction on individual income from work using a 
distance threshold of two kilometres: nonlinear models 
Dependent variable: change in monthly individual labour 
earnings 2001 to 2006 (in 2001 US$) 
(1) (2) (3) 
All 
individuals 
Women Men 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance ≤ 2 km 
2 km< distance reduction -33.32 47.05 -105.8* 
(36.14) (39.05) (58.12) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 2 km 15.21 11.01 -1.094 
(36.93) (41.53) (60.88) 
0-km distance reduction 32.77 8.794 40.67 
(52.60) (34.91) (93.22) 
Post-treatment municipality–subway distance > 2 km 
2 km< distance reduction -4.268 -66.18 91.78* 
(25.66) (32.03) (33.04) 
0 km< distance reduction ≤ 2 km -7.275 -42.81 32.47 
(25.66) (32.03) (33.04) 
0-km distance reduction (reference category) 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Observations 2,464 1,366 1,098 
R-squared 0.136 0.270 0.187 
Notes: As for Table 4.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
